My contribution to this issue was a speculative scenario that imagined how our choices could shape the future. The scenario I created, “Dispatch from 2050”, explored how African-led institutions, youth-driven innovation and ethical AI could play a critical role in maintaining orbital safety. At the heart of these issues lies a fundamental question: how do we ensure that the tools we build to safeguard space do not become sources of division or conflict? This question inspired the creative exercise that follows.

_{In the “Dispatch from 2050” scenario, a critical incident unfolded when a privately operated constellation and a State-led constellation entered conflict over contested frequency bands. Their automated systems, designed to respond independently to perceived threats, initiated a series of uncoordinated manoeuvres. These movements placed both networks on a trajectory that could have resulted in a catastrophic chain reaction of collisions.}

_{To address these mounting risks, African institutions had helped establish the Lusaka Protocol code 101e in 2047, a multilateral agreement aimed at regulating AI assisted decision making in orbit. The Lusaka Protocol code 101e emerged from years of growing concern that existing space governance instruments were ill equipped to manage the rise of autonomous decision making in orbit.}

_{During the crisis, a youth-developed AI system at the Lusaka Orbital Institute detected irregular movement patterns earlier than any human operator could. It predicted the likelihood of a collision and triggered an alert under the Lusaka Protocol code 101e. In response, an Emergency Orbital Hold was activated, freezing high-risk trajectories long enough to prevent immediate impact.}

This scenario, though speculative, reflects trends that are already emerging today. Research shows a rapid expansion of mega-constellations and increasing congestion in low Earth orbit (LEO), raising concerns about collision risks and frequency interference. Participating in the discussion around space policy and security initiatives firsthand has shown me that managing space security challenges requires more than advanced technology. It demands foresight, coordination, and inclusive governance frameworks that allow countries, private operators, and even youth to collaborate rather than compete in ways that could escalate into crises.

Ethical AI and governance in Earth’s orbit

The proliferation of satellites has transformed LEO into one of the busiest environments managed by humankind. Mega constellations, numbering in the thousands of satellites, are redefining connectivity, but also magnifying risks. Frequency interference, orbital crowding, and cascading collision hazards now pose systemic challenges.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed to monitor orbital traffic without continuous human intervention, predict collisions, and optimize frequencies. AI-driven conjunction assessment systems can generate earlier and more precise collision warnings, allowing operators to plan avoidance manoeuvres with reduced fuel costs and minimal disruption to satellite services.

For instance, private companies like Leo Labs use AI-powered radar systems to track thousands of objects in LEO, enabling rapid detection of potential collisions. Intergovernmental and national space agencies, such as the European Space Operations Centre and NASA, also employ AI algorithms to optimize satellite constellation management and reduce congestion risks. These innovations illustrate thatfaster, more accurate monitoring can be an opportunity to prevent accidents, maintain the reliability of satellite services, and support global connectivity. However, risks arise when different operators’ AI systems act independently, potentially leading to uncoordinated manoeuvres. 

The autonomy of these systems also raises new dilemmas. Automated collision avoidance systems operating without shared coordination frameworks may respond to the same perceived challenge in conflicting ways, increasing the chances of secondary conjunctions. Another thing to consider is that private algorithms might determine orbital priorities without human oversight, creating opaque decision making that could undermine coordination and safety.

Current legal and normative frameworks, such as the Outer Space Treaty, provide broad principles of peaceful use but do not explicitly address AI-driven decision making. As autonomous systems, including AI-enabled ones, take on operational control in orbit, new governance tools will be needed. The imagined Lusaka Protocol code 101e offers one such conceptual solution, anchoring decision making in ethical AI design, transparency and inclusive diplomacy.

African institutions are beginning to explore solutions in this space. For example, the South African National Space Agency is developing AI- and data-driven tools for space situational awareness, including monitoring orbital debris and supporting national and regional satellite operations. In academia, the University of Cape Town is conducting research into AI applications for satellite traffic management, while private startups in Nigeria and Kenya are exploring small satellite constellations with integrated AI for improved frequency coordination and orbital safety. These initiatives demonstrate the potential for African-led contributions to global space governance. This fills an important knowledge gap and ensures that African perspectives are represented in emerging norms and standards.

Taken together, these examples reveal that the challenge posed by AI in orbital management is not just technological capacity but governance alignment. While AI systems can significantly enhance safety, efficiency and sustainability, their benefits depend on coordination, transparency and shared rules of engagement among operators. Without common standards for data sharing, decision-making logic, and human oversight, autonomous systems risk reproducing fragmentation in orbit. This dynamic is particularly consequential for emerging space actors, as unequal access to data, infrastructure and governance forums may reinforce existing power asymmetries.

International dialogue is evolving to address these issues. For example, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs has begun exploring the responsible use of emerging technologies such as AI in relation to space. The 2023 REAIM Call to Action, which received wide international support, underscores the global commitment to responsible AI use in the military domain. Furthermore, the OECD Recommendations on AI  provide guidance on how to improve trustworthiness in AI systems. They offer a useful framework for assessing future AI-enabled orbital management systems, particularly in relation to the transparency of automated decisions, accountability for harm, and preservation of human control over safety in critical domains.

In the African context, scholars are beginning to explore how indigenous ethical systems, such as Ubuntu, could influence AI ethics by emphasizing communality, interconnectedness and shared responsibility. Such contributions show the need to define and operationalize African perspectives within AI policy frameworks.

Building the future we imagine

The imagined orbital crisis of 2050 might seem distant, but the seeds of prevention must be planted now. Governance of AI-driven decision-making systems in space remains underdeveloped. Recent research highlights how governance of AI-enabled space technologies is often reactive, with policy frameworks emerging only after risks or crises materialize. These frameworks should instead employ foresight, human oversight, and accountability at the design stage. This would ensure that systems managing space assets reflect collective human values.

In my “Dispatch from 2050” fictional scenario, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e was not written by domain experts alone, but together with storytellers, elders, scientists, and youth from Lusaka. The future of space governance must be inclusive. Historically, decisions about space exploration have been concentrated among a few nations. The UN Space 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Space Policy and Strategy demonstrate growing recognition of the Global South’s role in shaping the future of space.

Africa, in particular, has shown leadership through data-driven projects in Earth observation, climate monitoring, and satellite innovation. Zambia’s increasing participation in technology innovation highlights the transformative power of youth-led research and policy development. Ethical AI systems developed by African institutions can ensure that space technologies serve developmental goals improving agriculture, education and disaster response while aligning with local values and human rights.

Internationally, instruments like the envisioned Lusaka Protocol code 101e could formalize ethical obligations, much as the Paris Agreement did for climate. At UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025,  Zhanna Malekos Smith emphasized how data ethics underpins responsible governance in emerging technologies, providing a concrete example of how ethical practices in AI and data management can strengthen trust and accountability in space operations. Just as physical debris threatens satellites, ethical neglect threatens the stability of governance.

The 2050 vision where inclusively constructed AI systems protect Earth’s orbit may seem aspirational, yet it is built on principles we can adopt today. The fictional Lusaka Protocol code 101e reflects the real potential of collaborative, human-centred innovation. If we succeed, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e of tomorrow will not be fictional, but a living embodiment of a world that chooses dialogue over dominance, inclusion over isolation, and ethics over expediency. In the end, space security is not about protecting satellites, it is about protecting our shared future.

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Kondwani Mbale is an Artificial Intelligence student at the Specialized Institute of Applied Technology — City of Trades and Skills. His work focuses on computer vision, data analysis and intelligent systems. He has participated in international initiatives, including the ICANN80 NextGen programme and the FIRST Global Challenges, and is a laureate of the International Youth Competition of Scientific and Sci-Fi Works.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Kondwani Mbale, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post Preventing orbital crises with ethical AI first appeared on UNIDIR.

All engineering systems are developed across a lifecycle which generally consists of stages which include planning, development, implementation, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning.

The latter is an integral part of the systems engineering lifecycle process. The current opacity around decommissioning practices for AI systems, particularly military AI systems, leaves a gap in the understanding of their complete lifecycle. All systems ultimately have an end-of-life; that is, a point at which they are no longer fit for purpose and continuing to operate a system beyond this point presents both safety and legal risks.

This project will specifically focus on the decommissioning phase of AI-enabled military systems.

Unpacking decommissioning

What distinguishes decommissioning considerations of AI-enabled systems from that of conventional engineering counterparts is their software-driven nature. While many are cyber-physical systems (having both software and hardware components), it is the software component which introduces unique points of consideration.

Software is intangible and not subject to physical degradation or erosion over time. Its malleability and amorphousness also mean it changes with time. These factors impact when, why and how these systems are decommissioned.

The increasingly intertwined relationship between civil and military technology sectors, evident through data sharing and capacity building, adds an additional layer of complexity to decommissioning. The overlapping uses and applications of AI-enabled technologies and their infrastructure across these two domains also impacts when, why and how these systems are decommissioned.

The journey ahead

UNIDIR’s project will investigate the end-of-life of AI systems, presenting a framework to determine when a software-enabled system is no longer fit for purpose. It will also explore how these systems can be subsequently decommissioned.

Over the next two years, this research initiative will focus on:

1. Determining what constitutes the end-of-life of software.
2. Exploring different forms of decommissioning.
3. Understanding repurposing as a form of decommissioning.

In addition, the decommissioning of AI-systems project will convene multidisciplinary expert workshops across different regions to inform and advance this research.

Led by UNIDIR Fellow Associate Professor Zena Assad, the research is conducted in collaboration with UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme. To learn more about the project or to get involved, please contact [email protected].

The post Decommissioning military AI systems first appeared on UNIDIR.

This reflection shaped my contribution to the OS25 youth video competition, in which I argued that a 2050 hypothetical orbital conflict should be understood as a realistic possibility shaped by decisions being made today. Rather than treating 2050 as an abstract endpoint, I framed it as the cumulative outcome of present choices on access, responsibility and restraint in an increasingly congested orbital environment. The question we should be asking is therefore not what the future of space will look like, but rather what kind of orbital environment are we creating today.

Shared risks and uneven decision-making

The rapid expansion of human activity in low Earth orbit (LEO) represents a remarkable technological achievement. At the same time, it has introduced governance challenges that existing frameworks were not designed to manage. Hundreds of satellites are now launched each year, increasing congestion, collision risks, and the accumulation of long-lasting debris. Satellite tracking data shows how sharply the orbital population has grown over the past decade, driven by the deployment of large-scale mega constellations.
 
Technological tools such as improved tracking and collision-avoidance systems have developed quickly, but they cannot replace governance arrangements capable of managing collective risk. Many of the coordination mechanisms relied upon today were shaped in an era when space activity was slower, less crowded, and primarily State-led.

International space law, including the Outer Space Treaty, continues to provide essential principles and remains a cornerstone of space governance. However, as became clear during OS25 discussions, the current law alone cannot address the operational realities of a highly congested and commercially active orbital environment. The challenge is not the absence of rules, but the growing gap between legal principles and how space activity is conducted in practice.

States and private companies with advanced space capabilities now play a decisive role in shaping access to orbit. For non-spacefaring and space-nascent States, this often translates into reliance on external operators for critical services such as climate monitoring, navigation, communications, and disaster response. While these services deliver significant benefits, they also create new dependencies and vulnerabilities that risk reproducing familiar inequalities seen in other global commons. These include climate governance or international telecommunications, within a domain that was once imagined as universally shared.

One of the clearest examples of a shared threat discussed during OS25 was the long-term impact of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests on orbital sustainability. During Panel II, experts highlighted how kinetic ASAT tests contribute to persistent debris and increased collision risk in LEO. Data compiled by the Secure World Foundation show that kinetic ASAT tests alone have produced thousands of trackable debris objects, many of which will remain in orbit well into the coming decades.

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has repeatedly highlighted space debris as a growing threat to the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, emphasising the need for collective mitigation efforts. Technical assessments by the European Space Agency further demonstrate how debris generated by single events can increase collision probabilities over time, creating cascading risks that affect all operators regardless of their role in the original action.

