• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains near collapse, with only two crossings recorded on March 16.
• Bulk carriers are re-routing through Iranian territorial waters, indicating the emergence of selective, permission-based transit.
• Iran has executed a rare crude export from the Kooh Mobarak terminal, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely.
• Maritime security risk remains active in the Gulf, with a confirmed projectile strike on a tanker near Fujairah.
• Dark vessel activity and AIS suppression continue within the Strait, reinforcing ongoing sanctions evasion dynamics.
• Port activity remains unstable, with easing congestion at Salalah and elevated disruption levels in Karachi.
• Bandar Abbas shows a complete absence of commercial and military vessel presence, suggesting a potential drawdown or redistribution.
• Anomalous AIS behavior persists outside the Gulf, including prolonged “Not Under Command” broadcasts linked to Sea Horse, a Russia-associated tanker.
• Maritime security risks continue to expand geographically, with confirmed kinetic activity in the Black Sea.

Operational Overview 

Maritime activity across the Strait of Hormuz remains critically constrained as the conflict enters its third week, with transit volumes continuing at near-zero levels. On March 16, only two vessel crossings were recorded, reinforcing the sustained collapse in commercial traffic through one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

At the same time, routing behavior is evolving. Bulk carriers have begun re-routing through Iranian territorial waters to exit the Gulf, sailing along the Iranian coastline rather than standard international navigation channels. This shift indicates the emergence of a controlled transit environment, where movement is selectively enabled rather than fully denied.

Iran is also adapting its export strategy. A crude shipment from the Kooh Mobarak terminal, located east of the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrates a clear effort to bypass the chokepoint entirely and maintain oil flows despite maritime disruption.

Beyond the Gulf, maritime security risks continue to expand geographically. A confirmed tanker strike in the Black Sea underscores the development of a multi-theater threat environment affecting global shipping.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited.

On March 16, Windward recorded two total crossings, consisting of one inbound and one outbound vessel. This represents a 33.33% decrease compared to the previous day and remains below the 7-day average of 2.43 crossings.

All identified vessels were bulk carriers, both flagged to Panama. Overall traffic levels remain approximately 97% below normal, reinforcing the continued near-closure of the waterway to standard commercial shipping.

At the same time, routing behavior is shifting. Between March 15 and March 16, at least five bulk carriers were observed exiting the Gulf via routes within Iranian territorial waters, sailing along the Iranian coastline instead of standard navigation channels.

This pattern indicates that limited vessel movement is being reintroduced under structured and controlled conditions.

Iranian Crude Oil Export via Kooh Mobarak Terminal

A significant shift in Iranian export behavior has been identified at the Kooh Mobarak terminal, located east of the Strait of Hormuz.

On March 8, a sanctioned VLCC departed the terminal carrying approximately 1.77 million barrels of Iranian Heavy Crude, bound for Dalian, China. The vessel has remained in a 15+ day AIS blackout following departure.

Remote Sensing Intelligence confirmed the presence of a VLCC-class vessel at the terminal on March 7, consistent with the loading timeline.

This marks the first recorded export from Kooh Mobarak in 2026, following only a single shipment in 2025, indicating historically minimal usage of the terminal.

The terminal’s location enables Iran to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely, reducing exposure to transit restrictions and naval threats. The activity suggests a deliberate effort to diversify export routes and sustain crude flows under constrained maritime conditions.

Maritime Security Incident

A maritime security incident was reported 23 nautical miles east of Fujairah, UAE, involving a tanker struck by an unknown projectile while at anchor.

The vessel sustained minor structural damage, with no reported injuries or environmental impact. Authorities are currently investigating the incident.

Windward was unable to definitively identify the vessel due to the presence of a GPS jamming zone in the area, which limited tracking and attribution.

This event reinforces the continued presence of low-intensity, high-frequency threat activity in proximity to key Gulf anchorage areas.

Dark Vessel Activity

SAR imagery collected on March 16 identified an OFAC-sanctioned vessel operating without AIS transmission on the western side of the Strait of Hormuz.

Analysis indicates the vessel was underway and entering the Arabian Gulf, consistent with ballast status data. The vessel last transmitted AIS on March 13 near Khor Fakkan before going dark.

