I feel slightly more concerned this time than I was during the previous election last summer.

This time we are voting for the House of Representatives, and its electoral system is effectively designed for two-party politics, while Japan has already entered a multipolar era.

Unlike Australia, we choose only one candidate and one party. This means that many votes are likely to be wasted.

We have seen a similar phenomenon recently in the UK, and I worry that something similar may happen in Japan in a few weeks.

Britons may disagree over which politicians should represent the UK, but many still agree that election outcomes should reflect the actual distribution of votes.

I hope that in Japan we can share a similar expectation.

To change the voting system, however, we would need to elect politicians and parties who are willing to reform a system that currently benefits them.

Somehow, we need to break out of this quasi-deadlock.

Given this pattern of misinformation by high-profile figures discussed in the previous post, I have formulated the following wish list in the context of the rising number of immigrants in Japan, with a particular focus on Japanese academia.

• Full transparency for faculty members in Japanese higher education, including current and past nationalities and educational background.
• A blanket ban on religious discrimination in hiring across Japanese educational institutions, coupled with mandatory reporting and audit requirements, to be imposed as necessary conditions for access to public funding, accreditation, and preferential tax treatment.

First of all, how many of us would genuinely consider it legitimate for Christian universities to continue drawing substantial public funding from the officially secular Government of Japan while openly maintaining hiring policies that exclude most non-Christians? For context, non-Christians constitute roughly 99% of the Japanese population.

Such religiously discriminatory hiring at Christian universities stands in stark contrast to Japan’s “native” religions, Shinto and Buddhism. Buddhist universities are fewer in number, and Shinto-affiliated universities are fewer still. Based on my informal observation, both Buddhist and Shinto institutions often appear to impose far more lenient — if any — religious requirements in hiring, particularly for non-religious positions.

By comparison, in historically Christian-dominant Europe, I believe that hiring policies favouring or restricting employment to Christians at publicly funded educational institutions would be outright illegal.

What about the United States, whose population is arguably more religious than Europe today? Could Stanford or Harvard declare a hiring policy for non-religious positions that limits candidates to Christians, or require a mathematics professor of other faiths to “understand and support education based on Christian faith,” while continuing to receive regular federal or state funding? Would Jews, Muslims, or Hindus accept that?

Even in Japan, this was not accepted — at least, I considered it unacceptable.

Without formal legal training, I personally believe that religious discrimination by publicly funded educational institutions is unconstitutional and detrimental to our secular nation. Yet, conflict avoidance is a de facto social norm in Japan. So, we quietly tolerated religiously discriminatory hiring in academia.

We tolerated it partly because the immediate impact of such discriminatory practices on society was thought to be small. It was also clear that the scale of harm was nowhere near enough to risk a sudden breakdown of the nation. In the end, Christians constitute roughly 1% of Japanese citizens, and most of the population is non-religious; the overall negative impact therefore remained relatively contained. To the best of my knowledge, no Christian university has been taken to court in post-war Japan for religiously discriminatory hiring practices.

I regard this as a paradox.

The very reason Japanese society could tolerate religious discrimination by religious groups is the largely non-religious character of the majority population. Because most citizens are non-believers, public discourse has rarely been dominated by open conflicts between large religious groups. As a result, the primary concern of most people has not been preventing rival religious groups from capturing institutions or exercising illegitimate influence. When religious conflicts do arise, they tend to unfold covertly, often intertwined with non-religious social aspects and covered by the mass media through opaque or cryptic narratives. Again, conflict avoidance remains the dominant social norm.

This may sound counter-intuitive, so I repeat: the paradox, I see, is that religious people can discriminate against non-religious people easily in Japan because Japanese are mostly non-religious.

In a sense, Japan’s high degree of ethnic homogeneity enabled the majority to tolerate misbehaviour of some minority groups, while Western outlets often describe Japanese society as unable to handle “differences” due to its supposed lack of “diversity”. This makes me, a Japanese living in Europe, feel as though I am living in a parallel world.

In the case of Prof. Naoko Hashimoto at the ICU from the previous article, she secured a tenured position under a Christian-only hiring framework. And, from such a religiously privileged position, she disseminated misleading or factually incorrect information on immigration and posted sensational and hostile online comments against politicians who opposed expanding immigration during the national election. Given her family background, the likely higher proportion of Christians among immigrants to Japan, and the repeated nature of these inaccuracies, it is difficult to regard them as merely accidental. At a minimum, potential conflicts of interest deserve careful examination rather than automatic dismissal.

There were also likely non-altruistic reasons for our “tolerance.” For example, raising controversy can jeopardize future opportunities in peer review, funding, or employment. Lacking statistical evidence, I wonder how many law professors even at secular public universities genuinely feel incentivized to challenge religiously discriminatory hiring when their grant proposals are reviewed by peers across institutions — or when some private religious universities offer higher salaries and more flexible retirement arrangements than public ones. In this sense, should we still describe this attitude as “tolerance”?

Does the word “subservience” better capture the underlying dynamics?