Commercial activity adds another layer of complexity as private operators are rapidly occupying orbital slots and radio-frequency spectrum, often faster than international coordination mechanisms can support. International space law – most notably article VI of the Outer Space Treaty – establishes that States bear international responsibility for all national space activities. This includes those carried out by non-governmental actors, such as commercial entities, under their authorization and continuing supervision. However, it remains far less clear how the cumulative risks created by these activities should be assessed and managed collectively in an increasingly crowded orbital environment.

The growing integration of artificial intelligence introduces additional governance challenges. These capabilities offer clear operational advantages, yet they also raise difficult questions about accountability and oversight. Autonomous systems are distinctive because they can execute operational decisions in real time without direct human authorization. In this context, decision-making unfolds on timescales that far outpaces diplomatic coordination or regulatory intervention. In the event of an error or unintended interaction, responsibility may be difficult to trace – particularly when decision-making is distributed across multiple actors and jurisdictions.

These multifaceted developments highlight a broader pattern where technological capabilities advance more rapidly than the institutional capacity to govern them. Addressing these gaps will require a shared understanding of acceptable risk, restraint and responsibility.

Rethinking space security through justice

Discussions throughout OS25 repeatedly returned to the idea that space security cannot be measured solely through technological strength or strategic advantage. Over time, I came to see justice, not as a moral add-on, but as a practical requirement for sustainable governance. Operationalizing orbital governance from a justice lens can be understood in the following ways.

Distributive justice shapes who benefits from space-based services and who remains dependent on others for access. This concern is increasingly reflected in UN discussions around the implementation of the Space2030 Agenda. Notably related work under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space emphasise improving access to space science, technology and data so that all States can benefit socioeconomically from space-derived services.

Procedural justice is concerned with who participates in shaping the rules that govern orbit. Current initiatives within UNOOSA, for example, highlight that including non-space-faring and space-nascent States strengthens legitimacy and trust in shared environments such as outer space. Likewise past space security initiatives like the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, made sure to open participation to all States and additional stakeholders.

Intergenerational justice is a concept central to environmental governance and is increasingly applied to space, particularly in discussions concerning space sustainability. It emphasises preservation of the orbital environment for future generations.

Recent policy-oriented research reflects this shift toward justice-based approaches, arguing that long-term stability in outer space depends on sustainability and collective risk reduction rather than dominance alone.

Youth participation as a governance lens

Youth are often described as future decision-makers, yet UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025 made clear that meaningful participation matters in the present. As a youth participant, I found that our role was not to offer idealism, but to ask questions that are sometimes avoided like whose security is prioritized, how is risk distributed, and whether current practices align with long-term goals.

One insight that stayed with me was how differently States understand the concept of security in orbit. For some, security is framed primarily in terms of protection and resilience, while for others, it is understood through restraint and risk reduction. These differences are rarely articulated explicitly, yet they shape negotiations and governance outcomes in meaningful ways.

Framing 2050 as a realistic governance horizon helped ground these discussions. It encouraged a shift away from reactive thinking toward preventive approaches, and from short-term competition toward shared responsibility. In this way, youth participation contributed not sentiment, but perspective, particularly by extending the time horizons through which space security is evaluated.

Outer space does not generate inequalities on its own; it reflects and amplifies the decisions we make. Our orbital environment can remain a domain of shared progress if it is governed through transparency, inclusion, and long-term responsibility. Preserving Earth’s orbit, therefore, is not only about managing congestion or preventing conflict. It requires confronting distributive, procedural, and intergenerational justice in the way access is structured, decisions are made, and risks are distributed. If governance mechanisms remain fragmented while activity intensifies, existing asymmetries risk becoming permanently embedded above our heads.

Emily Karakoleva is an international relations student and served as the Bulgarian Youth Delegate to the United Nations (2024–2025). Her work focuses on youth participation in global governance and international policy processes. She has represented Bulgarian youth in international forums, including the UN General Assembly Third Committee, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, and the UNESCO Youth Forum, and serves as a European Climate Pact Ambassador.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Emily Karakoleva, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post The impact of orbital governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

Improving coordination is essential, yet in many contexts it is difficult to obtain the information needed to coordinate effectively. Limited access to data, remote locations and fragmented systems often make it difficult to gather information regularly. Even when data exists, it may be incomplete, outdated, interpreted inconsistently across actors, or simply not used when decisions are made. These gaps make it harder for actors to understand needs accurately and reach the people who require support most urgently.

From fragmented data to coordinated action

When information from multiple sources is brought together, the picture becomes clearer. Integrated data systems, dashboards and mapping tools can help actors to better understand what has happened, what the needs are and how best to respond. These tools can make it easier to identify gaps, reduce duplication and support more coordinated planning. They do not solve the underlying challenges on their own, but they provide a stronger foundation for timely and informed decision‑making in fast‑moving environments to support communities in urgent need.

This vision reflects the direction set by the UN Secretary‑General’s data strategy, which calls for improved data access, stronger interoperability and more timely data‑driven decision‑making across the system. The strategy recognizes that better information alone is not enough, but that when data is accessible, connected and responsibly used, it provides an integrated platform for coordinated and effective action in complex environments.

The promise and limits of technological change

To improve coordination, we need to do it fast, using high quality information, and with a holistic approach.

Technology plays an important role in enabling this shift. Digitization accelerates the flow of information. Data can now be collected from remote locations using mobile devices, coordination across multiple actors is supported through integrated data management platforms, and analysis that once required lengthy manual steps can be automated by different analytical tools. These advances make it possible to respond to the needs of conflict affected populations in more targeted and timely ways. Instead of navigating slow, fragmented and manual systems, actors can focus on understanding needs and directing support where it is most urgently required.

Early in my data career, when I first began working with a local NGO during the Rohingya refugee response in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, technology had barely reached the remote camp areas scattered across the hills and mountains. We collected information over the phone or through paper‑based questionnaires: a slow, manual process that was far from ideal in an emergency response, where every minute matters.

When we transitioned to an ODK‑based data collection system, everything changed. Instead of chasing phone calls and sorting through stacks of paper, field teams could send data directly from their mobile devices. As the information came in, we could analyse and visualize it within minutes. That shift dramatically improved the speed and quality of our decision‑making, allowing teams on the ground to respond faster and with far greater confidence.

Rabby Shakur, UNIDIR Associate Researcher

But even with better systems and new technology, the way information is presented still needs to work for the people who use it. Many actors are already stretched thin, juggling several crises at once and expected to do more with fewer resources. If tools are complicated or take extra time to learn, they can become a burden rather than an asset for the actors. Formats need to be simple, practical and easy to use so that busy teams can quickly understand the information and act on it. When data is presented in a way that fits how people actually work, it is far more likely to support real decision-making.

This focus on usability also aligns with the broader direction of the UN80 initiative, which the UN Secretary-General has framed as essential to reducing duplication, strengthening coherence and enabling the UN system to operate more efficiently with limited resources. While still in process, the initiative reflects the direction set out in statements from the Secretary-General and in guidance circulated by Guy Ryder and senior leadership emphasizing clearer roles, shared approaches and more streamlined ways of working. By simplifying processes and reducing unnecessary complexity, UN80 seeks to ensure that actors can spend less time navigating systems and more time supporting people in need.

Beyond accessibility and usability, data must be reliable, ethically collected and managed and interpreted carefully. Poor-quality or misinterpreted data can reinforce blind spots rather than resolve them. Strong systems must therefore be accompanied by strong analytical capacity and governance frameworks that ensure ethical generation and use.

Ethical implications behind the numbers

Research findings that are usually disseminated via static outputs, such as reports and briefings, may sometimes limit the ability to respond to immediate questions. To realize the full value of the data collected, interactive and comparative data dashboards transform these findings into dynamic, user-friendly visualizations, on the one hand allowing deeper engagement, and on the other, maximizing the utility of this information for all. The latter is an underappreciated ethical imperative.

The focus on ethics in research is often at the design and implementation stage – ensuring respondents are fully informed, consent protocols are followed and personal information is protected. Yet, while each of these steps is essential, this is only one aspect of ethical research.

In considering ethics in this discussion, we especially address the moral responsibility that arises when research involves vulnerable people impacted by conflict. It is incumbent upon researchers to ensure that the data generated from their time and engagement is fully utilized and shared in recognition of the burden of their engagement and as part of efforts to ensure they are not overly interviewed.  The UN, as an organization that promotes values like human rights, dignity and the protection of vulnerable populations, should be at the forefront of this type of ethical data use especially as UN actors seek to fulfill the Secretary-General’s data strategy vision.

Evidence that is collected from vulnerable, conflict-affected populations, but remains underused, inaccessible, or disconnected from policy and practice risks falling short of this ethical responsibility. In this sense, effective communication of research findings becomes part of ethical research practice, not merely a dissemination task.

Delivering results in a format that meets the need to inform real-time decisions is an ethical obligation to ensure that research is meaningfully used. Doing so via visual tools becomes increasingly critical, especially when addressing policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders working across conflict transition contexts, often operating under time constraints.

Data is never just numbers. It is a human story – originated from someone who asked a question and shaped by the lived experience of someone who answered. Behind every number is a life, a story, a moment of trust.

Clara Zuccarino, UNIDIR Graduate Professional

At UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project, we encounter these dynamics directly. The project conducts research to understand how and why individuals exit armed conflict, and how institutions can better support those transitions. Reintegration processes for individuals leaving armed groups are complex and deeply context specific. Generating rigorous evidence and assessments on conflict trajectories is essential to understanding what contributes to sustainable reintegration outcomes. However, research findings must be accessible if they are to inform real-world decisions.

By transforming UNIDIR’s evidence into accessible data portals and visualizations, we aim to make it easier for policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to translate evidence into action. The goal is not only to produce knowledge, but to ensure that it can inform planning, coordination and programmatic adjustments in meaningful ways and in semi-real time.

Maximizing the public value of evidence for future initiatives

Today, the UN system is asked to respond to complex global challenges amid tightening resources, resulting in both a practical and ethical responsibility to maximize the public value of data. Evidence generated through significant investment of time and trust by participants should not remain underused.

Evidence, however, is not an end in itself. Data has limitations, but strengthening how evidence is interpreted and applied across the system is both an efficiency measure and a commitment to ethical, impactful research and assessment. When information is translated into forms that genuinely support decision-making and shared responsibly in accessible formats such as dashboards or analytical tools, it becomes a foundation for more informed decisions in complex conflict response, ultimately improving outcomes for the populations the UN seeks to serve.

Mohammed Rabby Shakur is an Associate Researcher with UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict project. Previously, he served as an Information Management Delegate with the Finnish Red Cross in Ethiopia, as a Senior Information Management Officer with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Bangladesh, and as a Management Information System Officer with BRAC in Bangladesh. He has also worked as a consultant with the United Nations. Rabby holds a bachelor’s degree in management information systems from North South University. 

Clara Zuccarino was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Strategic Communications Unit. She holds a master’s in international and development studies from the Geneva Graduate Institute and a bachelor’s in philosophy, international and economic studies from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, where she graduated cum laude. Previously, Clara worked at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on media and social media relations and strategy with multiple international stakeholders.

The post Data and digital tools driving more effective conflict response first appeared on UNIDIR.

Arms control and disarmament measures are often absent from multilateral discussions concerning the WPS Agenda. Yet at the national level, States are increasingly connecting these policy areas through their National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS.

UNIDIR’s recently released Closing Gaps report analyzed 197 NAPs on WPS, revealing that over 70% include at least one mention to arms control and disarmament issues. However, most of these references appear only in introductory sections, rather than under proposed actions. To support States with moving from recognition to implementation, UNIDIR gathered concrete examples of actions and indicators that can advance the WPS Agenda and prepared a practical toolkit for addressing weapons-related risks in NAPs. These resources formed a key foundation for discussions throughout the workshop.

A diverse group of engaged actors

The event brought together more than 30 experts from a dozen European countries – including Albania, Austria, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Participants represented a wide range of stakeholders, including officials from ministries, gender equality agencies, military and academic institutions, national cybersecurity authorities, civil society and international organizations.

The workshop opened with high-level remarks from Slovenian officials Neva Grašič, State Secretary, and Darja Bavdaž Kuret, Ambassador-at-Large for Women, Peace and Security. Both highlighted the urgency of addressing evolving security risks — including weapons proliferation, hybrid warfare and emerging technologies — through a gender-responsive lens. They also stressed the importance of full, meaningful and equal participation of women in all areas of international security, which is one of the main pillars of the WPS Agenda.