The vessel is associated with sanctioned networks and fraudulent flag registration, highlighting the continued use of AIS suppression and identity obfuscation to enable movement under heightened monitoring conditions.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational patterns across regional ports indicate continued volatility, with mixed signals between disruption and localized easing.

Inside the Gulf, Umm Qasr recorded two transshipment-delay cases, with no change from the previous day and no deviation from the 7-day average.

Outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded two port-of-loading late departures, up 100% day-on-day, alongside seven rollovers, remaining unchanged from the previous day but up 1,125% compared to the 7-day average.

Salalah recorded eleven transshipment rollovers and nineteen delay cases, both showing sharp declines compared to the previous day and below the 7-day average.

The data suggests a temporary easing at Salalah, while disruption persists in Karachi, reflecting uneven pressure across alternative logistics hubs.

Bandar Abbas Activity

Satellite imagery indicates a complete absence of observable activity at Bandar Abbas as of March 15.

At the commercial dock, five vessels were present on March 2, compared to none on March 15. At the military dock, seventeen vessels were observed on March 2, with no vessels detected on March 15.

This sharp reduction suggests a temporary drawdown or redistribution of both commercial and military maritime presence at one of Iran’s primary port facilities.

Anomalous AIS Behavior

The Russia-linked tanker Sea Horse continues to exhibit anomalous AIS behavior in the Atlantic.

Since February 25, the vessel has remained in the Atlantic while continuously broadcasting a “Not Under Command” status, with no clear progression toward its previously declared destination in Cuba.

The prolonged stationary pattern and inconsistent movement signals suggest potential AIS manipulation or operational disruption, though the exact cause cannot be confirmed.

This behavior aligns with earlier indications of dark tanker activity near Cuban crude terminals, suggesting that opaque maritime logistics networks may still be facilitating energy flows despite reduced visible traffic.

Outlook

The March 17 operating picture reflects a maritime system operating under severe constraint, with the Strait of Hormuz effectively restricted and commercial traffic remaining near-zero.

At the same time, adaptive behaviors are emerging. Selective routing through Iranian territorial waters, alternative export pathways such as Kooh Mobarak, and shifting port activity patterns indicate that both state and commercial actors are adjusting to sustained disruption.

Maritime security risk remains active within the Gulf, with continued incidents near key anchorage areas, alongside ongoing dark vessel activity and AIS suppression.

Beyond the region, the confirmed tanker strike in the Black Sea and anomalous vessel behavior in the Atlantic point to a broader, multi-theater risk environment.

In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain defined by restricted transit through Hormuz, controlled movement under selective access conditions, and continued redistribution of trade flows across global maritime corridors.

The post March 17, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Bulk carriers sailing eastbound to exit the Middle East Gulf are re-routing through Iranian territorial waters to navigate the Strait of Hormuz, circumventing shorter, normal international navigation channels.
• Windward tracked at least five ships using this Iranian waters route over March 15 and 16.
• Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — the waterway for 20% of the world’s oil and gas — is down by approximately 97%.
• The new route, which allows allies and supporters to transit, illustrates how Iran’s selective blockade has evolved.
• The bulk carriers tracked eastbound through the strait had, in nearly all cases, previously called at Imam Khomeini port in Iran.

Re-Routing Through Iranian Territorial Waters

Bulk carriers sailing eastbound to exit the Middle East Gulf are seen re-routing through Iranian waters over the past 48 hours as they navigate through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the first signs of a workaround in the region.

Windward tracked at least five ships over March 15 and 16 leaving via a route that takes ships well within Iran’s territorial waters, circumventing shorter, normal international navigation channels.

There’s intense scrutiny around the number of transits via the Strait of Hormuz as the international waterway through which 20% of the world’s oil and gas remains effectively shut to shipping. Traffic is down around 97%.

Yet limited traffic is emerging, including evidence that vessels are sailing via longer routes through the Hormuz strait as they leave the Middle East Gulf.

In nearly all cases these bulk carriers, and others, that have been tracked eastbound through the Strait of Hormuz have previously called at Imam Khomeini port in Iran, one of the Islamic Republic’s key commercial ports.

