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doc: clarify how cp behaves with default acls#2

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andreas-gruenbacher wants to merge 1 commit intocoreutils:masterfrom
andreas-gruenbacher:create-mode
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doc: clarify how cp behaves with default acls#2
andreas-gruenbacher wants to merge 1 commit intocoreutils:masterfrom
andreas-gruenbacher:create-mode

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@andreas-gruenbacher
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The default behavior of cp in the presence of default acls is ill-documented; clarify. (I have explained this here as well: http://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=18748#36)

  • doc/coreutils.texi: Mention that when copying files without preserving
    permissions, the umask or a default acl affect the mode of new files.

* doc/coreutils.texi: Mention that when copying files without preserving
permissions, the umask or a default acl affect the mode of new files.
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pixelb commented Apr 13, 2015

@pixelb pixelb closed this Apr 13, 2015
@andreas-gruenbacher andreas-gruenbacher deleted the create-mode branch April 13, 2015 08:44
pixelb added a commit to pixelb/coreutils that referenced this pull request May 12, 2015
This issue was identified by running the test suite with
http://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/
which is included in GCC 4.8 and enabled with -fsanitize=address

This was checked on Fedora 20 with GCC 4.8 as follows:

  $ yum install libasan  # http://bugzilla.redhat.com/991003
  $ rm -f src/ptx.o
  $ make check AM_CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' SUBDIRS=. VERBOSE=yes
  $ failure identified in tests/test-suite.log

To see this particular failure triggered with multiple files:

  $ src/ptx <(echo a) <(echo a) 2>&1 | asan_symbolize.py -d

=================================================================
==32178==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x60200000e74f at pc 0x435442 bp 0x7fffe8a1b290 sp 0x7fffe8a1b288
READ of size 1 at 0x60200000e74f thread T0
    #0 0x435441 in define_all_fields coreutils/src/ptx.c:1425
    coreutils#1 0x7fa206d31d64 in __libc_start_main ??:?
    coreutils#2 0x42f77c in _start ??:?
0x60200000e74f is located 1 bytes to the left of 3-byte region
[0x60200000e750,0x60200000e753) allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x421809 in realloc ??:?
    coreutils#1 0x439b4e in fread_file coreutils/lib/read-file.c:97
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c047fff9c90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c047fff9ca0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c047fff9cb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c047fff9cc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c047fff9cd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd
=>0x0c047fff9ce0: fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa[fa]03 fa fa fa 00 00
  0x0c047fff9cf0: fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c047fff9d00: fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa
  0x0c047fff9d10: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c047fff9d20: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa
  0x0c047fff9d30: fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:     fa
  Heap right redzone:    fb
  Freed heap region:     fd
  Stack left redzone:    f1
  Stack mid redzone:     f2
  Stack right redzone:   f3
  Stack partial redzone: f4
  Stack after return:    f5
  Stack use after scope: f8
  Global redzone:        f9
  Global init order:     f6
  Poisoned by user:      f7
  ASan internal:         fe
==32178==ABORTING

The initial report and high level analysis were from Jim Meyering...

  "The underlying problem is that swallow_file_in_memory()
  is setting the contents of the global text_buffer for the first file,
  then updating it (clobbering old value) for the second file.
  Yet, some pointers to the initial buffer have been squirreled away
  and later, one of them (keyafter) is presumed to point into
  the new "text_buffer", which it does not.  The subsequent
  SKIP_WHITE_BACKWARDS use backs up "cursor" and goes out of bounds."

* src/ptx.c (text_buffers): Maintain references for the limits of each
buffer corresponding to each file, rather than just the last processed.
(struct OCCURS): Add a member to map back to the corresponding file.
Note normally this could be computed from the "reference" member
rather than needing the extra storage, however this is not possible
when in --references mode.
(find_occurs_in_text): Reference the array rather than a single entry.
(define_all_fields): Likewise.  Also avoid computing the file index
since this is now stored directly.
(main): Update text_buffers[] array rather than a single text_buffer.
* tests/misc/ptx-overrun.sh: Even though this issue is already triggered
with AddressSanitizer, add a new case to demonstrate the whitespace
trimming issue, and to trigger without AddressSanitizer.
Fixes https://bugs.gnu.org/16171
pixelb pushed a commit to pixelb/coreutils that referenced this pull request May 12, 2015
The -fsanitize=address run associated with v8.22-75-gf940fec
failed to check make-prime-list, as src/primes.h is not
regenerated with `make clean`.  Running with -fsanitize=address
indicates a read 1 byte beyond the allocated buffer.