Gendered dimensions of weapons, technology and security

The programme included thematic sessions outlining how gender-related considerations shape demand for, as well as impacts of, firearms in the region. Participants discussed options to strengthen arms control and disarmament measures that also seek to prevent the occurrence of sexual and gender‑based violence, in line with the WPS Agenda.

Given current developments concerning the use of landmines, the workshop also featured experts working with mine action in a number of contexts. They shared common challenges and good practices to foster inclusive participation in demining, risk education, victim assistance and international cooperation.

Participants also had an opportunity to discuss cybersecurity and military applications of artificial intelligence. They explored how these technologies intersect with the WPS Agenda and how national actors can integrate these topics into their work, including in WPS NAPs. This can help to ensure that the WPS framework remains relevant in the digital age, and efforts around addressing challenges and opportunities created by new technologies are not undertaken in silos.

Learning by doing

One of the highlights of the programme was a hands-on simulation, where participants split into two groups, taking on distinct roles in a drafting exercise focused on developing a WPS NAP that included specific arms control and disarmament measures. This exercise aimed at providing national actors with concrete ideas on how to integrate arms control and disarmament into their WPS design, drafting process and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation efforts.

The workshop concluded with renewed commitment from participants and new networks that will foster regional cooperation on arms control, disarmament and the WPS Agenda. UNIDIR and its partners will continue supporting States in advancing an inclusive approach to arms control and disarmament – one that ensures that gender equality and the WPS Agenda are not seen as add-on considerations, but rather central elements of international security.

The post UNIDIR delivers regional workshop in Slovenia to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda first appeared on UNIDIR.

For much of modern history, outer space has been contested in the popular imagination. Since the Cold War, it has been viewed as a domain for geopolitical competition through technological supremacy. In recent decades, public debate has been shaped as much by science fiction as by the material realities of space infrastructure concerning space exploration, the militarisation of outer space and a growing space industry.

As discussed at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025, space is central to daily lives for everyday citizens. Space systems provide Earth observation (EO) data used to monitor agriculture, track pollution and disaster management, as well as positioning, navigation and timing systems that support telecommunications, civilian aviation and international commerce. EO data is also used for military purposes including intelligence gathering, targeting and mission planning, and weapons deployment.

Space systems are so embedded in daily life that they are paradoxically mundane, such that, their presence often goes unnoticed. However, public understanding of space remains uneven, frequently shaped by the flashier and more sensational aspects of space activity – such as exploration missions and space entrepreneurs – rather than by its social, economic and political functions. Space literacy is one response to this gap.

In the absence of a single agreed definition, space literacy can be understood through a civic lens as the capacity to understand and engage with space as a public issue. It is also a form of civic preparedness for space security: when people understand why space matters to everyday life, they are more likely to participate meaningfully in public debates and policy decisions surrounding the resilience, governance and protection of space systems.

At present, discussions about space security often remain confined to academics, technical experts, international diplomats and industry leaders. Education and science communication play key roles in broadening participation and bringing space security into wider public conversation. 

Space as a civic issue

While outer space itself is governed as a global commons, many of these space-enabled services function as public goods that deliver broad benefit to entire communities and directly support all 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals. Civics is about how citizens understand and participate in the systems, institutions and decisions that influence public life.

It is key in a sector that is highly technological, heavily reliant on public investment, increasingly shaped by public–private collaboration and sensitive to government spending decisions. Framing space as a civic issue brings it into the public sphere and equips citizens to engage in debates about funding, environmental impacts, commercial activity and national security. This, in turn, strengthens democratic accountability and informed public participation.

To understand why space should be treated as a civic issue, it is helpful to view space systems through four segments that show how space touches different layers of society and carries civic relevance for diverse stakeholders.

As discussed at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025, if space systems were compromised, the effects would cascade across critical sectors and touch multiple international security dimensions.

The loss of space capabilities would affect environmental and climate security by weakening extreme-weather monitoring, threaten human security by disrupting humanitarian coordination and disaster response, and jeopardize economic and national security as financial systems, supply chains and critical infrastructure become compromised.

Treating space as a civic concern builds public awareness and buy-in for responsible behaviour and governance of space systems. It broadens the conversation to include the many communities and sectors that rely on space, while strengthening public expectations of transparency and accountability. This framing places space within the public imagination as a public issue.

While space law, policy and security issues are often viewed through international relations, a civic lens reframes them not only as international issues, but also as domestic public concerns. This reframing reflects the foundational principle of Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty that states space activities must be carried out “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,” stressing space as a shared public domain rather than a narrow topic.

The role of science communication

Once space is understood as a civic issue, science communication becomes the next step. Public understanding supports trust in the institutions that manage space systems and governance and encourages meaningful public engagement. Science communication broadly refers to the translation of scientific, technical and policy information into forms which the public can access, through education, multimedia, museums and other dissemination and outreach interfaces. At its core is science literacy: creating touchpoints that help people understand how scientific systems shape everyday life.

Applied to space, science communication can embed space in public discourse and build political support for engaged space policy. When a clear “space story” becomes embedded in public discourse, governments are likely better placed to justify investment in resilient space infrastructure, support more informed discussions on space policy and sustain political support for international cooperation. While space agencies have undertaken education and public outreach, these efforts should continue. Public messaging about why space matters is needed to foster long-term public ownership of space as a civic and scientific concern, with direct and indirect implications for space security.

Space and food security in Australia

Much of Australia’s space infrastructure is concentrated in its ground segment, which supports important sectors such as agriculture and mining. Farmers and irrigation technicians rely on EO data for precision agriculture, sustainable farming, pasture management and early detection of pests and disease.

This is an example of an issue not usually associated with space security. It is more often seen as a domestic or economic concern, and this dependence is less discussed in public. Framing space as a civic issue is consequently important, particularly in an economy where food production, food security and regional industries rely heavily on space-enabled services.

Science communication provides practical tools to bridge this gap and reveal how everyday dependencies are directly linked to space and food security. Targeted public narratives that present space systems as enablers of the industries that feed the nation and sustain regional livelihoods can elevate space as a public concern tied to food security and economic resilience.

As one of the most influential sectors in Australia’s economy, increased awareness would likely create more opportunities for agricultural communities to engage with space capabilities, integrate them into their operations, and build industry interest in supporting investment in the infrastructure they depend on. This framing shifts how space is understood, making an issue often seen as technical or international visible as a domestic civic concern with real, and often overlooked, security implications.

Further public perception research should be undertaken to better understand how different communities currently view space systems and where awareness gaps persist, which may help inform more effective engagement strategies.

Lifting space literacy

Space literacy aims to present space as a civic issue that cuts across multiple security dimensions. The ideas below outline how this could potentially be operationalized in education, workforce development and government.

1. Embed education and dissemination in space policy. Future space policy and reviews of existing policies should explicitly integrate education and outreach strategies. Educators and institutions should be consulted in national space planning to reflect the needs of students and communities. Governments and industry should expand curriculum partnerships across academic and research institutions to show how space connects with existing subjects. Cross-disciplinary programmes can position space as a mainstream civic and economic issue, increase public touchpoints and support long-term space literacy.
2. Strengthen school-to-industry pathways. Governments, education providers and industry should collaborate to expand internships, apprenticeships, vocational programmes and mentorships that provide practical exposure to multi-disciplinary space careers. International models such as the UK’s Space Placements in Industry programme offer instructive reference points. These pathways should highlight the diversity of careers across the space sector, including law, communications, cybersecurity, environmental science, business and the creative industries, to encourage a broad and inclusive future workforce.
3. Strengthen space literacy to governments. Space literacy should also be strengthened across the public service. Although space infrastructure underpins defence, border protection, environmental monitoring and other government functions, its role often remains less visible outside specialist government agencies. Targeted training and development would help public servants understand how space systems support their portfolios, improve whole-of-government coordination and ensure that resourcing and governance decisions are made with a clearer understanding of national priorities.

Towards a space literacy agenda

Seeing space as a civic issue provides the foundational step for understanding how space systems shape a wide range of security concerns. Moving toward a space literacy agenda builds on this civic framing by lifting public awareness of how deeply societies depend on space systems.

Once education, outreach and public messaging efforts begin to take hold, space literacy can grow beyond awareness-raising into a more nuanced civic understanding. At this stage, space literacy aims to deepen public engagement with how space systems operate across societies, and how public ownership and responsibility for space span individual, community, national and international levels. The progression of space literacy can guide a more mature public conversation about collective dependence, shared interests in outer space and evolving ideas of citizenship, stewardship and responsibility in a 21st-century, space-enabled world.

Framing space as a civic issue also creates pathways for understanding how space security is shaped by cultural and regional contexts. Using Australia as an illustrative case, future directions for space literacy in the Asia-Pacific should consider how space is understood across different historical, cultural and linguistic contexts. Space literacy therefore offers a means to further understand how space dependencies intersect with State-specific and regional priorities, while informing broader discourse on space governance. Ultimately, embedding space in the public imagination strengthens the foundations of space security. Space literacy is not peripheral to space security; it is a long-term investment in the civic conditions that make secure and sustainable space activity possible.

Andre Kwok is an Australian lawyer and researcher at the Australasian Centre for Space Governance. He is interested in space law and space diplomacy with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. He has a background in criminal law and international criminal law, supporting high-profile criminal investigations, advising civil society research initiatives and serving as a legal consultant to the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials. Andre has degrees in law and Asian Studies from Australian National University.

The author wishes to thank Thando Mathe, Sarah Erickson, Almudena Azcaráte Ortega and Chealsea Mai for their expert review and feedback.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Andre Kwok, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The author writes in his personal capacity, and the views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Australian government, UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post Moving towards a space literacy agenda first appeared on UNIDIR.

The proliferation of illicit conventional arms and ammunition in West Africa continues to pose a significant threat to State and human security, undermining both stability and development across the region. Recognizing these challenges, Guinea undertook a nationally led WAM baseline assessment, utilizing UNIDIR’s reference methodology to systematically review institutional and operational capacities, processes and practices, in line with regional and international standards. The assessment also identified needs and national priority areas for improvement, and fostered ownership of the arms control agenda among national stakeholders.

A nationally led WAM baseline assessment

The opening ceremony, held under the auspices of ComNat-ALPC, featured remarks from senior government officials, including General David Haba, Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Defense. Speaking on behalf of the Minister of Defense and high-level national authorities, he highlighted the vital importance of this initiative for the country’s security and stability. Joseph Ahoba, Director of the Small Arms Division at ECOWAS, formally opened the ceremony on behalf of the regional organization.

Building foundations for the future

Over the course of the week, participants engaged in high-level and technical discussions to establish a clear baseline of Guinea’s institutional and operational capacities across ten key functional areas of WAM. These include:

• National coordination mechanisms
• The legal and regulatory framework
• Transfer controls
• Stockpile management of weapons and ammunition
• Marking
• Recordkeeping
• Tracing and profiling
• Processing of illicit arms and ammunition
• Weapons collection
• Disposal of weapons and ammunition

The assessment provided a platform for stakeholders to share experiences, identify challenges and validate practical recommendations for strengthening the national WAM framework.

Driving an integrated and sustainable approach

The assessment process required active engagement to guide discussions and extract actionable findings. The workshop culminated in the substantive consolidation of key outputs including the drafting of a national roadmap. In exercising ownership of the assessment process, Guinean stakeholders led the validation of this roadmap during the final plenary session, facilitated by UNIDIR experts. In closing, national stakeholders confirmed that Guinea will utilize the validated options and recommendations to strengthen the national WAM framework. They emphasized the critical role of safe, secure and sustainable WAM for peace, security and development.

The path forward

As a next step, UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme remains closely engaged with ECOWAS and the ComNat-ALPC. UNIDIR hopes to draw upon the assessment findings to produce a publicly available WAM Country Insight publication, intended to inform targeted international assistance as well as future policy development.

Crucially, this national WAM baseline assessment undertaken by Guinea also strengthened ECOWAS’ regional ownership and leadership in utilizing UNIDIR’s reference methodology in support of its Member States. Concurrently, it directly contributed to the strengthening of Guinea’s national framework through actionable, guided, expert recommendations.

