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teamMemPaths.ts
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import { lstat, realpath } from 'fs/promises'
import { dirname, join, resolve, sep } from 'path'
import { getFeatureValue_CACHED_MAY_BE_STALE } from '../services/analytics/growthbook.js'
import { getErrnoCode } from '../utils/errors.js'
import { getAutoMemPath, isAutoMemoryEnabled } from './paths.js'
/**
* Error thrown when a path validation detects a traversal or injection attempt.
*/
export class PathTraversalError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message)
this.name = 'PathTraversalError'
}
}
/**
* Sanitize a file path key by rejecting dangerous patterns.
* Checks for null bytes, URL-encoded traversals, and other injection vectors.
* Returns the sanitized string or throws PathTraversalError.
*/
function sanitizePathKey(key: string): string {
// Null bytes can truncate paths in C-based syscalls
if (key.includes('\0')) {
throw new PathTraversalError(`Null byte in path key: "${key}"`)
}
// URL-encoded traversals (e.g. %2e%2e%2f = ../)
let decoded: string
try {
decoded = decodeURIComponent(key)
} catch {
// Malformed percent-encoding (e.g. %ZZ, lone %) — not valid URL-encoding,
// so no URL-encoded traversal is possible
decoded = key
}
if (decoded !== key && (decoded.includes('..') || decoded.includes('/'))) {
throw new PathTraversalError(`URL-encoded traversal in path key: "${key}"`)
}
// Unicode normalization attacks: fullwidth ．．／ (U+FF0E U+FF0F) normalize
// to ASCII ../ under NFKC. While path.resolve/fs.writeFile treat these as
// literal bytes (not separators), downstream layers or filesystems may
// normalize — reject for defense-in-depth (PSR M22187 vector 4).
const normalized = key.normalize('NFKC')
if (
normalized !== key &&
(normalized.includes('..') ||
normalized.includes('/') ||
normalized.includes('\\') ||
normalized.includes('\0'))
) {
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Unicode-normalized traversal in path key: "${key}"`,
)
}
// Reject backslashes (Windows path separator used as traversal vector)
if (key.includes('\\')) {
throw new PathTraversalError(`Backslash in path key: "${key}"`)
}
// Reject absolute paths
if (key.startsWith('/')) {
throw new PathTraversalError(`Absolute path key: "${key}"`)
}
return key
}
/**
* Whether team memory features are enabled.
* Team memory is a subdirectory of auto memory, so it requires auto memory
* to be enabled. This keeps all team-memory consumers (prompt, content
* injection, sync watcher, file detection) consistent when auto memory is
* disabled via env var or settings.
*/
export function isTeamMemoryEnabled(): boolean {
if (!isAutoMemoryEnabled()) {
return false
}
return getFeatureValue_CACHED_MAY_BE_STALE('tengu_herring_clock', false)
}
/**
* Returns the team memory path: <memoryBase>/projects/<sanitized-project-root>/memory/team/
* Lives as a subdirectory of the auto-memory directory, scoped per-project.
*/
export function getTeamMemPath(): string {
return (join(getAutoMemPath(), 'team') + sep).normalize('NFC')
}
/**
* Returns the team memory entrypoint: <memoryBase>/projects/<sanitized-project-root>/memory/team/MEMORY.md
* Lives as a subdirectory of the auto-memory directory, scoped per-project.
*/
export function getTeamMemEntrypoint(): string {
return join(getAutoMemPath(), 'team', 'MEMORY.md')
}
/**
* Resolve symlinks for the deepest existing ancestor of a path.
* The target file may not exist yet (we may be about to create it), so we
* walk up the directory tree until realpath() succeeds, then rejoin the
* non-existing tail onto the resolved ancestor.
*
* SECURITY (PSR M22186): path.resolve() does NOT resolve symlinks. An attacker
* who can place a symlink inside teamDir pointing outside (e.g. to
* ~/.ssh/authorized_keys) would pass a resolve()-based containment check.
* Using realpath() on the deepest existing ancestor ensures we compare the
* actual filesystem location, not the symbolic path.
*
*/
async function realpathDeepestExisting(absolutePath: string): Promise<string> {
const tail: string[] = []
let current = absolutePath
// Walk up until realpath succeeds. ENOENT means this segment doesn't exist
// yet; pop it onto the tail and try the parent. ENOTDIR means a non-directory
// component sits in the middle of the path; pop and retry so we can realpath
// the ancestor to detect symlink escapes.
// Loop terminates when we reach the filesystem root (dirname('/') === '/').
for (
let parent = dirname(current);
current !== parent;
parent = dirname(current)
) {
try {
const realCurrent = await realpath(current)
// Rejoin the non-existing tail in reverse order (deepest popped first)
return tail.length === 0
? realCurrent
: join(realCurrent, ...tail.reverse())
} catch (e: unknown) {
const code = getErrnoCode(e)
if (code === 'ENOENT') {
// Could be truly non-existent (safe to walk up) OR a dangling symlink
// whose target doesn't exist. Dangling symlinks are an attack vector:
// writeFile would follow the link and create the target outside teamDir.
// lstat distinguishes: it succeeds for dangling symlinks (the link entry
// itself exists), fails with ENOENT for truly non-existent paths.
try {
const st = await lstat(current)
if (st.isSymbolicLink()) {
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Dangling symlink detected (target does not exist): "${current}"`,
)
}
// lstat succeeded but isn't a symlink — ENOENT from realpath was
// caused by a dangling symlink in an ancestor. Walk up to find it.