The tracking augments rising evidence that Iran is exerting permission-based transit and control of the strait as the war extends into its third week, with its effective closure roiling the global economy.

The new route illustrates how Iran’s selective blockade has evolved to allow allies and supporters to transit.  In addition to bulk carriers, two liquefied petroleum gas carriers have sailed through in the past 36 hours. Their route wasn’t immediately apparent as GPS jamming obscured the tankers’ trajectory via AIS.

Eight ships, excluding Iranian flagged vessels, were tracked through the strait with their AIS on March 16, nearly double numbers seen earlier this week.

The post Bulk Carriers Find New Route Out of Hormuz Strait appeared first on Windward.

• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited, with only three outbound crossings recorded on March 15 and no inbound transits.
• Maritime security risk across the Gulf remains high, with 20 confirmed incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure recorded since the start of the Iran war.
• Kharg Island remains operational despite recent strikes, with multiple tankers still present near the terminal even as export volumes remain well below pre-war levels.
• Route redistribution remains active, with Bab el-Mandeb traffic sharply reduced, Suez Canal volumes rebounding, and Cape of Good Hope diversion traffic staying elevated.
• Regional logistics strain is increasing outside the Gulf, particularly at Salalah and Karachi, while Saudi Arabia continues expanding its Red Sea crude export workaround.
• Maritime security pressure is also widening beyond the Gulf, with a tanker strike in the Black Sea and unusual Russian tanker activity near a damaged Arctic gas platform.

Operational Overview 

Maritime activity across the Gulf and adjacent shipping systems remained heavily disrupted on March 15 as the conflict continued to distort commercial traffic patterns, energy flows, and maritime security conditions.

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remained near paralysis, with only three outbound vessels recorded and no inbound crossings. While that marks a slight increase from the previous day’s full visible halt, activity remains far below normal commercial levels and underscores the continued reluctance of operators to enter the corridor.

The broader security picture remains severe. Since the start of the Iran war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Cargo vessels account for the overwhelming majority of affected ships, indicating that the threat environment remains centered on mainstream commercial traffic rather than niche vessel categories.

Beyond the Gulf, global shipping routes continue adjusting. Bab el-Mandeb traffic remains sharply reduced, Suez Canal volumes partially rebounded, and Cape of Good Hope diversions remained elevated. At the same time, pressure is growing on alternative logistics hubs outside the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia continues shifting crude exports toward Red Sea infrastructure.

The conflict is also increasingly influencing maritime security beyond the immediate Gulf theater. A Greek-flagged tanker strike near Novorossiysk in the Black Sea, together with unusual Russian tanker behavior near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform, suggests that geopolitical maritime risk is spreading across multiple regions at once. 

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained extremely limited on March 15.

Windward recorded three outbound crossings and no inbound transits, marking the first visible movement through the Strait since March 13. While this represents a 300% increase compared with March 14, when no crossings were recorded, activity remains only marginally above the 7-day moving average of 2.29 crossings and still far below normal commercial levels.

The vessels included one bulk carrier and two vessels classified as other or unknown. Flag distribution included one Liberian-flagged vessel and one Guyana-flagged vessel.

One of the transiting ships was the sanctioned VLCC NORA (IMO 9237539), which loaded approximately 2.01 million barrels of crude oil at Kharg Island and departed the terminal on March 7. The vessel is currently en route to Ningbo, China, reinforcing that limited Iranian export flows continue despite the wider disruption.

Maritime Security Incidents

Maritime security monitoring indicates a sustained pattern of attacks against commercial shipping and offshore infrastructure across Gulf waters. Since the start of the Iran war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.

Cargo vessels account for the overwhelming majority of affected ships, representing 90% of all attacks. The breakdown includes eight bulk carriers (40%), six tankers (30%), four container vessels (20%), and two service or support vessels (10%).

Ownership and flag analysis indicate that several affected vessels had Western or Gulf-state linkages. Three vessels had a U.S. nexus, three had a UAE nexus, and three had a UK nexus based on ownership or flag state connections.