Anyway, time has passed. The fragile equilibrium that once allowed the majority to tolerate discrimination against themselves has shattered. The room for tolerance is rapidly closing — and rightly so.

Japan is now witnessing large-scale immigration from societies where religious identity plays a far more prominent role. Christian groups actively advocate changes to Japanese social norms to push their agenda while academics such as Prof. Hashimoto continue to make emotionally charged sensational claims based on factually incorrect information, with an explicitly stated intention to influence election outcomes.

This trajectory is not sustainable.

For most Japanese who comply with Japan’s nationality law, Japan is our only home country. There is no fallback state. To protect our only home country, we must not allow public funding to entrench religious influence within Japanese academia. We must not allow religiously motivated academics to distort public discourse on matters fundamental to our officially secular nation by spreading false information.

This is no longer a hypothetical concern or a distant prediction.

Vulnerabilities have been exploited, damage has been done. The mechanisms are visible, and actors were identified. We need to fix the vulnerabilities to prevent further exploitation.

I am not just making a plea for equality or fairness. I am not merely arguing for the protection of the majority groups from the reverse discrimination. I am calling for the protection of the overall Japanese society, without which many Japanese cannot sustain a stable civic life.

We need to act before institutional erosion becomes irreversible.

Now is the time to end the long-standing religious discrimination in Japanese academia.

The Japan Fact-check Center (JFC) has informed me that they plan to correct their article and retract their fact-check decision that was circulated in July 2025 during the previous House of Councillors election. -> Corrected article by the JFC.

For details, I will let JFC explain in their forthcoming correction articles.

This is part of my ongoing effort to address false information on crime statistics disseminated by academics and journalists.

Much of it is political in nature, as the information was spread in the context of national elections, and some of the individuals involved collaborate with certain political parties while denouncing others.

So far, the progress is as follows¹:

Corrected Cases

Dr. Yu Korekawa (是川夕博士), IPSS

Problem: Published an erroneous paper on crime statistics prior to the previous election, when crime statistics were a major public topic.

Status: Partially corrected; errata published.

Context: Dr. Korekawa is the Director of the Department of International Research and Cooperation at the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS). He provides advice to both local and central governments in Japan.

The paper was only partially corrected and still contains inappropriate statistical interpretations, internal inconsistencies, and unclear sources of raw data. Notably, the chief editor of the journal that accepted the article was Dr. Korekawa himself.

Paper:
https://www.hitachi-zaidan.jp/global-society-review/vol4/assets/pdf/vol4_commentary.pdf

Errata:
https://www.hitachi-zaidan.com/global-society-review/vol4/assets/pdf/vol4_commentary_errata.pdf

Japanese: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/n7ad400b6ac7a

Prof. Akinori Tomohara (友原章典教授), Aoyama Gakuin University

Problem: Made an erroneous claim that Japanese citizens are seven times more likely to commit major theft than foreigners.

Status: Mostly corrected; errata published.

Context: Prof. Tomohara is a full professor at Aoyama Gakuin University. The university’s stated “desired faculty profile” includes “a person who understands and can support education based on Christian faith,” even for non-confessional positions.

In 2024, the university received more than USD 16 million from the Government of Japan as a Subsidy for Operating Expenses of Private Universities and Colleges. This amount does not include tax benefits or project-specific financial support.

At the time the book containing the erroneous claim was published, Prof. Tomohara was a Research Associate at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), a policy think tank under the purview of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).

Hiring policy: https://www.aoyama.ac.jp/outline/effort/self_study/policy/academic.html

Government support: https://www.shigaku.go.jp/files/s_hojo_r06a.pdf

Errata: https://www.chuko.co.jp/news/127804.html

In Japanese 1: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/nb5fea4917c71

In Japanese 2: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/n4222ce4a4d70

Mr. Daisuke Furuta (古田大輔氏), JFC

Problem: Labelled the claim “crimes by foreigners are suddenly increasing” as inaccurate (「不正確」 in Japanese), but mistranslated this in the English version as false. In fact, the claim was consistent with the latest reports from the National Police Agency, which Mr. Furuta did not take into account.

Status: The Japan Fact-Check Center (JFC) has agreed to correct the article and retract the decision; the official correction has not yet been published. -> Published.

Context: JFC is a private organisation financially supported by Google and Yahoo! JAPAN.

In Japanese: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/ne2b5ba7c6c21

Contacted — No Response So Far

Prof. Shunsuke Tanabe (田辺俊介教授), Waseda University

Problem: Presented highly misleading crime statistics by relying on distortions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

Context: Prof. Tanabe is Chair of the Editorial Committee of the Japanese Association for Social Research.

In Japanese 1: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/naff62e29cf80

In Japanese 2: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/n5592e91d5e48

For further information on his suspected disinformation campaign:

Prof. Eriko Suzuki (鈴木江理子教授), Kokushikan University

Problem: Presented foreigner indictment rates that differ substantially from official statistics published by the Ministry of Justice.

