During trials conducted in a real-world telecom environment in January 2026, the team achieved quantum teleportation over 30 km of commercial fiber cables. The experiment was performed using Qunnect’s commercially available quantum entanglement distribution hardware and Deutsche Telekom’s Berlin quantum infrastructure, representing the first practical test of core components required for a future teleportation service. For this demonstration.”

Pre-print on the details of the quantum teleportation to be found here (origin of text): Deutsche Telekom and Qunnect Successfully Test Quantum Teleportation Over Live Berlin Network – T-Labs %
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From the webpage on the summary:
“The scope of this document is to provide a summary of countries with active PQC programs as context for the Post Quantum Telco analysis. This is not an exhaustive list and is intended to be indicative only. Given the rapidly evolving area for governments globally, ongoing monitoring is required to ensure consistency with strategic plans and roadmaps.

Note: This section has been updated (to 23 Feb 2026) include the latest guidance from the listed countries. For ease of reference countries have been included even if there is no update since Dec 2022.”

More information and origin of text: https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/post-quantum-government-initiatives-by-country-and-region/
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From the blog post:
“Today we’re announcing a new program in Chrome to make HTTPS certificates secure against quantum computers. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) recently created a working group, PKI, Logs, And Tree Signatures (“PLANTS”), aiming to address the performance and bandwidth challenges that the increased size of quantum-resistant cryptography introduces into TLS connections requiring Certificate Transparency (CT). We recently shared our call to action to secure quantum computing and have written about challenges introduced by quantum-resistant cryptography and some of the steps we’ve taken to address them in earlier blog posts.

To ensure the scalability and efficiency of the ecosystem, Chrome has no immediate plan to add traditional X.509 certificates containing post-quantum cryptography to the Chrome Root Store. Instead, Chrome, in collaboration with other partners, is developing an evolution of HTTPS certificates based on Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs), currently in development in the PLANTS working group. MTCs replace the heavy, serialized chain of signatures found in traditional PKI with compact Merkle Tree proofs. In this model, a Certification Authority (CA) signs a single “Tree Head” representing potentially millions of certificates, and the “certificate” sent to the browser is merely a lightweight proof of inclusion in that tree.”

Merkle Trees Certificates at IETF Datatracker: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-merkle-tree-certs/
Full text and origin of the text above: https://security.googleblog.com/2026/02/cultivating-robust-and-efficient.html?m=1
Picture: NMWP

From the webpage on the report:
“- The rise of quantum computing introduces systemic risks to cybersecurity but also creates the opportunity to elevate cryptography as a strategic asset that enhances business resilience.

• Three practices – cryptographic inventory, cryptographic agility and cryptographic defence-in-depth – underpin a resilient cryptographic framework.
• To thrive amid uncertainty, organizations should proactively harness emerging technologies, make informed choices and manage cryptography with long-term resilience and risk management in mind.

As quantum computing advances, it brings unprecedented opportunities as well as significant threats. One major concern is that it could break the cryptographic systems that underpin our digital trust today.
By the mid to late 2030s, quantum computers are predicted to have the potential to compromise today’s widely used encryption and authentication systems, specifically asymmetric cryptography based on public and private keys. Without the right and timely action, quantum computers could jeopardize digital security on a global scale. […]

Here, we set out a new vision for quantum safety: that the quantum-safe migration is a unique opportunity for organizations to rethink and modernize their cybersecurity strategies, elevating cryptography as an asset that enhances business resilience.”

https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/quantum-safe-migration-cryptography-cybersecurity
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From the webpage of the event:
“International Conference on Quantum Cryptography (ICQC – 2026) […] to provide an excellent international platform for the academicians, researchers, engineers, industrial participants and budding students around the world to SHARE their research findings with the global experts.

The key intention of ICQC is to provide opportunity for the global participants to share their ideas and experience in person with their peers expected to join from different parts on the world. In addition this gathering will help the delegates to establish research or business relations as well as to find international linkage for future collaborations in their career path.”