Geographically, the Northern Arabian Gulf has been the most affected area, accounting for 45% of incidents (9 vessels), followed by the Strait of Hormuz at 30% (6 vessels) and the Gulf of Oman at 25% (5 vessels).

Recent port call analysis also suggests elevated exposure after entering the regional threat environment. Approximately 45% of targeted vessels had recently called at UAE ports, while 20% had recent Iraqi port calls. At the same time, the affected vessels also included ships arriving from Thailand, Vietnam, and Brazil, indicating that the risk extends well beyond regionally linked trade alone.

Taken together, the pattern suggests broad targeting of dense commercial shipping lanes rather than a narrow focus on one nationality or operator class.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb remained sharply reduced on March 15.

Windward recorded 10 total crossings, consisting of five inbound and five outbound vessels. That represents a 52.4% decrease from the previous day and remains well below the 7-day average of 20.71 crossings.

The most common vessel subclasses included two bulk carriers, two oil and chemical tankers, and two oil products tankers. Flag distribution was led by Liberia with four vessels, followed by Singapore and China with one vessel each.

The continued decline reflects persistent operator concern over missile and drone threats to commercial shipping in the Red Sea corridor.

Suez Canal 

Traffic through the Suez Canal partially rebounded on March 15.

Windward recorded 39 total crossings, including 17 inbound vessels and 22 outbound vessels. That represents a 69.57% increase compared with the previous day and places activity above the 7-day average of 34 crossings.

The traffic mix included 11 bulk carriers, six crude oil tankers, and six container vessels. Liberia led flag distribution with 11 vessels, followed by Panama with five and Sierra Leone with three.

The rebound suggests that some operators are still willing to test Red Sea-linked routing despite the ongoing regional threat picture.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Diversion traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated on March 15.

Windward recorded 82 total vessel transits, including 35 eastbound and 47 westbound crossings. That represents an 18.84% increase compared with March 14 and remains broadly consistent with the 7-day moving average of 81.57 crossings.

The traffic mix was led by 26 bulk carriers, 21 container vessels, and eight crude oil tankers. Liberia led the flag distribution with 21 vessels, followed by Singapore with 14 and the Marshall Islands with 10.

These sustained volumes confirm that long-haul diversions around Africa remain a core alternative for operators avoiding Gulf and Red Sea risk corridors. The result continues to be longer voyage times, higher freight costs, and increased strain on Asia-Europe trade lanes.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational congestion is increasing across regional ports as vessels adjust routing and transshipment strategies in response to the Gulf conflict.

Inside the Gulf, Jebel Ali recorded 4 transshipment rollovers, up 100% from the previous day, though still 31.71% below the 7-day average, alongside 6 transshipment delay cases, up 200% day-on-day but still 34.37% below the 7-day average.

Outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded 8 transshipment rollovers, up 33.33% from the previous day and 300% above the 7-day average. Salalah recorded 26 transshipment rollovers, down 18.75% day-on-day but still 18.18% above the 7-day average, alongside 72 transshipment delay cases, up 100% from the previous day and 168.09% above the 7-day average.

The surge in delays at Salalah highlights its growing role as an alternative logistics hub outside the Gulf conflict zone.

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Export Pivot

Saudi Arabia continues accelerating its crude export rerouting through the East-West Pipeline, or Petroline, to reduce dependence on Gulf shipping routes.

Windward data shows weekly tanker port calls at Saudi Red Sea ports increasing from roughly 58 in late December 2025 to more than 90 by early March 2026.

This shift has contributed to a visible buildup of VLCCs near Yanbu, where vessels are waiting to load crude transported across the Arabian Peninsula. The accumulation underscores the scale of Saudi Arabia’s effort to sustain exports while bypassing Hormuz-related risk.

Black Sea Incident

On March 14, 2026, the Greek-flagged tanker MARAN HOMER, owned by the Angelicoussis Shipping Group and operating under a U.S. commercial manager, was struck by a suspected drone or small missile while operating in the Black Sea.

The vessel was unladen and waiting approximately 14 nautical miles off the Russian port of Novorossiysk to load crude oil when it sustained minor damage on its starboard side. All 24 crew members were unharmed, and the vessel was able to depart the strike area under its own power.