UNIDIR remains committed to supporting Member States in building resilient and effective national and regional frameworks for weapons and ammunition management. Recent similar work in Senegal demonstrates UNIDIR’s ongoing efforts to raise awareness and monitor WAM progress made across West Africa. The Institute’s reference methodology will also soon be made available in Portuguese, unlocking new avenues for support and cooperation across the region.

The post Strengthening Guinea’s framework for weapons and ammunition management first appeared on UNIDIR.

Through a series of dedicated sessions, UNIDIR shepherded discussions reflecting its ongoing work on AI and international peace and security. The Institute led on exchanges to advance the operationalization of responsible AI principles – a priority identified in the summit’s outcome document.

A longstanding commitment to responsible AI

UNIDIR’s participation at REAIM 2026 builds on sustained contributions to the initiative. The Institute has played an advisory role to successive host States (the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and Spain) – well before 2023, helping inform REAIM’s evolution.

This leadership has extended beyond intergovernmental settings, through the design and delivery of the 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations. It also facilitated structured multi-stakeholder engagement, as well as expert contributions to the Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain.

Rooted in independence, technical depth, and constant engagement, UNIDIR continues to translate evidence into policy-relevant pathways and solutions – particularly as States face governance challenges around the military implications of AI.

Regional dialogue and partnerships at the forefront

In the margins of REAIM 2026, UNIDIR Director Robin Geiss met with Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Defense, Hon. Soipan Tuya, reaffirming and deepening cooperation between the Institute and Kenya on responsible AI in the military domain. The exchange reflected a shared commitment to advancing responsible approaches to military AI and underscored the importance of trust-based, inclusive partnerships at both regional and global levels.

Kenya’s leadership was also evident as the host of the 2024 and 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations for Africa, which highlighted the value of inclusive regional dialogue and locally grounded perspectives in shaping global governance debates on emerging technologies and international security.

In this vein, UNIDIR launched its summary report capturing the perspectives shared at the 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations. The Global Prism of Military AI Governance presents existing national policies and best practices for the governance of AI in the military domain, as well as views from discussions held with multi-stakeholder communities across regions.

The report looks into the operationalization of responsible AI principles across the life cycle of AI-enabled military capabilities through lenses of procurement, incident response, crisis management and risk reduction. It offers quantitative data on assurance prioritization for the purchase of different military AI capabilities. The publication also lays out States’ reflections on the REAIM journey – three years from the inaugural summit. It concludes by identifying substantive priority areas that States wish to see further pursued, both within REAIM and beyond, before presenting a series of concrete recommendations for the road ahead.

UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme also met with representatives from the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) of Tsinghua University. The discussions highlighted the value of partnerships with leading academic institutions and built on ongoing collaboration through UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics (RAISE). The meeting also constituted an opportunity to exchange on good practices of confidence-building measures on AI in the military domain, emphasizing the work of CISS Tsinghua University’s US-China Track-2 Dialogue on AI and International Security with the Brookings Institution, and offered pathways for further cooperation with UNIDIR.

Engaging industry on military AI

Industry engagement was another central focus for UNIDIR at REAIM 2026, reflecting the increasingly decisive role of private sector actors in shaping AI-enabled military capabilities. From system design and data practices to testing, deployment and post-deployment support, industry decisions have a direct impact on reliability, predictability, accountability and the risk of harm in real-world contexts. As governance efforts in the military AI domain advance, effective collaboration with industry has become critical to translating shared principles into practice.

At the summit, UNIDIR – in partnership with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – launched the Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. This sets out a practical and actionable set of voluntary guidelines aimed at providing a common baseline for responsible industry conduct. The framework offers governments and other stakeholders greater clarity on responsible AI procurement and public-private partnerships.

Ahead of the launch, UNIDIR and the OHCHR convened a closed-door roundtable with industry representatives attending the summit. They were joined by framework collaborators from Microsoft, the Japan Defense Technology Foundation and Hitachi America, Ltd. The exchanges, held under the Chatham House rule, provided space for the private sector to share perspectives on substantive and project-oriented themes. They explored risk perceptions and practical strategies to address them, misuse pathways and assurance gaps, priority areas for governance, and the value of the framework at this point in time.

What’s next for military AI governance

During his remarks at the high-level plenary session, UNIDIR Director echoed what many participants at the summit have noted: REAIM is at an inflection point. The summit has been instrumental in catalyzing global momentum on responsible military AI. The 2024 and 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations, in particular, have translated international debate into regional and national relevance.

Yet, as UN processes are now growing, future efforts for the governance of AI in the military domain must be approached with coherence in mind. Coherence will be key for the effectiveness and optimization of available resources, and to ensure that ultimately, the development and deployment of AI will foster international peace and security – not undermine it.

With proper governance in place, military AI could help reduce harm to civilians by improving situational awareness, highlighting uncertainty, and supporting more careful use of force.

Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

UNIDIR’s participation at REAIM 2026 marks the beginning of much work to build on the discussions held in A Coruña, with a host of opportunities for States, the private sector and the wider multi-stakeholder community to contribute meaningfully to the Institute’s work.

UNIDIR is actively on the lookout for collaborators to support the development of the Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. Collaboration does not imply endorsement or entail binding commitments, but industry participation in the development process will be critical to the framework’s ultimate utility and effectiveness.

Looking ahead, UNIDIR will organize the second edition of its Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics on 18-19 June 2026. This will be held consecutively to the informal exchange in Geneva on AI in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security, organized pursuant to the UN First Committee Resolution 80/58. UNIDIR welcomes the submission of proposals to hold thematic deep-dives, lightning talks and poster presentations, the details of which will be released in late February.

The post UNIDIR highlights regional and industry engagement at REAIM 2026 first appeared on UNIDIR.

Gangs have systematically used sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) to control territory, carry out reprisals, and intimidate the local population. Between January and September 2025, the United Nations verified 1,361 incidents of sexual violence by armed actors, involving 1,452 survivors; the majority of survivors are women (90%), and 139 cases involved children. Due to severe underreporting, these figures likely represent only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, humanitarian actors reported over 3,500 cases of rape during the same period. The UN has observed that sexual violence is facilitated by widespread access to smuggled military-grade weapons and ammunition.

A new opportunity to tackle these problems emerged in September 2025 when the UN Security Council adopted a resolution transforming the Multinational Security Support Mission into a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This new mandate, if paired with strengthened national criminal justice and prevention capacities, offers a window to tackle the link between firearms’ proliferation and SGBV. In particular, the UN system and regional partners should comprehensively address illicit flows of weapons and implement gender-sensitive arms control by, among other measures, strengthening data collection and analysis on firearm-related SGBV; strengthening capacities of Haitian institutions; and prioritizing an inclusive approach involving women’s groups, civil society, and survivors.

Gangs, weapons and sexual violence in Haiti

The main gang coalition, Viv Ansanm, controls approximately 85% of Port-au-Prince, while other gangs exert influence in the Artibonite, West, and Central departments, exposing residents to massacres, sexual violence, child recruitment, and abductions. Sexual violence in gang-controlled areas mainly takes the form of gang rape, often committed during home invasions or while victims are walking in the street, sometimes in front of family members or accompanied by the murder of a partner. Most cases involve a firearm. While armed actors are not the only ones involved in sexual violence, gangs remain the main perpetrators.

Gangs are increasingly obtaining high-caliber and military-grade firearms and ammunition through air, sea and land routes, mostly originating from the United States through the Caribbean. There are currently an estimated 500,000 illegal firearms in circulation in Haiti. Lack of resources and inspection capabilities, as well as diversion or theft from public and private stocks, also fuel these flows. Some criminal groups therefore possess firepower that exceeds law enforcement capabilities. The proliferation of weapons is closely linked to sexual violence. Firearms are used to commit rape, cause injury or death, and intimidate, control and silence victims, undermining the rule of law and indirectly increasing the incidence of SGBV.

Despite severe challenges, Haitian authorities and international partners are taking steps to address SGBV and curb illicit arms flows. However, these measures are often fragmented and under-resourced. For example, at the national level, Haiti has adopted a National Strategy on Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration and Community Violence Reduction (DDR-CVR),^[1] which recognizes the heightened risk of sexual exploitation among women and girls but lacks concrete actions to address the incidence of SGBV or indicators to assess progress. Haiti has also endorsed the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap as a regional initiative to reduce illicit arms flows, which is reflected in a National Firearms Action Plan. Yet, this initiative lacks reference to the gendered dimension of illicit firearms or their impact on SGBV.

Some policies have been slowed down amid the current political instability. For example, a draft Firearms Bill, which aligns with international arms control instruments, contains provisions to prevent the use of firearms for sexual violence by allowing the suspension of firearm licences when such risk is reported. This draft bill has been under review by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security for at least 18 months at the time of writing.

New opportunities for action

The UN Security Council has mandated the GSF to use all necessary measures to counter gangs, seize firearms, and provide the Haitian National Police (PNH) and the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH) with expertise and training, including on the prevention of and response to sexual violence. The GSF will receive logistical and operational support from a new UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), which will coordinate with the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the Organization of American States, and Haitian authorities.

Prevention of sexual violence, accountability mechanisms, and arms control are highlighted in the mandates of both BINUH and the GSF. As this configuration takes shape, effective coordination between the GSF, UNSOH, BINUH, other UN agencies (including those implementing the UN’s development cooperation framework), and national institutions will be essential to tackle SGBV in a comprehensive manner. This approach offers an opportunity to address the proliferation of weapons and SGBV more systematically, particularly in three areas.

Improving the collection and sharing of disaggregated data

Despite political instability and a volatile security context, the PNH are still operational, and recent reports have shown they are conducting active operations along with a Government-established anti-gang task force supported by private military contractors, seizing weapons, and arresting gang members. The PNH, along with other law enforcement authorities, should collect disaggregated data on SGBV, documenting the firearms involved (origin, specifications, type, role in coercion). Data collection must be standardized and use trauma-informed interview techniques to avoid re-traumatization. Information-sharing protocols should ensure survivors are never put at risk.

In 2022, the UN Security Council established a sanctions regime and arms embargo on Haiti, targeting those who support or engage in firearms trafficking, gang violence, and human rights abuses, including SGBV. As of February 2026, seven individuals had been sanctioned for criminal activities, five of them including SGBV. The panel of experts monitoring the sanctions regularly reports on violations of the arms embargo and SGBV cases, highlighting their incidence. Nonetheless, enforcement of the embargo is weak due to limited cooperation between states and insufficient resources for monitoring. Through BINUH’s mandate to monitor and report on SGBV, the mission should collect and analyse data on weapons involved as part of its ongoing efforts. Better information on the use of firearms could enhance accountability by identifying trends and patterns among armed gangs, inform prevention activities by the mission, support monitoring and implementation of the arms embargo and sanctions regime, and where necessary, inform revision of its scope.

Enhanced data collection by both BINUH and national authorities can improve prevention and accountability. Such data, including analysis of weapons, can inform more robust counter-proliferation strategies. In addition, it can guide advisory bodies such as the Working Group on DDR-CVR, support gender-sensitive assessments of regulatory and policy frameworks governing weapons and ammunition, and advance implementation of national strategies like the National Action Plan on Firearms and the National Strategy on DDR-CVR.

Strengthening the capacities of national actors

Both BINUH and the GSF have mandates to strengthen the capacity of the PNH and FADH. Providing resources, training, and logistical support can improve responses to sexual violence, including specialized training on investigations, evidence management, and survivor protection, particularly in gang-related cases. Raising awareness of the role that arms control and disarmament play in preventing SGBV should be part of national and local capacity building.

BINUH and specialized UN entities, such as the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC); UN Office on Drugs and Crime; and UN Development Programme, are supporting the PNH and customs authorities to counter firearms trafficking and strengthen arms control. UNLIREC will notably train criminal justice officials on integrating gender perspectives into responses to firearms-related crime and on using arms control to prevent SGBV.