Context: Prof. Suzuki is President of the Japan Association for Migration Policy Studies (JAMPS) and a vocal critic of the Immigration Services Agency of Japan (ISA). For example, together with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), she criticised ISA’s smartphone app that allows users to distinguish genuine residence cards from counterfeit ones. Regarding integration policy, she argues that learning the Japanese language should be a right, not an obligation, in Japan.

Criticism of ISA: https://sdp.or.jp/sdp-paper/pursue-the-residence-card-special-permanent-resident-app/

Language policy: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/dear/64/0/64_4/_pdf/-char/ja

In Japanese: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/ncb910f9d4e08

Contacted — But Refused

Mr. David Atkinson

Problem: Made erroneous claims about crimes committed by foreigners, with particular emphasis on foreign tourists.

Status: Mr. Atkinson contacted me via social media. I explained to him how he had misused the official statistics. He replied with cryptic comments and then blocked me.

Context: Mr. Atkinson is a British citizen residing in Japan with close ties to the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and is often described as a key advisor to former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. He has actively promoted inbound tourism while running Konishibijutsu Kogei-sha, the largest company handling cultural properties in Japan. His presentation of crime statistics understates the rise in crimes committed by short-term visitors, many of whom are inbound tourists.

No Correction Request Sent Yet

Prof. Naoko Hashimoto (橋本直子教授), ICU

Problem: Disseminated a wide range of inaccurate claims regarding foreigner crime statistics.

Context: Prof. Hashimoto is an associate professor at International Christian University (ICU), which maintains a Christian-only hiring policy for faculty positions at Lecturer level and above. (Exception: Non-Christians may be appointed if they deeply understand and actively support the Christian mission.)

In 2024, ICU received approximately USD 4 million from the Government of Japan as a Subsidy for Operating Expenses of Private Universities and Colleges excluding tax benefits and project-based funding.

The problematic information she disseminated includes ignoring annual crime reports by the National Police Agency, omission of major terrorist incidents, likely cherry-picking of statistics, and inappropriate statistical manipulation and interpretation.

So far, I have not succeeded in stopping the dissemination of these claims. Since false claims by Prof. Hashimoto continues to appear across multiple media outlets and even in the Diet, it is difficult to file timely and carefully documented correction requests for each instance.

Hiring policy: https://www.icu.ac.jp/refurbishment-assets/pdf/about/Faculty_QualitiesOrganization_J.pdf

Government support: https://www.shigaku.go.jp/files/s_hojo_r06a.pdf

In Japanese 1: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/n7dee710ce2fc

In Japanese 2: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/n6bbf67cb49c3

In Japanese 3: https://note.com/unitedreasoning/n/nd4c2edb724ea

Beyond Individual Errors

These cases differ in detail and response, but they share a common pattern: influential figures disseminated statistically incorrect or misleading claims in politically sensitive contexts, often with slow or incomplete correction.

As these cases accumulated, however, it became increasingly difficult to treat them as isolated errors. They point to deeper structural questions about institutional incentives and governance in Japanese academia. I will examine broader implications in a separate follow-up article.

→ Part 2: The Need for Transparency and Religious Neutrality in Japanese Academia

1. Note on sources, language, and evidentiary standards.
   The detailed statistical analyses, primary-source documentation, screenshots, and chronological reconstructions underlying each case are published separately in Japanese on my note.com blog. I do not currently have the capacity to translate those materials into English.
   
   Accordingly, this article provides a concise procedural summary of outcomes and institutional responses rather than a full evidentiary exposition. For readers who read Japanese or wish to verify the underlying documentation, links to the original analyses are provided for each case below.
   
   The existing Japanese materials present the evidence in a narrative and dialog-style format (sometimes using fictional or illustrative characters for accessibility), rather than in conventional academic prose. While the presentation style is informal, the underlying sources, data, and verification standards are real and reproducible.
   
   Separately, although this has not yet been completed, I am planning to further articulate and consolidate the criticisms presented here in English as a formal academic paper, supported by comprehensive and independently verifiable evidence. That process necessarily requires additional time for careful documentation, validation, and scholarly presentation.
   
   I am fully aware that publicly naming established academics and journalists and offering direct criticism of their published claims is not standard practice in many academic settings, and is even less common in Japanese academic culture. Such writing can understandably be uncomfortable for those being criticized and for those closely associated with them, and therefore carries a heightened responsibility for accuracy, fairness, and evidentiary rigor.
   ︎

http://aipv2026.github.io

When I felt tired, sad, or stressed, I often went to the beaches in the evening to clear my mind.

On sunny weekends, I enjoyed walking from Coogee to Bondi.

I did not swim, but I watched beach life from a distance and enjoyed the coastal view, sometimes with an ice cream in hand.

On the night when it became clear that I had to leave Australia, I sat on the beach and listened to the waves. It was a quiet moment I still remember.

Regarding the recent mass shooting in Bondi, I am deeply sorry for what has happened, but I cannot offer meaningful comments because I do not know enough details, and I believe it is important to wait for a careful investigation before forming opinions.