Greek Maritime Affairs officials have indicated that the attack may represent a secondary geopolitical consequence of the broader conflict involving Iran, assessing the strike as a possible pressure tactic linked to the recent U.S. decision to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil in order to stabilize global energy markets disrupted by the Gulf conflict.

The incident highlights the expanding geographic scope of maritime security risks, suggesting that commercial shipping may increasingly face asymmetric threats across multiple maritime theaters simultaneously.

Arctic Activity

Unusual Russian vessel behavior has also been observed in the Arctic.

A Russian tanker, assumed to be carrying Wagner-linked or military personnel, has been loitering near the Arctic Metagaz platform since March 9. The platform experienced an explosion on March 3 that has been widely suspected to be linked to Ukrainian sabotage.

The vessel’s prolonged presence suggests a damage assessment, security, or support mission rather than normal commercial activity.

Emerging Iranian Logistics Activity

Satellite and AIS data indicate renewed movement involving IRISL vessels departing Gaolan Port in Zhuhai, China.

Four Iranian-flagged container ships are currently returning toward Iran. These voyages follow the earlier departures of Shabdis and Barzin, which reportedly carried sodium perchlorate, a key component in solid-propellant missile fuel.

These movements suggest that Iran-linked logistical and industrial supply chains remain active despite sustained pressure on Gulf shipping.

Outlook

The March 16 operating picture points to a maritime system that remains disrupted rather than frozen. Visible traffic through Hormuz remains extremely limited, reflecting continued operator reluctance to transit the corridor under current security conditions.

At the same time, the broader commercial response still reflects extreme caution. Vessel accumulation in the Gulf of Oman, reduced Bab el-Mandeb traffic, elevated Cape diversions, and mounting congestion at alternative hubs indicate that many operators continue to avoid direct exposure to the Gulf threat environment. Maritime security risks are expanding beyond the Gulf theater, illustrated by the strike on the MARAN HOMER in the Black Sea and Russian activity near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform.

In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain defined by restricted transit through Hormuz, continued route redistribution across global corridors, and growing pressure on alternative export and transshipment infrastructure. As the conflict enters its third week, the operational consequences are no longer limited to Gulf shipping alone but are increasingly shaping wider maritime security and trade patterns across multiple regions.

The post March 16, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Commercial vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz fell to zero on March 14, marking the first full day of the conflict with no AIS-confirmed crossings in either direction.
• Multi-source intelligence detected approximately 400 vessels operating in the Gulf of Oman, indicating a large backlog of ships waiting near the Strait rather than immediately rerouting globally.
• Selective transit behavior continues under exceptional conditions, with several Pakistani and Turkish-linked vessels confirmed crossing the Strait on March 13 under apparent authorization or special circumstances.
• Route redistribution across global shipping corridors remains active, with elevated traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, stable flows through Bab el-Mandeb, and sharply reduced volumes transiting the Suez Canal.
• Energy infrastructure disruption expanded beyond the Strait as a drone-related fire temporarily halted oil loading operations at Fujairah, a key Gulf export and bunkering hub located outside Hormuz.
• Iran’s Kharg Island export terminal remains operational despite recent strikes, while satellite imagery confirms continued tanker activity around the terminal even as export volumes remain significantly below pre-war levels.
• Policy responses to the war-driven oil market disruption are expanding, with OFAC General License 134 allowing Russian oil already loaded on approximately 377 tankers (≈215 million barrels) to complete delivery.

Operational Overview 

Maritime activity across the Gulf maritime and energy system remained highly unstable on March 14 as the conflict entered its third week.

Commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz fell to a new low, with no AIS-confirmed vessel crossings recorded in either direction. The development marks the first visible halt in commercial shipping through the chokepoint since hostilities began.

Despite the lack of visible traffic inside the Strait itself, the surrounding maritime environment remains densely populated. Multi-source intelligence collected on March 13 identified approximately 400 vessels operating across the Gulf of Oman, indicating that many shipping operators are holding position near the chokepoint rather than committing to long-distance diversions.