} catch (lstatErr: unknown) {
if (lstatErr instanceof PathTraversalError) {
throw lstatErr
}
// lstat also failed (truly non-existent or inaccessible) — safe to walk up.
}
} else if (code === 'ELOOP') {
// Symlink loop — corrupted or malicious filesystem state.
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Symlink loop detected in path: "${current}"`,
)
} else if (code !== 'ENOTDIR' && code !== 'ENAMETOOLONG') {
// EACCES, EIO, etc. — cannot verify containment. Fail closed by wrapping
// as PathTraversalError so the caller can skip this entry gracefully
// instead of aborting the entire batch.
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Cannot verify path containment (${code}): "${current}"`,
)
}
tail.push(current.slice(parent.length + sep.length))
current = parent
}
}
// Reached filesystem root without finding an existing ancestor (rare —
// root normally exists). Fall back to the input; containment check will reject.
return absolutePath
}
/**
* Check whether a real (symlink-resolved) path is within the real team
* memory directory. Both sides are realpath'd so the comparison is between
* canonical filesystem locations.
*
* If teamDir does not exist, returns true (skips the check). This is safe:
* a symlink escape requires a pre-existing symlink inside teamDir, which
* requires teamDir to exist. If there's no directory, there's no symlink,
* and the first-pass string-level containment check is sufficient.
*/
async function isRealPathWithinTeamDir(
realCandidate: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
let realTeamDir: string
try {
// getTeamMemPath() includes a trailing separator; strip it because
// realpath() rejects trailing separators on some platforms.
realTeamDir = await realpath(getTeamMemPath().replace(/[/\\]+$/, ''))
} catch (e: unknown) {
const code = getErrnoCode(e)
if (code === 'ENOENT' || code === 'ENOTDIR') {
// Team dir doesn't exist — symlink escape impossible, skip check.
return true
}
// Unexpected error (EACCES, EIO) — fail closed.
return false
}
if (realCandidate === realTeamDir) {
return true
}
// Prefix-attack protection: require separator after the prefix so that
// "/foo/team-evil" doesn't match "/foo/team".
return realCandidate.startsWith(realTeamDir + sep)
}
/**
* Check if a resolved absolute path is within the team memory directory.
* Uses path.resolve() to convert relative paths and eliminate traversal segments.
* Does NOT resolve symlinks — for write validation use validateTeamMemWritePath()
* or validateTeamMemKey() which include symlink resolution.
*/
export function isTeamMemPath(filePath: string): boolean {
// SECURITY: resolve() converts to absolute and eliminates .. segments,
// preventing path traversal attacks (e.g. "team/../../etc/passwd")
const resolvedPath = resolve(filePath)
const teamDir = getTeamMemPath()
return resolvedPath.startsWith(teamDir)
}
/**
* Validate that an absolute file path is safe for writing to the team memory directory.
* Returns the resolved absolute path if valid.
* Throws PathTraversalError if the path contains injection vectors, escapes the
* directory via .. segments, or escapes via a symlink (PSR M22186).
*/
export async function validateTeamMemWritePath(
filePath: string,
): Promise<string> {
if (filePath.includes('\0')) {
throw new PathTraversalError(`Null byte in path: "${filePath}"`)
}
// First pass: normalize .. segments and check string-level containment.
// This is a fast rejection for obvious traversal attempts before we touch
// the filesystem.
const resolvedPath = resolve(filePath)
const teamDir = getTeamMemPath()
// Prefix attack protection: teamDir already ends with sep (from getTeamMemPath),
// so "team-evil/" won't match "team/"
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(teamDir)) {
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Path escapes team memory directory: "${filePath}"`,
)
}
// Second pass: resolve symlinks on the deepest existing ancestor and verify
// the real path is still within the real team dir. This catches symlink-based
// escapes that path.resolve() alone cannot detect.
const realPath = await realpathDeepestExisting(resolvedPath)
if (!(await isRealPathWithinTeamDir(realPath))) {
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Path escapes team memory directory via symlink: "${filePath}"`,
)
}
return resolvedPath
}
/**
* Validate a relative path key from the server against the team memory directory.
* Sanitizes the key, joins with the team dir, resolves symlinks on the deepest
* existing ancestor, and verifies containment against the real team dir.
* Returns the resolved absolute path.
* Throws PathTraversalError if the key is malicious (PSR M22186).
*/
export async function validateTeamMemKey(relativeKey: string): Promise<string> {
sanitizePathKey(relativeKey)
const teamDir = getTeamMemPath()
const fullPath = join(teamDir, relativeKey)
// First pass: normalize .. segments and check string-level containment.
const resolvedPath = resolve(fullPath)
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(teamDir)) {
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Key escapes team memory directory: "${relativeKey}"`,
)
}
// Second pass: resolve symlinks and verify real containment.
const realPath = await realpathDeepestExisting(resolvedPath)
if (!(await isRealPathWithinTeamDir(realPath))) {
throw new PathTraversalError(
`Key escapes team memory directory via symlink: "${relativeKey}"`,
)
}
return resolvedPath
}
/**
* Check if a file path is within the team memory directory
* and team memory is enabled.
*/
export function isTeamMemFile(filePath: string): boolean {
return isTeamMemoryEnabled() && isTeamMemPath(filePath)
}