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    <description>Technical analysis of AWS security incidents, blast radius patterns, and cloud attack surface insights.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>AWS Security Agent Is GA. What It Does and Doesn&apos;t Do.</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/aws-security-agent-vs-hackaws-cloud</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>AWS launched its autonomous penetration testing agent. It finds XSS, SQLi, and application-layer vulnerabilities. It doesn&apos;t map your IAM blast radius. These are two different problems, and your environment probably has both.</description>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>aws-security</category>
      <category>comparison</category>
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      <title>AWS Credential Theft Has Been Industrialized</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/aws-credential-harvesting-industrialized</link>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>766 hosts compromised. 196 sets of AWS credentials stolen. One operator with a search engine for your secrets. The UAT-10608 campaign isn&apos;t an outlier. It&apos;s the new baseline for how attackers harvest cloud credentials at scale.</description>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>credential-access</category>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>supply-chain</category>
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    <item>
      <title>The Credentials That Live Outside AWS Are the Ones That Get Stolen</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/litellm-teampcp-supply-chain-aws-footholds</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://hackaws.cloud/blog/litellm-teampcp-supply-chain-aws-footholds</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>TeamPCP didn&apos;t attack AWS to steal AWS credentials. They compromised a CI pipeline and waited for the credentials to come to them. The campaign that hit Trivy, LiteLLM, and Checkmarx in 8 days reveals something important about where your AWS keys actually rest.</description>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>supply-chain</category>
      <category>credential-access</category>
      <category>lateral-movement</category>
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      <title>AWS Keeps Breaking Its Own Trust Boundaries</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/aws-security-bulletins-trust-boundary-pattern</link>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>We read every AWS security bulletin from the last six months. The recurring theme isn&apos;t buffer overflows or cryptographic flaws. It&apos;s trust boundary failures that turn minor permissions into full privilege escalation.</description>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>privilege-escalation</category>
      <category>lateral-movement</category>
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    <item>
      <title>93 HackerOne Reports Show the Same AWS Blast Radius Problem</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/ssrf-credential-theft-blast-radius-hackerone</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>We analyzed 1,169 AWS-related HackerOne reports. The dominant pattern: SSRF or leaked credentials become full infrastructure access because nobody measured the blast radius of the compromised identity.</description>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>ssrf</category>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>credential-exposure</category>
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    <item>
      <title>AWS Finally Gave S3 Buckets Their Own Rooms</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/aws-finally-gave-s3-buckets-their-own-rooms</link>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>For years, predictable S3 bucket names let attackers squat resources and hijack AWS services. Account-regional namespaces, launched March 2026, eliminate the entire attack class. Here&apos;s what changed and what you need to do.</description>
      <category>s3</category>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>supply-chain</category>
      <category>shadow-resources</category>
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    <item>
      <title>What the LexisNexis Breach Teaches Us About Blast Radius in AWS</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/blast-radius-lexisnexis-breach</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A single ECS task role with read access to every secret in the account. The LexisNexis breach is a textbook case of why blast radius validation matters.</description>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>secrets-manager</category>
      <category>breach-analysis</category>
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      <title>The Capital One Breach, Seven Years Later: The Blast Radius Problem That Won&apos;t Go Away</title>
      <link>https://hackaws.cloud/blog/capital-one-ssrf-imds-blast-radius</link>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>In 2019, a single SSRF vulnerability turned into 106 million stolen records. AWS shipped IMDSv2. Seven years later, half of EC2 instances still don&apos;t enforce it, and attackers have industrialized the technique.</description>
      <category>blast-radius</category>
      <category>ssrf</category>
      <category>iam</category>
      <category>imds</category>
      <category>breach-analysis</category>
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