Selective transit activity also continues under exceptional circumstances. Windward confirmed that four cargo vessels crossed or were crossing the Strait overnight on March 13, including one Pakistani vessel, while three additional vessels were also observed transiting. A Turkish-owned vessel also reportedly received authorization to transit after calling at an Iranian port.

Beyond the Strait, global shipping routes continue to redistribute around the disruption. Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remained broadly stable, Suez Canal volumes fell sharply below recent averages, and rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated.

At the same time, the conflict is beginning to affect adjacent infrastructure and policy systems. Oil loading at Fujairah was temporarily halted after a drone-related fire, work on the 2Africa “Pearls” subsea cable segment in the Arabian Gulf was suspended under force majeure, and the United States issued a sanctions waiver allowing previously loaded Russian oil cargoes to complete delivery.

Taken together, the current maritime picture is defined by visible paralysis inside Hormuz, conditional exceptions for selected vessels, continued global rerouting, and widening disruption across energy infrastructure, logistics, and maritime policy frameworks.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz fell to zero on March 14, with no AIS-confirmed crossings recorded in either direction, marking a 100% decrease compared with the previous day, and falling well below the 7-day average of 2.57 crossings.

Iranian officials have framed the situation as a selective restriction rather than a full closure. In remarks on March 15, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the Strait remains open to international shipping and claimed that only U.S. and Israeli vessels are barred from transit. According to Araghchi, vessels avoiding the area are doing so because of general security concerns rather than formal Iranian enforcement measures.

The statement comes amid U.S. warnings that multinational naval forces could be deployed to ensure freedom of navigation if Iranian attempts to restrict transit continue.

Selective and Low-Visibility Movement 

Despite the absence of AIS-confirmed crossings on March 14, intelligence sources indicate that limited vessel movement occurred shortly beforehand.

Windward confirmed that four cargo vessels crossed or were crossing the Strait overnight on March 13 and into the early morning hours, including one Pakistani vessel.

Separately, Turkish authorities confirmed that a Turkish-owned vessel was permitted to transit the Strait after calling at an Iranian port, while 14 additional Turkish-owned vessels remain in the region awaiting clearance.

Multi-source intelligence also identified a ~200-meter vessel transiting the Strait on March 13 at 02:05 UTC, suggesting that isolated movements were still occurring shortly before AIS-visible traffic dropped to zero.

Taken together, these developments suggest that access to the Strait may increasingly be managed through selective authorization rather than normal commercial freedom of navigation, with some vessels permitted passage based on operational or diplomatic considerations.

Gulf of Oman Maritime Overview

Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence for the Gulf of Oman on March 13 identified approximately 400 vessels operating in the region, indicating a densely populated maritime environment surrounding the Strait.

The concentration suggests that many vessels are holding position outside Hormuz rather than dispersing globally, potentially reflecting expectations that the corridor may reopen.

Vessel size distribution includes:

• <80 m: 24 vessels.
• 80–150 m: 127 vessels.
• 150–250 m: 178 vessels.
• 250–350 m: 60 vessels.
• 350 m+: 11 vessels.

Medium-sized vessels between 150–250 meters dominate the distribution, while vessels larger than 250 meters account for roughly 18% of detections.

The relatively small number of vessels under 80 meters suggests that the area represents a commercial shipping concentration rather than a small-craft anchorage zone.

Satellite imagery also identified at least eight vessels positioned east of the Strait, likely operating in floating storage or waiting-to-load patterns.

Kharg Island Export Activity

Iran’s primary crude export terminal at Kharg Island continues to operate despite sustained military strikes and regional maritime disruption.

Recent U.S. strikes reportedly targeted military infrastructure rather than oil loading facilities, suggesting an effort to signal escalation capability without immediately disrupting global oil supply.

Vessel tracking and satellite imagery confirm that limited crude export activity continues at the terminal, with multiple VLCC-class vessels present despite export volumes remaining well below pre-war levels.

According to Vortexa data, two sanctioned tankers departed Kharg after March 11, including SERENA (IMO 9569645), which departed March 11, and ARK III (IMO 9187655), departing March 15.

The combined cargo associated with these departures is estimated at approximately 2.68 million barrels of crude oil.

Satellite imagery indicates a sustained tanker presence around the terminal.