Still, I want to express my sincere wishes for the recovery of the injured and offer my condolences to the families and friends who have lost loved ones.

I hope that, in time, Bondi Beach will return to being a cheerful and safe place again.

They managed to dilute the crime rate of foreigners by including tourists in the denominator, to the point that the resulting crime rate of foreigners matched the crime rate of Japanese.

How?

Let me explain it step by step. Even though I was not part of the TV program team, the following questions and their plausible answers help explain what likely happened, and they are consistent with the official statistics.

Q1: Which year was this news broadcast?
A1: 2025.

Q2: Which year’s statistics did they use?
A2: 2020.

Q3: Why not 2024?
A3: Because there were too many tourists, so the crime rate of foreigners would have become suspiciously small.

Q4: Why not 2021?
A4: Because there were almost no tourists due to the pandemic, so the crime rate of foreigners would have been higher than that of Japanese.

Q5: Why 2020?
A5: Because the border was open until March and April for tourists, so there were “just the right number” of tourists to dilute the crime rate of foreigners to the point that it became the same as that of Japanese.

Q6: Wouldn’t some audience members notice something strange if a 2020 dataset was used in a program broadcast in 2025?

A6: Worry not. Because Prof. Tanabe and the TV station simply removed the reference year “2020,” most viewers would not even notice that they used the statistics from 2020.

Q7: Wouldn’t some audience members notice something strange if we dilute the crime rate of foreigners by including short-term stays (短期滞在) in the denominator?

A7: Relax! Because Prof. Tanabe and the TV program presented the number of “short-term stays (短期滞在)” simply as “stays (滞在)”, most audience members would never imagine that short-term visitors were included in the denominator.

Q8: What outcome should we expect from this program?

A8: Probably many viewers became afraid of being “misled“ by “fake news“ claiming that foreigners’ crime rate is higher than that of Japanese, and therefore decided not to become “xenophobic“ by refusing to support such “fake news.”

Q9: Why do you think some Japanese viewers would decide not to become “xenophobic” after watching this TV program?

A9: Because Prof. Tanabe warned Japanese nationals that if they become “xenophobic,” they themselves would risk losing their own freedoms and rights.

This Q&A was simply my criticism of their academic and journalistic integrity.

Now, as a human… how could an academic specialized in “xenophobia” maintain such a gentle smile while, in my view, deceiving laypeople about crime statistics, likely taking advantage of a disaster that killed countless people?

This was not about trying to show good figures to impress reviewers and get one more paper accepted.

This was about deceiving the general public for some unknown reason and purpose.

As already indicated, I am inclined to label this as intentional disinformation rather than unintentional misinformation.

Prof. Shunsuke Tanabe is a full professor at one of the top universities in Japan. His specialization is quantitative sociology with a focus on immigration and xenophobia. He is also the Editorial Committee Chair of the Japanese Association for Social Research. Given his expertise, it is unreasonable for me to believe that he would not understand the problems with presenting data in this way.

Since the Canadian media, Japan Media Review, was further spreading this false information into the English language sphere, I gave a warning to them and offered to walk through the government statistics with them.
They wrote back to me, “I have no reason to trust you over Japanese mainstream media.”

The original version of this TV program is available here in Japanese: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXH8x6j6158)

I generally see the outcome positively not because any particular party or candidate won or lost, but because the results seem to reflect the nuanced sentiments of the public, rather than a radical or risky shift in power. The campaign period also showed signs of policy adjustment by candidates, likely in response to opinion polling.

What Japan’s Upper House Election Reveals

Looking at the specific issues that shaped the election, immigration was undoubtedly one of the most discussed topics. On this issue, the election results were clear: parties advocating stricter immigration controls, either in terms of regulations and numbers, gained more seats. Conversely, those that remained mostly neutral or opposed such measures either lost ground or failed to improve on their previous standing.

This might sound counter-intuitive, but I believe that this outcome is not necessarily negative for foreigners in Japan. Surely, if the goal was to push for even more lenient regulations or to expand what some perceived as preferential treatments for foreigners, then the election outcome was a defeat. However, if the aim was to maintain the social stability of the nation, which also hosts foreigners, this outcome helps establish much-needed measures to better manage immigration.

Up to now, the Japanese government is said to have implemented a “stealth immigration” policy. Officially, the government denied pursuing any immigration policy, aiming to soothe the nerves of worried electorates. Yet, it simultaneously encouraged universities to accept foreign talents and companies to hire foreigners. Visa restrictions were also relaxed to accommodate long-term foreign residents who fall into the broader definition of “immigrants.” Because this was officially not an immigration policy, coherent, state-level policies for immigrants were largely absent or inadequate. This left necessary integration efforts to local entities with fewer budgets and authorities. This election result, however, suggests that such a “stealth” approach may now be coming to an end.

“Far-Right”? Anti-Vax and Organic Food in Japan

Amid these developments, one narrative has drawn international attention: the reported rise of a “far-right” populist party, Sanseito. Personally, I am not especially alarmed at this stage.

