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PEP 522: Rewrite accounting for Nathaniel's feedback#23

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ncoghlan merged 1 commit intopython:masterfrom
ncoghlan:security-sensitive-rng
Jun 20, 2016
Merged

PEP 522: Rewrite accounting for Nathaniel's feedback#23
ncoghlan merged 1 commit intopython:masterfrom
ncoghlan:security-sensitive-rng

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@ncoghlan
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The core proposal (raising BlockingIOError) remains the same,
but the rationale and background sections now go into much more
depth for folks that want it.

The PEP now also explicitly covers the related changes to interpreter
and random module initialization, as well as providing references
to most of the related bugs.python.org messages.

The core proposal (raising BlockingIOError) remains the same,
but the rationale and background sections now go into much more
depth for folks that want it.

The PEP now also explicitly covers the related changes to interpreter
and random module initialization, as well as providing references
to most of the related bugs.python.org messages.
and when it occurs then there is no direct way for userspace to tell it has
happened without querying operating system specific interfaces.

On \*BSD systems, encountering this situation means ``os.urandom()`` will block
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This is a minor nitpick, but AFAICT (could easily be misinformed on one piece of another but):

  • OpenBSD: requires entropy be present before spawning the first userspace process
  • FreeBSD: reads from /dev/urandom and /dev/random block if the RNG is uninitialized, and never afterwards (as described here)
  • NetBSD: acts like Linux

This is why my draft avoided saying anything about *BSD :-)

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3 participants