EO imagery from March 14 identified six VLCCs and two smaller tankers positioned at or near the terminal.

SAR imagery from March 15 shows approximately ten tankers in the Kharg anchorage area, suggesting that additional vessels may be waiting to load or operating with limited AIS visibility.

Satellite-based fire monitoring detected active fire signatures on Kharg Island on March 14, consistent with reports of recent strikes, though no active detections were visible on March 15 imagery.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb remained broadly stable on March 14.

A total of 21 crossings (13 inbound, 8 outbound) were recorded, representing a 40% increase compared with the previous day and remaining close to the 7-day average of 22.57 crossings.

Traffic included six bulk carriers, four container vessels, and four crude oil tankers among the most common vessel subclasses observed. Flag distribution was led by Panama with six vessels and Liberia with five, followed by Malta with two vessels.

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal declined sharply.

A total of 23 crossings (15 inbound, 8 outbound) were recorded, representing a 39.47% decrease compared with the previous day and falling significantly below the 7-day average of 36.86 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included five crude oil tankers, five bulk carriers, and two general cargo vessels, while the flag distribution was led by Liberia and Panama with five vessels each, followed by the Marshall Islands with four vessels.

The decline suggests that operators are increasingly avoiding Red Sea routes linked to the Gulf crisis.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope remained active on March 14, although overall traffic declined compared with the previous day. A total of 69 crossings were recorded (35 eastbound and 34 westbound), representing a 28.12% decrease compared with the previous day and falling below the 7-day moving average of 78.25 transits.

The traffic mix was led by 27 bulk carriers and 13 container vessels, with five crude oil tankers also observed among the transiting vessels. An additional 24 vessels were classified under other or unidentified categories, reflecting the diverse traffic composition along this long-haul diversion route.

Flag distribution was evenly concentrated among the leading registries, with 10 vessels each flagged to Panama, the Marshall Islands, and Liberia.

Despite the day-to-day decline, the sustained level of traffic confirms that long-haul diversions around Africa remain an active routing strategy as operators continue to avoid higher-risk corridors linked to the Gulf and Red Sea conflict zones. These diversions imply longer voyage times, higher freight costs, and increased logistical pressure on Asia–Europe trade lanes.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational exceptions on March 14 indicate continuing strain across Gulf-adjacent logistics hubs.

Inside the Gulf

Umm al Quwain, UAE:

• 2 transshipment delays (+900% vs 7-day average).

Hamad, Qatar:

• 2 transshipment rollovers.

Outside the Gulf

Karachi, Pakistan:

• 6 transshipment rollovers.
• 9 delay cases (+152% vs 7-day average).

Salalah, Oman:

• 34 rollovers.
• 36 delays (+76% vs average).

Sohar, Oman:

• 3 delay cases (+162.5% vs average).

The disruption remains concentrated in Oman and Pakistan, reflecting the role of these ports as major transshipment hubs for Gulf-linked cargo flows.

Fujairah Energy Hub Disruption

Oil loading operations at Fujairah, the UAE’s key export and bunkering hub located outside the Strait of Hormuz, were temporarily suspended following a drone-related incident on March 14.

UAE authorities reported intercepting a drone, but debris from the interception caused a fire at the facility, prompting a precautionary halt in loading operations while damage assessments were conducted.

Fujairah is a critical outlet for Murban crude exports and one of the world’s largest bunkering hubs, with more than 70 million barrels of storage capacity.

The incident highlights the vulnerability of alternative export infrastructure relied upon to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

Critical Infrastructure Disruption

The conflict is also beginning to affect non-shipping maritime infrastructure.

Work on the “Pearls” segment of the 2Africa subsea cable project in the Arabian Gulf has been suspended after contractor Alcatel Submarine Networks issued force majeure notices citing regional security risks.

The suspension underscores how the conflict is beginning to affect digital infrastructure and subsea installation operations, extending disruption beyond shipping and energy markets.

OFAC General License 134

On March 12, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 134, temporarily authorizing the delivery and sale of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products loaded on vessels on or before March 12, 2026.