An effective response must, however, go beyond law enforcement. The justice system is essential to ensure justice for survivors, strengthen the rule of law, and restore social cohesion. A positive development in this regard is the creation of a specialized judicial unit for mass crimes, including SGBV, which could accelerate accountability. Training judges and prosecutors to identify links between illicit firearms and SGBV will enable effective and transparent investigations. Sustained investment in judicial capacity, particularly to accelerate investigations and prosecutions through survivor-centred approaches, is essential.

Including women, survivors and civil society organizations in prevention

Local survivor-led advocacy and community protection organizations, such as Nègès Mawon, Kay Fanm and Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn, play a critical role in documenting sexual violence and providing assistance and protection for survivors. They are often the first to document, verify and respond to incidents of SGBV due to restricted access to gang-controlled areas. Past experiences like the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali show that engaging with and building the capacity of local civil society are essential for sustaining efforts to prevent, respond to, and report on SGBV.

The UN and its partners should invest in technical and financial support to strengthen local actors’ operational capacity, enabling them to reach survivors in hard-to-access areas. A dedicated mechanism could be envisaged to ensure that UNSOH and BINUH regularly consult with civil society and to provide feedback loops on illicit firearms trafficking and its links to SGBV, informing UN protection priorities. The UN and its partners could also support community violence reduction programs that promote alternative models of masculinity and break the association between virility and firearms.

Looking ahead

On 29 January 2026, the UN Security Council gave BINUH a new mandate to work in an “integrated manner” with all UN entities in Haiti on monitoring sexual violence and supporting Haitian authorities in implementing arms control measures. This, together with the deployment of the GSF and UNSOH, presents an opportunity to address the links between illicit firearms trafficking and SGBV in Haiti. This will require close coordination between intelligence and operations, DDR-CVR mechanisms, national agencies, and other relevant actors. Such coherence could link security operations to disengagement and reintegration pathways, particularly for children recruited by gangs. However, the international community should exercise sustained vigilance to ensure that the GSF does not become a source of sexual exploitation and abuse, as it happened during the previous UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti. Member States must therefore establish stringent vetting mechanisms and provide comprehensive, mandatory training to all personnel to prevent any occurrence of sexual abuse.

Ultimately reducing sexual violence and other forms of violence in Haiti requires addressing the illicit trafficking of weapons within an integrated strategy combining security, criminal justice, governance and social transformation. Centred on survivors and disaggregated data, this strategy should address both structural gender inequality and the immediate dynamics of violence in Haiti. Success could be measured through reduced cases of SGBV, strengthened national frameworks (for example, a firearms law better able to prevent sexual violence facilitated by firearms), increased national capacity to respond to SGBV, and meaningful participation of survivors and civil society in prevention efforts.

An earlier version of this article was originally published in the Global Observatory.

[1] The strategy was adopted in 2021 and is founded on four axes of intervention: (1) security, (2) economic recovery and strengthening community capacities, (3) community and social mobilization and citizen engagement, and (4) protection. SGBV is mentioned directly in the axis on strengthening community capacities and indirectly in the protection axis when referring to vulnerable populations, including women and girls who are victims of armed violence.

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Held from 12 to 16 January, the week-long interactive training aimed at enhancing cyber resilience in Pakistan by fostering greater cohesion and collaboration among national stakeholders. This workshop is part of UNIDIR’s broader commitment to supporting States in implementing the UN cyber norms and responding to the call for more localized and responsive capacity-building, as emphasized by the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT Security.

Strengthening cyber resilience in Pakistan

The training opened with high-level remarks capturing the strategic importance of cybersecurity for national resilience and international stability. The session featured addresses by Ambassador Amna Baloch, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan; Ambassador Tarik Ali Khan, High Commissioner of Canada to Pakistan; Dr Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director; and Mohamed Yahya, UN Resident Coordinator in Pakistan.

Rapid technological change is unfolding amid an increasingly complex geopolitical context. UNIDIR serves as a trusted, neutral partner to help states like Pakistan build more secure, stable and resilient digital future.

Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

The training brought together over 70 experts, representing a wide range of stakeholders, including representatives from government ministries, critical infrastructure providers, academic institutions, private sector, civil society, and national and provincial computer emergency response teams. Sessions were tailored to the specific cybersecurity context of Pakistan, addressing key topics such as threat evolution, emerging risks and opportunities posed by artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cloud, IoT and 5G, incident management, and international cyber governance.

The programme introduced UNIDIR’s Foundational Cyber Capabilities framework. This model outlines essential components for national cyber resilience, including strategic planning, legal and institutional development, operational capabilities, and trusted partnerships.

One of the highlights of the week was various dynamic scenario-based exercises to apply UNIDIR Taxonomy of Malicious ICT Incidents to real-world scenarios. This scenario-based activity allowed participants to practice real-time decision-making, coordination, and response strategies in a controlled setting—reinforcing the importance of strategic thinking, preparedness and collaboration.

Aligning policy decision-making with technical response capabilities

The training featured parallel policy and technical tracks designed to strengthen whole‑of‑government cybersecurity preparedness. The UNIDIR-led policy track equipped participants with strategic insights on cyber diplomacy, international law, the UN framework for responsible State behaviour, and national‑level decision‑making during cyber crises, including coordinated responses to ransomware and disinformation.

In parallel, the technical track led by the International Telecommunication Union provided practical exercises and expert briefings for practitioners on incident detection and response, and protection of critical information infrastructure. Together, the two tracks promoted integrated, cross‑sectoral approaches to cyber resilience by linking technical response capabilities with policy, legal and diplomatic frameworks.

Advancing regional cyber resilience

This training in Pakistan forms part of a growing regional series of bilateral trainings – also held in the Philippines, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand – aimed at reinforcing national and regional cybersecurity capacities. Strengthening digital resilience is crucial for preserving open, peaceful, safe and secure cyberspace in the years ahead. UNIDIR remains dedicated to supporting governments with tailored tools and training, enabling them to respond effectively to today’s fast-evolving cyber challenges.

To learn more about UNIDIR’s research-driven training and capacity-building programmes, visit the UNIDIR Academy.

This project is funded by Global Affairs Canada under its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The post UNIDIR and Pakistan boost national cyber capacity first appeared on UNIDIR.

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Ces dernières années, les conflits se sont intensifiés et la violence armée a augmenté en Afrique de l’Ouest, fortement influencée par la montée de l’extrémisme violent ainsi que la disponibilité des armes et des munitions conventionnelles. La violence extrême et la demande d’armes partagent des causes sous-jacentes. Agir sur les liens entre ces causes profondes communes et les sources d’armes illicites peut contribuer à prévenir la violence armée de manière plus durable.

L’atelier conjoint UNIDIR-UNREC-DFAE a marqué l’aboutissement d’une étude empirique sur les bonnes pratiques en Afrique de l’Ouest pour relier la prévention de l’extrémisme violent (PEV) et la gestion des armes et des munitions (GAM). Cette étude a été demandée lors d’un séminaire ouest-africain, organisé par les trois partenaires en 2023, afin d’examiner « ce qui fonctionne » dans la région pour agir à la fois sur l’offre illicite d’armes et sur les causes profondes de la violence.

Appel à briser les cycles de violence

En ouvrant l’atelier, Kadja Hodabalo-Pitemnéwé, Secrétaire général du Ministère de la sécurité du Togo, a souligné la pertinence de l’événement : « L’approvisionnement continu en armes alimente un cercle vicieux : plus il y a d’armes, plus l’extrémisme violent se renforce, stimulant à son tour la demande supplémentaire d’armes. » À cet égard, Bintah Sanneh, Coordinatrice résidente par intérim des Nations Unies au Togo, a déclaré que les réponses sécuritaires, bien que nécessaires, ne suffisent plus. S.E. Simone Giger, Ambassadrice de Suisse au Ghana, au Bénin et au Togo, a ajouté que les tensions ne peuvent être résolues par la force des armes, mais plutôt par la volonté d’agir sur les causes profondes de la violence, en mettant l’accent sur le dialogue et la coopération transfrontalière.

Compte tenu de la propagation de la violence armée en Afrique de l’Ouest, Adedeji Ebo, Adjoint au Haut-Représentant des Nations Unies pour les affaires de désarmement, a souligné le besoin de plus en plus évident d’apporter des réponses holistiques : « C’est précisément là que convergent la GAM et la PEV. » S’exprimant au nom de la Commission de l’Union africaine, Richard Apau a mis en avant les nombreux efforts régionaux déployés pour traiter ces questions, tels que la Feuille de route de l’UA pour faire taire les armes ou la Convention de la CEDEAO sur les armes légères et de petit calibre. Enfin, pour Ursign Hofmann, Chercheur principal à l’UNIDIR, l’atelier ouvre la voie à la mise en œuvre du Pacte pour l’avenir des Nations Unies et à la valorisation des bonnes pratiques ouest-africaines.

Points à retenir de l’atelier

Sur la base des conclusions de l’étude, les participants à l’atelier ont partagé les bonnes pratiques et les opportunités inexploitées pour intégrer la PEV et la GAM dans les cadres stratégiques, les institutions et les pratiques opérationnelles aux niveaux local, national et régional. Les participants ont notamment souligné que :

• Pour prévenir durablement la violence armée, il faut agir à la fois sur les symptômes et sur les causes. Cela implique d’aller au-delà des réponses fragmentées et kinétiques ;
• Aucun acteur ne peut relever seul les défis. Le renforcement des structures nationales et la coopération entre tous les acteurs concernés sont nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre des approches intégrées ;
• Les cadres stratégiques existants doivent évoluer. Il est essentiel de reconnaître et d’agir sur les liens entre la PEV et la GAM dans ces cadres afin d’opérationnaliser la coopération institutionnelle et les activités intégrées ;
• Les mécanismes de dialogue formels et informels sont des moyens essentiels pour intégrer la PEV et la GAM. Ils restent insuffisamment utilisés ;
• Les efforts visant à intégrer la PEV et la GAM doivent se concentrer sur les communautés. Les acteurs locaux (par exemple, les chefs religieux et communautaires, les femmes, les jeunes) doivent être reconnus comme agents du changement afin de mener cette intégration et être mis en réseau ;
• Une approche régionale harmonisée et la coopération sont essentielles pour des réponses concertées. Elles devraient cibler les zones les plus vulnérables, en particulier les zones frontalières ; et
• La mise à jour des cadres institutionnels et stratégiques peut constituer une première étape vers l’intégration des approches. Elle peut être suivie d’une adaptation des structures et de formations spécifiques.

Intégrer la PEV et de la GAM n’est plus une option, mais un impératif stratégique.

Feedback d’une participante

La voie à suivre

Les participants ont souligné l’urgence de passer de reconnaître les liens entre la PEV et la GAM à leur opérationnalisation, adaptée aux contextes. Ils ont salué les mesures pratiques de mise en œuvre présentées dans l’étude. Il est essentiel que les responsables politiques de haut niveau priorisent cette question, tandis que les structures nationales ont été encouragées à exploiter l’espace disponible au niveau programmatique. L’engagement des parlements et des acteurs de la sécurité est particulièrement important. Mobiliser les ressources nationales est indispensable. Les partenaires internationaux ont également été appelés à apporter leur soutien. Enfin, les participants ont reconnu la contribution de la recherche dans la mise à disposition de savoir-faire.

Afin de faire progresser les approches intégrées, les participants ont formulé des actions concrètes qu’ils aspirent à entreprendre ou promouvoir dans le cadre de leurs capacités respectives ou collectivement.