While I am neither a member nor a supporter of Sanseito, I suspect that the label “far-right,” frequently used by Western media to describe the party, often overlooks crucial aspects of Japan’s political and social context.

For instance, two issues sometimes cited as reasons for this classification are the party’s stances on vaccines and organic foods, both of which are sometimes associated with right-leaning ideologies outside Japan.

However, the history of vaccine hesitancy in Japan is complex and not neatly aligned with a single political ideology; indeed, the most influential anti-vaccine campaign in recent Japanese history was arguably against the HPV vaccine, amplified by the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun, long before the COVID-19 vaccine rollout. And even in the context of COVID-19 and its aftermath, Kazuhiro Haraguchi, a senior member of Japan’s main left-leaning opposition party, was sued by Meiji Seika after he called its next-generation mRNA vaccine “almost a biological weapon” and “close to murder.” The organic food movement, furthermore, traditionally holds left-leaning associations.

Where Sanseito Stands: An International Comparison

Another reason for my skepticism on labeling Sanseito as “far-right” stems from an international perspective. While some aspects of Sanseito’s constitutional draft represent right-leaning tendencies compared to most Japanese peers, Sanseito is actually a pacifist party: it does not advocate for engaging in warfare, while many Western ruling parties have recently been or are currently engaging wars directly or militarily supporting factions involved in war.

Also, Sanseito does not call for deporting legal refugees or other immigrants, while major Western governments are sending back or considering to send back both legal and illegal foreigners to their countries of origin or third countries like Rwanda or Nauru.

Furthermore, Sanseito officially rejects conscription, even though a major figure in Sanseito made a comment in favour of the idea in the past. For this reason, I argue, Sanseito is less hawkish than Western ruling parties that are already conscripting soldiers or trying to do so.

Finally, Sanseito does not strongly prioritize building a stronger defence force and explicitly prioritises providing financial support to electorates over military spending, while most NATO countries aim for a 5% GDP target for defense by 2035.

My current view is that Sanseito is right-leaning compared to most other Japanese parties for issues where nationalism matters (immigration and defence) but rather left-leaning compared to most liberal democracies due to Japan’s extreme individualism and a smaller number of foreigners in Japan per resident.

This perspective is, I acknowledge, counter-intuitive and may not align with the labels commonly employed by Western news agencies. However, for the aforementioned reasons, I view Sanseito as even more left-leaning than many Western ruling parties, even those generally categorized as left-leaning, such as the Labour Party in the UK.

This suggests that the application of the “far-right” label might arise more from implicit biases or attention-seeking tendencies than from a comprehensive understanding of the party’s platform.¹

Misinformation by Dr. Jeffrey J. Hall at Kanda University

To further illustrate this point, consider the following example of mischaracterisation found in the work of Dr. Jeffrey J. Hall, who first claimed that the leader of “Sanseito used a racial slur for Koreans.” It later became clear, however, that the party leader had been quoting the slur that others had called the party—not using the term to describe Koreans.²

Although Dr. Hall did issue a follow-up clarification, his initial framing, which implicitly suggested that the leader had used the term against Koreans, reached a far wider audience than the correction ever did. Dr. Hall has been interviewed by DW News and other major outlets, likely influencing their portrayal of Sanseito as a “far-right” party.

If the misleading report was intentional, it would constitute an exploitation of the language barrier to create the false impression. Indeed, for anyone fluent in Japanese, it was unmistakably clear that the party leader was quoting what others had said about Sanseito, not directing the slur at Koreans.

Here is another example of a misleading narrative by Dr. Jeffrey J. Hall: “there was 1 million new immigrants who came into the country and the far-right has used this calling it a stealth immigration policy to attack the mainstream conservatives and hit them from the right on immigration,” as shown in this YouTube video. 

It may well be true that right-leaning parties might have used the expression “stealth immigration”; however, this expression is not used exclusively by far-right groups. Rather, the expression was used well before the election campaign by proponents of immigration, such as the Japan Center for International Exchange, to call for more systemic support. Therefore, if this interview from DW News gave the impression that far-right parties coined the term “stealth immigration” to foster anti-foreigner sentiments in Japan, you are misguided by Dr. Hall’s commentary.

“The rise of far-right populism in Japan” is certainly a catchy topic, well-suited for the attention economy. Yet, considering the aforementioned reasons and the misleading narratives, I suspect this classification is more a reflection of personal preferences than an accurate portrayal. This holds true even though I acknowledge the party positions itself as right-leaning and draws conservative support compared to most other parties in Japan.

In light of this, I urge major media organisations to exercise greater caution when evaluating both the credibility and factual accuracy of Dr. Jeffrey J. Hall’s commentary.

Forging National Unity Through Cooperation

More broadly, some of the unfair or misleading criticisms directed at Sanseito may have unintentionally generated sympathy among individuals who do not formally support the party.

As a Japanese citizen, I do not welcome false narratives that risk undermining social stability and fostering political radicalisation within Japan, especially when such narratives are shaped by foreign commentators in Japan whose intentions remain unclear.