More information, registration and origin of text: https://inexed.org/Conference/27664/ICQC
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From the webpage of the event:
“QCNC 2026 provides a forum for academic researchers and industry practitioners to present research progresses, exchange new ideas, and identify future directions in the field of Quantum Communications, Networking, and Computing. […]

• Track 1: Quantum Communications and Networks
• Track 2: Quantum Computing and Sensing
• Track 3: Quantum Key Distribution & Security Implications of Emerging Quantum Technologies
• Track 4: Quantum Simulations, Prototypes, Testbeds and Applications”

More information, registration and origin of text: https://www.ieee-qcnc.org/2026
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From the webpage on the report:
“In the next decade quantum computers are likely to become powerful enough to break widely used public-key encryption. The economic and geopolitical consequences of not preparing for this so-called Q-day could be severe as it would result in the disruption of current digital security.

In our view, organizations that rely on digital encryption and require long timelines for information privacy, should focus now on implementing established post-quantum cryptography standards.

Key Takeaways

• Post-quantum cryptography is key to combatting quantum threats: The challenge is not the lack of a solution, but the difficulty of implementing the right solution at scale. For data that requires long-term confidentiality, retroactive cracking of encryption makes action now urgent.
• Vulnerable systems must move to quantum-safe alternatives: Quantum readiness starts with a clear sequence of actions that identify exposure, prioritize critical systems, enable agility, guide migration and sustain long-term resilience.
• Crypto’s quantum risks need addressing: For Bitcoin, public key exposure applies to only about 25% of coins. For other blockchains, the majority of coins are vulnerable. But these newer blockchains can move faster”

More information, full text and origin of the text above: https://www.citigroup.com/global/insights/quantum-threat
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From the announcement:
“Seamless Post-Quantum Transition: Agile and Efficient Encryption for Data-at-Rest:

As quantum computing matures, its impact on traditional cryptographic protocols becomes increasingly critical, especially for data-at-rest scenarios where large data sets remain encrypted for extended periods of time. This paper addresses the pressing need to transition away from pre-quantum algorithms by presenting an agile cryptosystem that securely and efficiently supports post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs).

Relaxing the Single Point of Failure in Quantum Key Distribution Networks: An Overview of Multi-path Approaches

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks are receiving growing attention by researchers and funding agencies, with the largest projects spanning hundreds of kilometers and large, multi-national initiatives well under way. The growing scale of QKD networks poses some extra challenges, in particular due to the current impossibility of establishing end-to-end security between nodes: for large distances, reliance on intermediate trusted nodes is required, an aspect which increases the attack surface of QKD networks. A possible mitigation strategy for this problem lies in leveraging the complexity of the network: by making use of multiple paths and applying techniques issued from cryptography and/or error-correcting theory, it is possible to mitigate some attacks and force an adversary to compromise more nodes in the network.

This paper discusses relevant approaches to leverage multi-path aspects of QKD networks for increased security, analyzing the different security assumptions, guarantees, and performance of different techniques, and presenting their applicability to the different networks.”

More information and origin of text: https://piqaso1.substack.com/p/two-new-papers-published-by-unibwm
Picture: Universität der Bundeswehr München

• How intelligence and law enforcement agencies will operate with the expansion of end-to-end encryption and post-quantum cryptography;
• Preparing for the future impact of quantum computing on encryption standards, and/or;
• Developing quantum-safe cryptographic methods for national security applications.”

• Origin of text: https://www.researchireland.ie/funding/public-service-fellowship/projects/
• More specifically described in the call document: https://media.researchireland.ie/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/NCSC2_PostQuantumCryptography.docx
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From the webpage on the summary:
“The policy framework outlines the general issues related to cryptography policy within the Central Government. It is meant to provide relevant frameworks for central government agencies that will lead the procedures, architecture and design principles regarding cryptography.

This new policy framework is mandatory for the Central Government. However, it can also serve as a guideline for other government organisations that wish to establish or update their cryptography policies. The framework provides a comprehensive overview of cryptography policy and outlines the technical aspects of cryptography that require decision-making.”

Englisch version now available as PDF here/origin of text: https://www.nldigitalgovernment.nl/news/new-quantum-cryptography-policy-framework/
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