Au niveau national :

• Diffuser les résultats de l’étude et plaider en faveur d’approches intégrées auprès des décideurs et des parties prenantes nationaux, y compris les parlementaires ;
• Créer des plateformes d’échange nationales afin de renforcer la coopération programmatique et opérationnelle entre toutes les parties prenantes concernées ;
• Étudier la création d’une structure institutionnelle nationale ou de canaux de communication entre les structures nationales de PEV et de GAM ;
• Appliquer l’étude pour renforcer un projet pilote de gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité (GSS) au Togo et amplifier les expériences de projets menés dans d’autres pays, en utilisant la GSS holistique comme point d’entrée clé pour l’intégration ;
• Connecter la PEV et la GAM dans les actions prévues dans les stratégies nationales relatives aux armes légères et de petit calibre, dans les activités de sensibilisation et dans la collecte de données. L’étude a également été jugée opportune pour la révision du cadre de PEV du Ghana et de la stratégie antiterroriste de la Côte d’Ivoire ;
• Intégrer les approches de la PEV et de la GAM dans les programmes de promotion de la paix et de réconciliation ;

Au niveau régional :

• Promouvoir des approches intégrées et l’utilisation de l’étude dans toute la région via des réseaux régionaux, tels que le Réseau des parlementaires africains membres des commissions défense et sécurité et le Réseau d’action sur les armes légères en Afrique de l’Ouest ;
• Réaliser une auto-évaluation par des organisations régionales et continentales, y compris la revue des cadres stratégiques, afin de déterminer comment renforcer des approches intégrées au sein de ces entités, et mettre en place des équipes multisectorielles pour opérationnaliser les conclusions pertinentes de l’étude ; et
• Renforcer les indicateurs liés à la PEV et aux armes dans le mécanisme d’alerte précoce des conflits d’un réseau régional de la société civile, l’alerte précoce étant une voie essentielle pour l’intégration.

Du dialogue à l’action

Les participants ont proposé d’utiliser les forums existants en Afrique de l’Ouest et sur le continent pour alimenter le débat politique. Ils ont appelé l’UA et les organisations régionales à favoriser l’intégration de la PEV et de la GAM dans leur travail et dans des lignes directrices ou plans d’action existants ou nouveaux. La coopération entre les organisations doit rester vive. L’atelier a notamment mis en avant l’initiative « Faire taire les armes » de l’UA.

Les participants ont également recommandé de maintenir la plateforme de dialogue multipartite pour les experts en matière de PEV et de GAM, fournie par l’UNIDIR, l’UNREC et le DFAE (l’« Initiative de Lomé »), afin de suivre les progrès de mise en œuvre et de promouvoir les échanges et l’apprentissage au niveau régional. Les trois partenaires ont aussi été invités à soutenir la diffusion de l’étude auprès des États et des partenaires régionaux, et à élargir le dialogue à d’autres régions.

À l’horizon février 2026, l’UNIDIR, l’UNREC et le DFAE publieront et lanceront l’étude, proposant des mesures efficaces pour une mise en œuvre opérationnelle en Afrique de l’Ouest. Elle contribuera également de manière tangible à la 9ème révision de la Stratégie antiterroriste mondiale des Nations Unies et à la 9ème réunion biennale des États du Programme d’action sur les armes légères. L’étude sera un exemple concret d’opérationnalisation de l’appel lancé par le Pacte pour l’avenir des Nations Unies en faveur de la prévention de la violence armée, et inspirera, espérons-le, d’autres régions africaines à intégrer efficacement la PEV et la GAM.

The post Tracer des voies pour renforcer la prévention de la violence armée en Afrique de l’Ouest first appeared on UNIDIR.

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In recent years, conflicts have intensified and armed violence has increased in West Africa, strongly driven by the rise of violent extremism and availability of conventional arms and ammunition. Extremist violence and demand for weapons share underlying causes. Acting upon the linkages between these common root causes and the sources for illicit weapons can help prevent armed violence more sustainably.

The joint UNIDIR-UNREC-FDFA workshop concluded an empirical study on West African good practices for linking the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) and weapons and ammunition management (WAM). This study was requested during a West African seminar, convened by the three partners in 2023, to examine “what works” in the region to address both illicit weapons supply and the root causes of violence.

Call for breaking cycles of violence

Opening the workshop, Kadja Hodabalo-Pitemnéwé, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Security of Togo, stressed the relevance of the event: “The continuous supply of weapons fuels a vicious circle: the more weapons there are, the more violent extremism grows, which in turn stimulates further demand for weapons.” In this regard, Bintah Sanneh, UN Resident Coordinator ad interim in Togo, shared that securitized responses – although necessary – are no longer sufficient. H.E. Simone Giger, Swiss Ambassador to Ghana, Benin and Togo, added that tensions cannot be resolved by force of arms, but rather by a willingness to tackle the root causes of violence, with dialogue and transborder cooperation at the core.

In light of the spillover of armed violence in West Africa, Adedeji Ebo, Deputy to the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, pointed to the ever more evident need for holistic responses: “This is precisely where WAM and PVE converge.” Speaking on behalf of the African Union Commission, Richard Apau underlined the many regional efforts to tackle the issues such as the AU’s Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns or the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Finally, for UNIDIR Senior Researcher Ursign Hofmann, the workshop leads the way in implementing the UN’s Pact for the Future and showcasing good West African practices.

Workshop takeaways

Based on the study’s findings, workshop participants shared good practices and unexploited opportunities for integrating PVE and WAM across policy frameworks, institutions and operational practices at the local, national and regional levels. Participants notably highlighted that:

• Sustainably preventing armed violence requires tackling both the symptoms and their causes. This implies moving beyond fragmented and kinetic responses;
• No single stakeholder can overcome the challenges alone. Strengthening national structures and cooperation between all relevant actors are necessary to implement integrated approaches;
• Existing policy frameworks need to evolve. Recognizing and acting upon PVE-WAM links in them is key for operationalizing institutional cooperation and integrated activities;
• Formal and informal dialogue mechanisms are an essential means for integrating PVE and WAM. They remain insufficiently used;
• Efforts to integrate PVE and WAM should focus on communities. Local actors (e.g., religious and community leaders, women, youth) should be empowered as agents of change to drive integration and be networked with one another;
• A harmonized regional approach and cooperation are essential for joined-up responses. They should be targeted at the most vulnerable hot spots, particularly in border areas; and
• Updating institutional and policy frameworks can be a first step to integrate approaches. This may be followed by adapting structures and by dedicated training.

Integrating PVE and WAM is no longer an option, but a strategic imperative.

Participant’s feedback

The path forward

Participants stressed the urgency of moving from acknowledging the links between PVE and WAM to operationalizing them, adapted to contexts. They praised the practical implementation steps laid out in the study. High-level political prioritization is critical, while national structures were encouraged to harness available space at the programmatic level. Particularly key is engagement with parliaments and security actors. Securing national resources is a must. International partners were also called upon to support. Finally, participants recognized the contribution by research in providing knowhow.

Moving ahead on integrated approaches, participants put forward concrete actions that they seek to undertake or promote in their respective capacity or collectively.

At the national level:

• Disseminate study findings and advocate for integrated approaches to national decision-makers and stakeholders, including parliamentarians;
• Create national exchange platforms to strengthen programmatic and operational cooperation among all relevant stakeholders;
• Explore establishing a national institutional umbrella or communication channels between national PVE and WAM structures;
• Apply the study to enhance a security sector governance (SSG) pilot project in Togo and scale project experiences from other countries, using holistic SSG as a key entry point for integration;
• Join up PVE and WAM in planned actions in national small arms and light weapons strategies, sensibilization activities and data collection. The study was also considered timely for the revision of Ghana’s PVE framework and Côte d’Ivoire’s Counter-Terrorism strategy;
• Integrate approaches to PVE and WAM in peace promotion and reconciliation programmes;

At the regional level:

• Promote integrated approaches and use of the study across the region via regional networks, such as the Network of African Parliamentarians for Defense and Security Committees and West African Action Network on Small Arms;
• Conduct a self-assessment by regional and continental organizations, including reviewing policy frameworks, to help determine how integrated approaches can be fostered within these entities, and establish multi-sectoral teams to implement relevant study findings; and
• Strengthen PVE and weapons-related indicators in a regional civil society network’s conflict early warning mechanism, early warning being a key avenue for integration.

From dialogue to action

Participants proposed using existing venues in West Africa and in the continent to shape the policy debate. They called upon the AU and regional organizations to foster integration of PVE and WAM in their work and in existing or new guidelines or action plans. Cooperation between organizations should remain vivid. The workshop highlighted the AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative in particular.

Participants also recommended sustaining the multi-stakeholder dialogue platform for PVE and WAM experts, provided by UNIDIR, UNREC and FDFA (the “Lomé Initiative”), to monitor implementation progress and promote regional exchange and learning. The three partners were also invited to support dissemination of the study to States and regional partners, and widen dialogue to other regions.

Looking ahead, in February 2026, UNIDIR, UNREC and FDFA will publish and launch the study, offering effective steps for operational uptake in West Africa. It will also contribute tangibly to the 9th review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the 9th Biennial Meeting of States of the Programme of Action on Small Arms. The study will be a concrete example of actioning the UN’s Pact for the Future’s call for armed violence prevention, and will hopefully inspire other African regions to effectively integrate PVE and WAM.

The post Charting pathways to strengthen armed violence prevention in West Africa first appeared on UNIDIR.

The energy was electric. As a young Malawian stepping into COP30, I was swept into the rush: high-level delegates weaving between pavilions, back-to-back meetings, cameras flashing, conversations in dozens of languages. This was my first international conference of this calibre, the global stage where decisions shaping our present and future are being made. 

I carried the voices of young people from one of the many fragile and climate-vulnerable States, and yet the silence on climate-security issues was deafening. 

The missing link 

We expected the impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security to feature prominently on the agenda. The Pearce Sustainability Consulting Group warned that climate security remained “the missing link” in climate diplomacy.  And still, when the agenda dropped, that link was missing once again. 

There were glimmers of hope. In his opening speech, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva referenced conflict and military spending, signaling awareness of the climate, peace and security nexus. But those signals never translated into substance. Unlike COP28 – which produced a Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace – COP30 offered no Peace Day and no negotiation item on climate security. Even the celebrated Belém Declaration on Hunger and Poverty omitted any mention of displaced or conflict-affected populations. ODI Global criticized this gap, noting that fragility had been treated as context, not constituency despite clear evidence that conflict and hunger are deeply intertwined in climate-vulnerable regions. 

Youth refused the silence 

While older generations largely sidestepped the nexus, young people refused to. At the UN Climate Change Conference of Children and Youth (COY20), held in the run-up to COP, linkages between climate and conflict were brought to the table. Our collective output, the Global Youth Statement called for formal recognition of the interdependence between climate action, peace and security. For us, this is not just rhetorical; we are the ones who will live longest with the consequences of today’s inaction.  

We didn’t just analyse the problem – we offered practical solutions. The Global Centre for Climate Mobility organized a series of panel sessions to highlight climate mobility solutions from young people. Youth leaders from Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tonga offered adaptation initiatives such as capacity-building for internally displaced persons, disaster zones mapping initiatives and improving access to clean water and health care to support displaced communities. 

Then came the question that cut through the room: “How do we protect youth from being drawn into armed groups after climate-induced displacement?”, a Somali youth delegate asked. 

His question reminded me of the work carried out by UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project. Field research from the Lake Chad Basin region and Colombia shows how climate change impacts individuals’ economic livelihoods and communities’ social structures, driving people into armed groups in search of better opportunities. Integrating climate considerations into peace programming and strengthening conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation and mitigation is key to address these multidirectional dynamics.  

Side events bridged the gap 

Thankfully, COP corridors told a different story. Side events stepped in where formal negotiations fell short. At the UN Climate Security Mechanism’s session “Bridging the Gap: Making Climate Finance Work for the Underserved”, the core message was clear: Climate finance must shift from short-term crisis response to long-term, peace-positive resilience in fragile and conflict-affected States. Speakers from fragile contexts like Somalia stressed the need for accessible, simplified financing models that actually work for countries navigating both climate impacts and instability. 
 
Similarly, I joined a discussion at the International Organization of Migration’s pavilion on the security risks emerging from climate migration across Africa. High-level panellists from the African Union, Ghana, and academia described how climate disasters push people to move, strain already fragile institutions, and expose young people to recruitment pressures. 

These conversations echoed what research has long been highlighting: climatic stresses increase the risks of instability, heighten vulnerabilities, and widen protection gaps.  

Progress, gaps and what comes next 

While COP30 will be remembered for many things, climate security may likely not be one of them. Just as some parties expressed frustration over the lack of a fossil fuel phase-out roadmap in the final text, others – myself included – were disappointed by the silence surrounding the climate, peace and security nexus. 

Yes, there has been progress. Climate migration and climate-related security risks are no longer taboo topics. Youth, civil society, and research institutions continue to push the agenda forward. But side events are not enough. Climate security risks must move from the margins to the mainstream of negotiations. 