Anyway, the mandate now rests with the newly elected members of the Diet. I hope that the ruling coalition will align its policy implementation with the will expressed in the election, and that opposition parties will cooperate when appropriate. Such collaboration could help address pressing national challenges and allow those parties to gain the experience necessary to govern responsibly in the future.

For the record, I reiterate: I am neither a member nor a supporter of Sanseito, and this article should not be interpreted as an endorsement.

1. In this article, I do not, for now, treat Sanseito’s proposed constitutional draft as a viable political agenda. While this draft certainly represents a right-leaning tendency compared to other parties in Japan, its current influence is limited by the party’s nascent status and the significant political and legal hurdles for constitutional revision. Given the current balance of power in the Diet and the high legal thresholds required for such changes, the party is nowhere near possessing the influence necessary to bring them into effect.  ︎
2. This slur is so archaic that, in nearly four decades of life, I had only heard of it being used once—indirectly.  ︎

We’re happy to share that Proof Summit 2025 wrapped up last week with nearly 30 participants packing the seminar room at NII. The event featured lively discussions across academia, industry, and the hobbyist community.

Proof Summit is a Japanese semi-academic theorem proving event, revived this year after the long pandemic pause. This year’s edition also featured an international speaker, marking a small but meaningful step toward becoming a global gathering.

While a few brave souls—including me—tried to wave the Isabelle, Rocq, and Agda flags, the summit was unmistakably Lean-heavy. The crowd didn’t seem to mind… they were too busy enjoying the Lean parade.

Special thanks to Mr. Kensho Tsurusaki (NII), who co-organized the event, arranged the venue, and presented his ongoing work on Literate Programming in Lean. An early version of this work was shared at HIM last summer—his recorded talk is available here.

We’re also grateful to Dr. Yoshihiro Imai, who started the Proof Summit series in 2015 and co-organized this year’s revival.

Many thanks to BeProud Inc. for providing connpass.com—a platform we used to manage attendance, communication, and slide sharing—and to the research programme of Strategy AV21 AI: Artificial Intelligence for Science and Society for supporting my travel to the venue.

The day concluded with a nomikai attended by 18 participants—proof that informal reasoning has its place too. Thanks to the well-chosen (and very reasonably priced) izakaya, we managed to enjoy a full meal and drinks for just around $17 per person. A small logistical win to end the day!

This year, we had to close registration early due to the seminar room’s capacity—keeping the event free meant working within tight space limits. As interest in the summit grows, we’d love to welcome even more participants in the future.

Looking ahead to Proof Summit 2026, we’re seeking industrial partners who might be able to help us secure a larger venue at low or no cost. If you’re interested in supporting this expanding community, we’d be happy to hear from you.

Rough Sleeping vs Homelessness

Maybe this is common sense for native English speakers, but I didn’t realize that homelessness and rough sleeping are distinct concepts until I lived in the UK. When I heard the term “homeless people,” I used to imagine rough sleepers specifically.

From what I’ve learned, rough sleepers are people who have no access to shelter, while homeless people might stay in temporary shelters but still feel displaced and without a sense of home.

‘Sans famille’ in Japanese

In Japanese, we didn’t have separate words for “family” and “home”, and the word for “house” (家 i-e) encompassed both meanings until the late 19th century. For example, Sans famille by Hector Henri Malot was translated as “家なき子 (I-e-na-ki-ko) = a child without a house.”

This term later became the title of a phenomenal Japanese TV series in 1994 (家なき子), a loose homage to Malot’s work. The protagonist was not exactly a rough sleeper — she usually had some form of shelter — but she was certainly homeless in the emotional and structural sense.

Economic Decline and the Haunting Line

The series aired just a few years after the burst of Japan’s bubble economy. Its most famous line — “同情するなら金をくれ (If you feel sorry for me, give me money)” — struck a chord with viewers. It harshly depicted the instrumental role of money and reflected Japan’s utilitarian mindset.

This was in 1994, before the publicized closures of Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997, and before the surge in male suicides (from 16,416 to 23,013). But the social mood had already shifted. People knew the golden era had ended. We were entering what would later be called the “lost decade.” Now, thirty years later, we speak of the “lost three decades.”

And that line from the series still haunts me, forcing me to think: if I feel so sorry for the people in Palestine and Sudan, why am I not sending more money to them? Should I buy this high-end keyboard as my own Christmas present while showing sympathy for the starving people?

The Invention of ‘Family’ and ‘Home’ in Modern Japan

Returning to the topic of language, in the late 19th century, Japan created new terms for “family” (家族, ka-zo-ku) and “home” (家庭, ka-te-i) while importing concepts from Europe and the United States. Japan adapted them using Kanji, which are mostly Chinese characters.

These words, written in Kanji, were eventually adopted by China, which had traditionally been the source of advanced civilization from the Japanese perspective, and where the original forms of Kanji were developed. 