  $ rm src/make-prime-list.o
  $ make AM_CFLAGS=-fsanitize=address src/make-prime-list
  $ src/make-prime-list 5000

=================================================================
==13913==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x61e00000fa43 at pc 0x4016f5 bp 0x7fff9d9840e0 sp 0x7fff9d9840d0
READ of size 1 at 0x61e00000fa43 thread T0
    #0 0x4016f4 in main src/make-prime-list.c:214
    coreutils#1 0x7f98892c5fdf in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x1ffdf)
    coreutils#2 0x401774 (src/make-prime-list+0x401774)

0x61e00000fa43 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2499-byte
region [0x61e00000f080,0x61e00000fa43) allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7f98896ba7b7 in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.1+0x577b7)
    coreutils#1 0x400f3f in xalloc src/make-prime-list.c:163
    coreutils#2 0x400f3f in main src/make-prime-list.c:198

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
src/make-prime-list.c:214 main
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c3c7fff9ef0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c3c7fff9f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c3c7fff9f10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c3c7fff9f20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c3c7fff9f30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c3c7fff9f40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c3c7fff9f50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c3c7fff9f60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c3c7fff9f70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c3c7fff9f80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c3c7fff9f90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:     fa
  ...
==13913==ABORTING

* src/make-prime-list.c (main): Bounds check the incremented index,
before using to access the buffer.
Fixes http://bugs.gnu.org/19784
pixelb added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 7, 2015
This was detected in about 25% of runs with gcc -fsanitize=address

  ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address ...
  READ of size 4 at 0x000000416628 thread T0
    #0 0x40479f in genpattern src/shred.c:782
    #1 0x4050d9 in do_wipefd src/shred.c:921
    #2 0x406203 in wipefile src/shred.c:1175
    #3 0x406b84 in main src/shred.c:1316
    #4 0x7f3454a1ef9f in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x1ff9f)
    #5 0x4025d8 (/tmp/coreutils-8.23/src/shred+0x4025d8)
  0x000000416628 is located 56 bytes to the left of
  global variable '*.LC49' from 'src/shred.c' (0x416660) of size 17
  0x000000416628 is located 12 bytes to the right of
  global variable 'patterns' from 'src/shred.c' (0x416540) of size 220
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow src/shred.c:782

* src/shred.c (gen_patterns): Restrict pattern selection
to the K available, which regressed due to v5.92-1462-g65533e1.
* tests/misc/shred-passes.sh: Add a deterministic test case.
* NEWS: Mention the bug fix.
Fixes http://bugs.gnu.org/20998
hubot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2016
ASAN reported this error for: split -n2/3 /dev/null
  ERROR: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param: (size=-1)
  #0 0x7f0d4c36951d in __asan_memmove (/lib64/libasan.so.2+0x8d51d)
  #1 0x404e06 in memmove /usr/include/bits/string3.h:59
  #2 0x404e06 in bytes_chunk_extract src/split.c:988
  #3 0x404e06 in main src/split.c:1626

Specifically there would be invalid memory access
and subsequent processing if the chunk to be extracted
was beyond the initial amount read from file (which is
currently capped at 128KiB).  This issue is not in a
released version, only being introduced in commit v8.25-4-g62e7af0

* src/split.c (bytes_chunk_extract): The initial_read != SIZE_MAX
should have been combined with && rather than ||, but also this
condition is always true in this function so remove entirely.
* tests/split/b-chunk.sh: Add a test case.

Fixes http://bugs.gnu.org/25003
hubot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2016
This was detected with:
  echo a > a; pr "-S$(printf "\t\t\t")" a -m a > /dev/null
Resulting in ASAN triggering:
  ====================================================
  ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow
  READ of size 1 at 0x00000041b622 thread T0
    #0 0x40506a in print_sep_string ../src/pr.c:2241
    #1 0x407ec4 in read_line ../src/pr.c:2493
    #2 0x40985c in print_page ../src/pr.c:1802
    #3 0x40985c in print_files ../src/pr.c:1618
    #4 0x4036e0 in main ../src/pr.c:1136

* src/pr.c (init_parameters): Ensure we only override the
specified separator when it's a single tab, thus matching
the calculated separator length.
* tests/pr/pr-tests.pl: Add a test case.
* NEWS: Mention the fix.
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