If future COPs continue to overlook this reality, they risk crafting climate solutions that fail the people most affected. For those of us living daily at the intersection of climate fragility and insecurity, this is not an academic debate – it’s survival. 

The next COP must do better. Climate security is not a side event. 
It is the main event. 

The post Climate security sidelined at COP30 first appeared on UNIDIR.

The rapid pace of scientific and technological innovation is reshaping the global security landscape, presenting both opportunities and risks for disarmament efforts. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, additive manufacturing, and autonomous systems are blurring traditional boundaries between civilian and military applications, creating new challenges for weapons control and verification regimes.

In a response to scientific and technological advancements surpassing global disarmament frameworks, UNIDIR hosted the Watchtower project launch as a side event to the 80th session of the UN General Assembly First Committee. The launch underscored the urgent need to bridge the gap between innovation and international security.

What experts are saying

The launch event spotlighted some of the most pressing implications of science and technology for disarmament regimes. In the realm of conventional arms and ammunition, Rueben Dass, Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajatnaram School of International Studies noted that “additive manufacturing (3D printing) enables the rapid, decentralized production of weapons components, potentially undermining export controls and fuelling illicit proliferation.”

Blockchain and cryptocurrency innovations, while promising for supply chain transparency, could also facilitate anonymous funding for arms trafficking. For nuclear weapons, Dr Manpreet Sethi, Science and Technology Advisor at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, highlighted that “cyber vulnerabilities in command-and-control systems and the rise of small modular reactors introduce dual-edged risks: enhanced energy security alongside proliferation concerns if safeguards lag.”

Key risks and opportunities

Emerging biotechnologies, such as gene editing and synthetic biology, blur lines between beneficial medical research and chemical or biological weapon development. This is exacerbated by AI tools that democratize access to hazardous designs. Quantum computing further threatens encryption protecting sensitive disarmament data, while AI-driven autonomous systems could erode human oversight in conflict escalation.

Yet, these technologies also hold opportunities for stronger monitoring. AI algorithms could revolutionize safeguards verification by analyzing satellite imagery for undeclared nuclear activities, and mobile apps might empower citizen science for radiation detection. Challenges in science and technology monitoring, however, loom large. The sheer velocity of breakthroughs demands agile, inclusive data-sharing; geopolitical tensions hinder cross-border collaboration; dual-use ambiguities complicate risk assessment; and bridging the divide between scientific communities and policymakers requires sustained trust-building and geographical diversity to ensure equitable representation.

The Watchtower project will provide a systematic horizon-scanning function, track emerging innovations, and assess their potential implications for international peace and security. It will also foster dialogue between policymakers, scientists and disarmament experts to bridge technical and policy perspectives.

What’s next

In January, UNIDIR is gearing up for the launch of the Expert Networks across three disarmament areas:

• Conventional Arms and Ammunition (co-chaired by Rueben Dass and Josephine Dresner);
• Nuclear Weapons (co-chaired by Dr Manpreet Sethi and Dr Hassan Elbahtimy); and
• Chemical and Biological Weapons (co-chaired by Dr Jonathan Forman and Dr Una Jakob).

These Expert Networks will serve as a collaborative platform to exchange insights, pilot methodologies for technological monitoring, and publish periodic assessments.

The Watchtower project builds on UNIDIR’s ongoing research on emerging technologies and their security implications, including recent analyses under the Security and Technology Programme. Previous publications have examined the role of AI in arms control verification, neurotechnology in the military domain, and trends in biotechnology and material science relevant to non-proliferation. The project will complement and expand this body of work, helping ensure that international disarmament policy evolves in step with scientific progress.  

The post UNIDIR launches Science and Technology Watchtower for global security first appeared on UNIDIR.

A panel of youth and experts selected six outstanding submissions from Bangladesh, France, Malawi, Mongolia, Nigeria and Ukraine for their originality, thematic relevance, and thoughtful visual storytelling. 100cameras awarded these young photographers with digital cameras and online photography training to support their continued creativity and advocacy for peace. These are their visions of peace:

Tumenkhuslen, Mongolia

Above noise and chaos
There is this serenity in ordinary things.
Clear vision on the sky
Longed for so long
Still scene of vast steppe.

Lynda, France

On the heights of Fort Gouraya, a Barbary macaque watches over the city of Bejaïa as the sun sets.

For me, this moment represents peace. The beauty of nature rising above human life, reminding us that the natural world is timeless, protective, and greater than us.

Peace is found when we let nature breathe, when we live in harmony with it, and when we remember that it quietly watches over us all.

Roshan, Malawi

Peace is the quiet of a long road with no rush! The empty, open road gives a feeling of freedom, no pressure, no noise just a quiet space to breathe.

Tall trees lined up perfectly literally shows that peace is nature standing still! It gives a sense of stability, grounding and more importantly sense of order!

All in all, peace is the journey not the destination. Just like a quiet drive where your mind finally goes silent, yet you can hear your own thoughts clearly!

And yes peace. Peace is the soft light and clear skies because it relaxes your chest instantly!

Anastasiya, Ukraine

This image comprises the full spectrum of colours that influence not just the mood but also the thoughts they evoke.

The white-lit St Catherine Church has always been a sanctuary for peace in all places and for all people. Standing in the darkness alone, it silently sends and invitation to anyone in need of refuge – both for body and soul – offering a physical shelter and a place to be heard.

It is one of the very few places in this small Ukrainian border town where people come with hope that the light of peace will prevail over the embers of war.

Musa, Nigeria

This place once echoed with fear and silence. Insurgency had stripped it of laughter, trust and life.

Today, standing by the still waters where wildflowers bloom, I see a different story unfolding.

A promise that peace can return, that what was broken can be rebuilt, and that tomorrow can hold shade, fruit and joy.

Imran, Bangladesh

This Rohingya woman is collecting discarded plastic inside the refugee camp. She sells these scraps to earn a small income. This everyday action represents resilience, responsibility and strength in a place where opportunities are limited. The barbed wire fence behind her reminds us of displacement and a life defined by borders. Yet she continues forward, with purpose. Her act may seem small, but it symbolizes dignity and determination.

This image shows how strength is shaped not only by big moments, but by the quiet, persistent effort to care for oneself and one’s family even when life is difficult.

Amplifying youth voices in peacebuilding

The Youth Visions of Peace campaign reflects UNIDIR’s continued commitment to meaningful youth participation in conversations about peace, security and disarmament. It meets young people where they are – through photography, storytelling and social media – amplifying underrepresented perspectives that are often overlooked.

UNIDIR and its Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project remain committed to engaging young people through participatory research and creating spaces where their voices directly shape the policies and processes that affect their present and future.

The post Global youth envision peace through photography first appeared on UNIDIR.

Four years later, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force, with Article IV prohibiting placing “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” This provision effectively institutionalized the idea that strategic stability in space was inseparable from nuclear restraint. The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems further reinforced that principle, restricting development, testing and deployment of missile defence, and space-based missile defence. This restriction recognized that space technology itself and the intent to pursue such technology could undermine stability if unconstrained.

These treaties acknowledged that introducing new avenues for nuclear competition into orbit could worsen crisis instability without delivering meaningful military advantage. As such, the early legal architecture of outer space was in large part about managing nuclear danger. For example, the Soviet Union in their remarks to a 1983 UNGA Special Committee debate warned that orbital systems designed to neutralize early-warning and command-and-control satellites could create conditions for a successful pre-emptive strike, while undermining confidence in the ability to retaliate. Thus, heightening nuclear escalation risks.

Yet, space activity has changed profoundly since the 1980s and so have some of the debates that couple it. Space-enabled services are more valuable to human wellbeing than ever before, and the space environment now includes thousands of commercial satellites and the continued advance toward cislunar and lunar exploration. Strategic anxieties persist amidst challenges of debris, congestion and sustainability; factors that do not always have a direct nuclear analogue. Re-examining the nuclear inheritance in a time of increased nuclear anxiety and proposed space-based missile defence is therefore useful. Not to overly emphasize it, but to rebalance it. Future protections need to be created to manage nuclear risk and escalation in outer space. These protections, however, should form the floor, not the ceiling, for a modern and inclusive approach to space governance.

The persistence of nuclear fragility

Modern nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems depend on satellites for early warning, detection and communication. This reliance introduces acute vulnerabilities since jamming, dazzling, cyber intrusion, or proximity operations can disrupt signals in ways that mimic or prefigure hostile intent. Experts have argued this phenomenon of entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear systems creates pathways for inadvertent escalation, and space assets are certainly included. Recent research underscores how dual-use satellites and the influence of the private sector can confound strategic stability as differing incentive structures and ambiguous leadership roles make technical anomalies and activity difficult to interpret. Such activity may create even more escalation pathways, where misperception rather than intent could trigger a crisis.

The risk lies not only in technology but in psychology, as there is also a perception of vulnerability. Early warning satellites and space-based communications are anchors of deterrence. Any disruption, be it accidental or deliberate, can appear to threaten a State’s ability to detect or respond to a nuclear strike, creating powerful incentives for pre-emption. In this context, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) remains as relevant as ever. Though progress has often stalled, the idea of prevention—acting before destabilizing dynamics become entrenched—captures the essence of why shared restraint in space remains indispensable.

However, two key challenges complicate pursuing solutions to this problem.

• Asymmetry. Reliance on space assets differs markedly among nuclear-armed States, and the specific role and degree of reliance on space-based infrastructure within a State’s early-warning architecture remains unclear. As such, non-interference norms around NC3 satellites could disproportionately benefit the most space-dependent actors. Securing such commitments therefore requires a measure of empathy, or a willingness to safeguard a rival’s sense of security, even when the immediate advantage appears uneven. It is a difficult political ask, one that demands attempts at trust-building and mutual understanding before any formal measures can take shape.

• Inequality. Privileging nuclear systems risks re-entrenching a two-tier security order reminiscent of the broader asymmetries embedded in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The logic that protects nuclear-armed States and their strategic assets can unintentionally reinforce hierarchies of vulnerability, leaving important civilian and humanitarian infrastructures comparatively unprotected. This framing could also narrow outer space security discourse to the threat perceptions of a few, treating space as an extension of nuclear deterrence rather than a shared environment with diverse users and collective risks. Ensuring stability in space therefore requires that the protections afforded to strategic systems be equally extended to the broader infrastructures that underpin human security and equitable access to the benefits of space.

The rise of space-centric challenges

While nuclear fragility persists, some of the most pressing space challenges today arise from the space environment’s own dynamics. The number of active satellites now exceeds 13,000 and constellations are projected to surpass 100,000 in the coming decade. This degree of densification escalates debris risks sharply, as well as further complicates spectrum allocation and harmful interference concerns. Exacerbating this problem, some national security debates are popularizing the concept of resiliency via redundancy to respond to space insecurity. This creates overlaps, constellation proliferation, crosslinking, and rapid launch replacement. In a global model where only one country pursued such a national security architecture, the environmental effects may be minimal. However, should multiple States adopt such a model, as is likely the case in the current multipolar context, the impact on the environment and international security relations would be damaging. Moreover, assessments on resiliency via redundancy have shown potential increased vulnerabilities to fragmentation events which may significantly increase the risk of consequential collision events. Large-scale redundancy architectures can also crowd orbital regimes and spectrum resources, constraining access for emerging spacefaring States and complicating efforts to uphold the Outer Space Treaty’s obligation to use outer space “on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.”

Proposals for space-based missile interceptors often present large constellations as a route to deterrence by denial. Yet, technical modelling finds boost-phase, space-based architectures technically and economically challenging, requiring hundreds to thousands of on-orbit interceptors. These findings make space-based interceptor concepts as much a commons-management issue as a deterrence question. Any large in-orbit interceptor layer would add significant density to already congested orbits, with debris-hazard externalities borne by all operators and benefactors of space systems. Recent expert remarks have emphasized that the co-orbital ASAT potential of such systems is a more salient concern than claims about boost-phase interception. This is because the co-orbital potential is more feasible to realize than an effective boost-phase interception, arguably making space-based interceptor systems a more immediate threat to the space environment and space-based infrastructure.