Family (家族) and home (家庭) are two of many Kanji words (和製漢語, wa-sei-kan-go) that were invented in Japan in the 19th century during the Meiji Restoration, after Japan opened its borders, and were subsequently exported to China. Strictly speaking, China did have the word 家族, which at the time did not mean “family” but rather “clan.” 

Other Kanji words invented in Japan during that period include “culture” (文化), “society” (社会), and “science” (科学). Interestingly, the words for “people” (人民) and “republic” (共和国) were also coined in Japan.

Katakana and Exoticism

I’m glad that Japanese scholars at the time came up with these new Kanji words instead of importing new concepts using Katakana, which is a common practice nowadays. It was a meaningful contribution to the Sino-cultural sphere and is less confusing for us. 

Today, there are many Katakana words like パーパス (pah-pa-su = purpose), even though we already have a word for “purpose” (目的, mo-ku-te-ki). I find it odd that Japanese businesspeople often use pah-pa-su, especially when curious Westerners are talking about Ikigai. 

It is argued that users of these Katakana words want to convey nuances not properly expressed by the corresponding Japanese words. But often, I suspect they simply want to add a foreign, exotic flavor to present themselves or their products with a sense of novelty. 

Modern China seems to be more careful in this respect. For example, the word for computer is 电脑 (dian-nao), which, even with my very limited Chinese, I can guess means ‘electric brain’ due to the meaning of the characters, while in Japanese we use ‘コンピュータ’ (konpyūta).

Medical Care and Fictional Fear

Returning to ‘child-without-a-house’ (家なき子, I-e-na-ki-ko), the phenomenal Japanese TV series from the 1990s depicted the serious financial struggles to cover the medical costs necessary to treat the protagonist’s sickly mother.

This scared me as a child. However, it was a fictional portrayal, and in reality, the High-Cost Medical Expense Benefit (高額療養費制度) has been protecting Japanese citizens from excessive medical costs since 1975.

I find it unfortunate that Japan has built a comprehensive, inexpensive, high-level medical care system for all its citizens, who are highly sensitive to negative information, yet we often fail to appreciate such public support.

Instead, we opt for additional health insurance and take conservative career paths to feel more secure, which ultimately impedes societal progress by missing valuable opportunities for investment, both financially and in career growth.

Security and Risk-Aversion

Even during the ‘lost three decades,’ the number of rough sleepers in Japan has steadily declined, although significant gender inequality among them persists. Notably, authorities in Japan do not frame rough sleeping as a lifestyle choice. 

The robust social security system that Japan has built should inspire us to take bold, adventurous career steps — choices that may be too risky for most US citizens, who often face significant financial burdens for healthcare, or people from societies without social safety nets. 

However, this does not seem to be the case in most fields, with the exception of highly competitive entertainment industries such as manga artists, musicians, comedians, and voice actors. 

The desire for security, which led us to establish a comprehensive social welfare system, still seems to bind many of us even today. Instead of embracing new challenges, we often use that energy to sticking to predictable trajectories, ultimately hindering progress and, in turn, long term-security.

Nostalgia and Anxiety

Anyway, this post became more subjective than I originally planned. I still feel drawn to the 90s in Japan, when people realized the time of prosperity was over. Even as a child, I felt the inexplicable yet pervasive sense of anxiety looming over society. 

Becoming a teenager in the 90s’ gloomy atmosphere influenced me in ways that still linger. It was not an overall prosperous decade for most Japanese, but I still recall the mildly depressing mixture of nostalgia, anxiety, and a hint of hope for adulthood that I felt at the time. For now, I’ll close this journey with the theme song from 家なき子:

I don’t know why a torii was chosen to represent the Japanese garden in Prague—but it got me thinking.

Maybe the garden’s designers thought using the national flag could be problematic—it fades under sunlight, and its circular motif resembles those of other flags, like Bangladesh’s or Palau’s. Or perhaps they were aware of the political controversies surrounding the Japanese flag in the 1990s.¹ Depicting the shape of Japan is also tricky: it’s visually complex, potentially contentious due to territorial disputes, and sometimes even confused with other island nations, like New Zealand. Maybe they simply wanted to focus on culture rather than the state.

Overall, I’m not expressing any serious objection to a park in Czechia using a torii to represent Japan or Japanese gardens in this blog article. It’s beyond my control, outside my responsibility, and I don’t find it offensive.

But what if a Shinto torii were used as a symbol of Japan—or of a Japanese garden—within Japan, by Japanese people ourselves? Would that be appropriate, or even effective, as a cultural symbol of an officially secular state?

A Native Religion in a Secular Nation

Shinto is undoubtedly a religion native to Japan² and, in practice, exists almost exclusively within the country. Aside from Shinto, the only other major native religion I’m aware of is that of the Ainu people, often described as animism centered around kamuy (spiritual beings or deities), although it doesn’t have a standardized name like “Shinto.” But what does it mean for a native religion to represent an entire nation or cultural identity?