The extension of human activity into cislunar and lunar space introduces not only new operational and governance challenges but also new layers of a security dilemma. As States and private actors aspire towards sustained presence beyond Earth orbit, even scientific missions may generate competitive insecurity. The orbital dynamics of the cislunar region, characterized by weak stability zones and sparse situational awareness coverage, further heighten uncertainty about intent. This intersects with a broader and enduring feature of outer space activity, its dual-use and dual-purpose dilemma. Dual-use describes the simultaneous or overlapping use of a technology for civilian and military applications. Dual-purpose refers to systems that can be repurposed from their stated function to serve different (potentially aggressive) ends. In space, these dilemmas are particularly acute. The high cost of access, limited redundancy in infrastructure, and incentive structures that reward versatility of function mean that few actors can afford to develop purely single-use or -purpose systems. Civil, commercial and military missions therefore share technologies, launch infrastructure, and orbits thereby blurring distinctions of intent. Even technologies developed to enhance sustainability of the space environment can be reinterpreted as tools for interference or negation. These structural and financial realities make space uniquely prone to dual-nature ambiguity, where current mechanisms for generating transparency can help identify where and what an object is but cannot ensure the intent behind its use.

These are space-centric problems, rooted in the physics of orbital mechanics, the economics of commercial activity, and the ambiguity of dual-natured operations. They generate instability theoretically through fears of deterrence failure, but more concretely through system complexity, resource competition, and the absence of coordinated management. The nuclear lens explains why restraint matters, but not how to manage the collective action problems that now define orbital sustainability and space security overall.

A broader vision of space security governance

Progressing space governance requires moving beyond the assumption that nuclear stability is the highest good. It may remain a necessary condition, but it is no longer solely sufficient for the challenges that define today’s orbital environment. The persistence of nuclear deterrence logic driving future space security debates could have two consequences: it continues to centre great-power rivalry as the lens for all space governance, and it marginalizes the concerns of space nascent or non-spacefaring States whose priorities lie in access, sustainability and equitable benefit.

A more inclusive approach is needed to advance space governance, what we apply to the concept of prevention in PAROS matters. Prevention of an arms race should encompass not only prospective weapons deployments but also the competitive dynamics, postures and perceptions that precipitate arms racing. Practical steps towards this already exist. Transparency and confidence-building measures, endorsed by UNGA Resolution 68/50 (2013), encourage among other things information exchange on national policies, pre-launch notifications, and cooperative data sharing on space situational awareness. Yet, transparency without confidence can resemble deterrence signalling rather than reassurance. Turning transparency into dialogue—through sustained communication and reciprocal understanding—is what transforms procedure into prevention, especially if routed through structured consultations and due-regard obligations already embedded in the Outer Space Treaty.

Equally vital are non-interference pledges. Commitments to avoid actions that could degrade satellites supporting nuclear command and control, but also those essential to humanitarian and civilian functions offer substantive starting-off points for extending restraint beyond strategic assets to the systems that sustain human security.

Finally, diplomacy, dialogue and cultural exchange remain essential for sustaining stability in space. Historical arms control progress depended on the continuous contact among scientists, diplomats and policymakers who learned to interpret each other’s signals. In strategic terms, patience is not passive. It reflects restraint built through familiarity, shared understanding, and confidence in the other’s intentions. In the space environment, where there may be countless opportunities for misinterpretation, nurturing such patience is difficult yet indispensable. Mechanisms to promote understanding and patience do exist. The Outer Space Treaty’s provisions for consultation, due regard, and information-sharing offer avenues for enhancing trust and restraint, provided States find the political will to use them and translate legal commitments into State practice. The same holds for multilateral bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly; their value in trust building is determined not by their existence but by the seriousness and sincerity with which States participate.

The early treaties of the space age created a durable foundation for preventing nuclear conflict in orbit or on Earth. Their logic of restraint remains vital. Yet, six decades later, the space environment they helped stabilize has evolved into something far more complex. Recognizing the persistence of nuclear fragility is essential. Threats to early-warning satellites and NC3 systems still embody the sensitivities and danger of deterrence failure. The space environment’s vulnerabilities, encompassing debris, congestion, expansion beyond Earth orbit, and the blurred lines of dual-use development, show that effective governance must now pursue sustainability alongside stability. If nuclear deterrence logics once tried to preserve peace by managing fear and uncertainty, the next generation of governance must preserve peace by managing interdependence. Protecting nuclear systems should be the floor, not the ceiling, for a governance approach that recognizes the broader interconnections of security, sustainability and equity in space.

The author would like to thank Andrey Baklitskiy, Sam Hickey, Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Pavel Podvig, and James Revill for their expert review and feedback.

The post The long shadow of the nuclear age on space security governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

In recent years, improvised weapons have become a pervasive threat to international security – from the role of weaponized commercial drones in conflicts in Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine, to the use of DIY firearms by criminals and terrorists in Africa, the Americas and Europe. With production and use growing beyond State control, participants at the UNIDIR conference Inside the networks: How knowledge-sharing drives improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS production highlighted the urgent need for enhanced national, regional and international responses to this emerging threat.

Capabilities that were once limited to States and industrial arms manufacturers are now within reach of individual hobbyists, criminal networks, and terrorist organizations. It is a moment to rethink traditional approaches to arms control.

Ambassador Thomas Göbel, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament

One of the driving forces behind the proliferation of improvised weapons is the diffusion of knowledge on their production and use. One of the conference’s experts highlighted that “groups from across contexts copy the tactics and the expertise, not only the hardware.” Increasingly detailed guidance for acquiring, assembling and using improvised weapons is shared through online and offline knowledge networks. Therefore, it is a timely moment to raise awareness, foster information-sharing, and enhance joint efforts to counter the illicit production and use of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS.

If we continue to treat improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS as separate challenges, we will fall short – because their uses and users are now inseparably connected.

Matilde Vecchioni, Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR

Countering the spread of knowledge

Organized by UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, the conference on improvised weapons brought together over 80 participants from permanent missions in Geneva, international and regional organizations, national law enforcement agencies, civil society, and academia. The expert gathering  addressed the role of knowledge transfer in the illicit proliferation of improvised weapons.

Stakeholders discussed key trends and linkages in improvised production of SALW, IEDs and UAS, and unpacked the role of different knowledge networks in acquisition, production and use across conflict and non-conflict settings. The programme also addressed regional and national perspectives, exploring the use of improvised weapons in case studies from different geopolitical contexts – including Brazil, Myanmar, Somalia and Ukraine.  

Addressing improvised weapons proliferation

In the final roundtable session, participants shared best practices and challenges for addressing the illicit proliferation and misuse of improvised weapons observed in their work. Potential measures and some concrete next steps emerged to improve national, regional and international responses, focusing on three main areas for further developments and cooperation:

• Legislative approaches and policy frameworks:

Existing policy frameworks – international, regional and national – should be revised to keep pace with emerging trends in improvised weapons production. New legislative approaches also merit exploration, including the criminalization of possessing or using blueprints for the purpose of manufacturing weapons. Several countries, including Canada, North Macedonia, Singapore, and the State of New South Wales in Australia, have already adopted such measures. Monitoring their impact and effectiveness will be especially important for understanding how these policies may help prevent the misuse of 3D-printing technologies.

Existing regulations – such as those on readily convertible blank-firing firearms – can also inspire similar approaches for other improvised weapons, offering a practical pathway for controlling items and components with high misuse potential.

• Operational practices and investigations:

Improvisation is a process – and each step offers valuable opportunities to strengthen the prevention and disruption of illicit weapons production. Several national good practices from the UK, Brazil, Cambodia and others highlighted ways to enhance countermeasures by:

1. tracking the materials, technologies and hardware used in weapons manufacturing;
2. monitoring the individuals involved, including foreign fighters; and
3. following the flow of online knowledge – not only on the dark web, but also across open-source platforms.

Civil society actors involved in field and open-source investigations can also play a crucial role in mapping flows, hotspots and tendencies related to improvised weapons production.

• Information sharing and data collection:

Those involved in improvised weapons production – whether hobbyists, criminal networks, or actors in active conflict – constitute an inventive, fast-adapting, and continuously evolving community. As one participant put it: “If the international community cannot move as quickly or as collaboratively as they do, we will always be one step behind.“

Improving information sharing among all relevant stakeholders – national authorities, law enforcement, border control, civil society organizations, and through postal and shipping services and social media platforms – is therefore essential. This effort must also be grounded in stronger data collection: ensuring that those responsible for gathering information are trained to identify and record different types of improvised weapons accurately. This is critical for understanding emerging developments and identifying common trends. Civil society actors can provide innovative solutions to enhance data collection efforts.

Shaping a community for collective action

By bringing together policymakers, law enforcement officials, regional and international organizations, as well as civil society and academia, the conference helped bridge sectoral knowledge gaps and foster dialogue on potential cooperative solutions. This represents only a first – but significant – step towards more coordinated and effective action to counter the growing threat posed by the improvised production of SALW, IEDs and UAS.

The mix of law enforcement and national and international experts created a uniquely productive environment. The networking and cooperation opportunities offered during the event have been invaluable.

Participant’s feedback

UNIDIR remains committed to building on these discussions and advancing collective efforts to curb the spread of improvised weapons.

The post Facilitating cooperation to counter improvised weapon production first appeared on UNIDIR.

Millions of illicit small arms and light weapons are used in armed conflict, terrorist and criminal activities across Eastern, Central, Great Lakes Region, and Horn of Africa countries. Addressing the sources of supply for illicit arms and ammunition, and their drivers of demand, is therefore vital to reducing human suffering.

National Focal Point Coordinators on SALW met to review the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons, considering amendments and updates to its best-practice implementation guidelines. This was followed by a stakeholders’ conference attended by representatives from government of RECSA Member States, regional organizations, civil society organizations, international partners, and UN agencies. Both meetings highlighted SALW control progress, persistent challenges and threats, new and emerging opportunities relating to new technologies, climate-induced conflicts and evolving transnational crime and terrorism dynamics.

The event represented a significant milestone for the joint UNIDIR-RECSA project to review and strengthen the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. Funded by the UK and launched in June to coincide with RECSA’s 20^th Anniversary, the initiative will deliver the first comprehensive review of the protocol implementation and proposals to address persistent SALW-related challenges and emerging threats to peace, security, stability and sustainable development.

Proposals to amend the protocol

Kenya’s Inspector-General of the National Police Service, Douglas Kanja Kirocho, emphasized that “over the past two decades, the Nairobi Protocol has transformed from a visionary agreement into a practical framework for action.”

The National Focal Point Coordinators examined implementation trends and explored potential alignment between the Nairobi Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty, the Global Framework for Through-life Management of Conventional Ammunition, and the International Tracing Instrument. Proposals to amend the protocol include:

• Explicitly apply to SALW parts and components and conventional ammunition, as well as armed uncrewed aerial systems (drones) and improvised explosive devices;
• Enhance controls on the manufacture of arms and ammunition, including prohibiting the manufacture of improvised explosive devices and 3D-printed weapons;
• Strengthen national coordination mechanisms and strategic planning for SALW control, with a “whole-of-government” approach that is integrated into national security and development architectures;
• Better cross-border cooperation mechanism and greater use of technology in border controls;
• Mainstream gender-responsive SALW control measures and emphasize preventing gender-based violence, as well strengthen the meaningful participation of youth in arms control efforts; and
• A periodic/regular review mechanism.

A holistic approach for illicit arms control

Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, explained that the research and meetings in Nairobi has sent him a strong message that “to be effective, we need to take a holistic approach to tackle not only the sources of supply for the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition, but also the drivers of demand that lead to misuse and human suffering.” National authorities and partners in civil society, international and regional organizations, academia and the private sector need to work together to address both supply sources and demand drivers to ensure success in addressing the scourge of illicit arms in the next 20 years, which will be defined not by what is said, but by what is implemented.

In March 2026, a joint UNIDIR-RECSA report and scorecard will present the findings of the implementation review and considerations for further strengthening the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.

The true measure of our success will be seen in safer streets, empowered communities and a region free from the scourge of illicit arms flows.

Jean Pierre Betindji, RECSA Executive Secretary

The post Marking 20 years of the Nairobi Protocol first appeared on UNIDIR.