While secularism is formally enshrined in Japan’s constitution, the constitution declares the Emperor – long associated with Shinto tradition – to be the symbol of the state, and by extension, the nation itself. This tension reflects how Shinto functions: not as a prescriptive religion, but as a symbolic layer embedded in state ritual—one that coexists with, but doesn’t dominate, public life.

Most Japanese citizens are non-believers in the doctrinal sense, and other religious groups rarely confront this arrangement—perhaps because they also benefit from political representation or tax status, or because open religious confrontation is socially disfavored.

Outside the period between the Meiji Restoration and the end of World War II, Shinto hasn’t played a major role in regulating the daily lives of ordinary people—at least not through explicit mandates. It does not prescribe detailed norms regarding eating habits, fasting, family structure, or obligations for daily or weekly prayer or attendance. Neither does it concern itself with universalist doctrine or an overarching moral narrative, either.

In that sense, Japanese society has, by default, operated with a kind of functional secularism from the perspective of devoted followers of Abrahamic religions.³ So, there is little tension between Shinto-derived practices and secular life, since Shinto generally avoids prescribing how people should live their everyday lives in moral, ritual, or legal terms. An emphasis on harmony with nature may be a rare exception.⁴

Why not Buddhist symbol?

Importantly, the Japanese garden—especially the kare-sansui style—is more closely tied to Zen Buddhism than to Shinto. Many of the most famous examples, such as those in Kyoto, were created as part of Zen temple complexes. In contrast, Shinto is more closely associated with natural sacred spaces such as forests (chinju no mori) and emphasizes minimal human intervention in the landscape. So using a Shinto symbol to represent a Japanese garden—particularly a dry landscape garden—feels somewhat misplaced.

On the other hand, the typical signage used for Japanese Buddhism is the manji (卍), a left-facing swastika symbol. A mirrored, right-facing version (卐), rotated 45 degrees, was later adopted and politicized by the Nazi Party in Germany. As for the Japanese garden in Prague, I would guess that Czech organizations consider conflating Shinto and Buddhist culture far less problematic than risking the evocation of Nazi imagery. In any case, Buddhism and Shinto were historically integrated through a system known as Shinbutsu-shūgō—the syncretism of kami (Shinto deities) and buddhas—which defined religious practice in Japan for most of its premodern history.

So, if such a torii symbol were used within Japan, it would likely fail to function as a representative emblem for Japanese gardens, since the Japanese garden tradition is more rooted in Buddhism. But what about as a symbol representing Japan as a state or society?

Where the Torii Belongs (and Probably Will Stay)

Shinto is not dominant in modern Japanese society. Buddhism is equally present, and overall, most people would be considered non-believers—not in the sense of rejecting religion, but in the sense of not adhering strictly to any organized doctrine. The nation-state is also constitutionally secular. Given this, using a Shinto torii as a signifier for the state or society—especially in an official setting—would seem overly narrow.

Perhaps the strongest argument for its use would rest on the idea that the native or indigenous tradition deserves special recognition and occupies a higher position within national identity. This kind of logic underpins symbolic gestures in countries like New Zealand, where Indigenous culture is afforded official recognition as foundational to national heritage.

My guess is that Japan will continue using the national flag in official contexts to represent the state, while Shinto-derived imagery will remain in informal domains—such as anime, cultural motifs, or contexts that refer specifically to Shinto, like shrine icons on maps.

Ugh… that minor puzzling feeling ended up as a long essay!

Happy Easter — from a non-Christian scientist without a theology license. Fact-checks welcome.

1. The legal recognition of the national flag itself followed years of domestic controversy, court cases, and even, tragically, a suicide. ︎
2. Although commonly referred to as a religion, this classification reflects a definition shaped by Abrahamic traditions. Shinto lacks formal doctrine, moral commandments, or universal truth claims, and in many respects functions more like a mythology or ritual cosmology, as discussed below. ︎
3. While literal interpretations of Abrahamic scriptures are probably incompatible with Shinto mythology, Shinto itself isn’t doctrinally exclusivist and has historically coexisted with a range of traditions. Followers of Abrahamic faiths in Japan are a small minority, and they typically avoid conflict with Shinto or Buddhism, often finding ways to live in quiet accommodation with the surrounding cultural landscape. Certainly, some Shinto myths do reflect early political centralization and symbolic dominance by the Yamato state, but these stories focus more on internal consolidation than on inter-religious rivalry. As a religious framework, Shinto has generally not aimed to displace or convert other traditions. ︎
4. Historically, Buddhism filled some of this spiritual and ethical space, and it did so in diverse and often regionally distinct ways. Japanese Buddhism diverged significantly from its Indian and Chinese counterparts and, on the whole, has tended to be less demanding for laypeople in terms of moral or ritual obligations. Participation has largely been occasional, symbolic, or tied to major life events—such as funerals, memorials, or seasonal observances—rather than structured weekly or daily practice. Even so, Buddhism did shape aspects of everyday life in earlier periods, particularly through dietary customs: repeated bans on meat reflected Buddhist aversion to killing, and contributed to a long-standing tendency toward semi-vegetarian or pescatarian diets in premodern Japan. ︎