The measure is intended to stabilize commodity markets disrupted by the Middle East war and currently affects approximately 215 million barrels of Russian oil carried by 377 tankers that remain at sea or in floating storage. The cargo mix includes about 126 million barrels of crude oil, 60 million barrels of refined products, and 35 million barrels of fuel oil.

Windward data indicates that 44% of the affected tankers are sanctioned by the United States, United Kingdom, or European Union, while roughly 50% are classified as high-risk vessels. The fleet involved includes approximately 10 VLCCs, 60 Suezmax tankers, 135 Aframax or LR2 tankers, and more than 130 Medium Range tankers.

The license allows cargoes already loaded to complete delivery, but does not authorize new Russian oil trade. By enabling these shipments to reach their destinations, the waiver reduces pressure on floating storage while helping stabilize oil markets disrupted by the Gulf conflict.

Russian Oil Floating Storage

Beyond the cargoes covered by GL134, approximately 250 million barrels of Russian crude and petroleum products remain at sea, either in floating storage or awaiting discharge.

China and India remain the largest destination markets for Russian maritime crude flows.

The accumulation of oil on the water reflects both logistical disruption caused by the Gulf conflict and backlog created by sanctions and market volatility.

Outlook

Maritime traffic patterns around the Gulf suggest that shipping operators are currently adopting a wait-and-see posture rather than committing to permanent rerouting. The concentration of hundreds of vessels in the Gulf of Oman indicates that many operators expect some form of reopening or controlled transit regime in the Strait of Hormuz rather than a prolonged closure.

However, the risk environment remains highly unstable. The halt in Hormuz transit, infrastructure disruptions, such as the Fujairah incident, and ongoing military activity across the region continue to create uncertainty for commercial shipping and energy markets. 

If restrictions on Hormuz transit persist, the global shipping system is likely to experience continued route redistribution toward the Cape of Good Hope, declining Suez Canal volumes, and sustained logistical pressure on Asia–Europe trade corridors. Energy markets would face additional strain as export routes adjust and floating storage accumulates.

In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain characterized by limited authorized transits, vessel accumulation outside the Gulf, and elevated reliance on satellite and Remote Sensing Intelligence to monitor activity in contested waters.

The post March 15, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained near a standstill during the week, with only 10 vessel crossings recorded between March 7 and March 11, compared to a typical daily average of 70-80 crossings.
• Maritime attacks intensified across the Gulf, bringing the total number of vessels struck since the start of the conflict to at least 16 ships across multiple maritime zones.
• Remote Sensing Intelligence detected dark vessel presence inside the Strait, suggesting limited transit activity continues under partially visible or non-transmitting conditions.
• Electronic interference expanded sharply, with more than 1,650 vessels experiencing GPS and AIS disruption across the Gulf region.
• Global shipping routes continued to adjust to the disruption, with Cape of Good Hope diversion traffic remaining elevated while Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal volumes fluctuated.
• Saudi Arabia accelerated its Petroline export workaround, redirecting crude shipments toward the Red Sea port of Yanbu, where a fleet of 27 VLCCs is now arriving to load cargoes.
• Energy supply disruption deepened across the region as Iraqi production collapsed, Asian refiners reduced operations, and global tanker freight rates surged.
• Dry bulk commodity flows through the Gulf also collapsed, leaving hundreds of bulk carriers stranded and disrupting key global metals and fertilizer supply chains.
• Sanctions and oil-flow dynamics also shifted beyond the Gulf, as OFAC temporarily allowed Russian crude already at sea to complete delivery while Swedish authorities boarded the sanctioned tanker SEA OWL I in European waters.

The Second Week of the Iran War at Sea

Two weeks after the launch of Operation Epic Fury, the maritime conflict in the Gulf has shifted from immediate disruption to sustained systemic stress across global shipping networks.

The initial days of the conflict triggered a rapid collapse in commercial confidence in the Strait of Hormuz as vessel strikes, missile threats, and insurance withdrawals pushed operators out of the corridor. By the start of the second week, routine commercial traffic had largely disappeared.

Vessel attacks expanded geographically, electronic interference intensified, and global shipping routes began redistributing trade flows away from Gulf transit corridors.

Major powers also expanded their monitoring posture in the region. China deployed the Liaowang-1 signals intelligence vessel to the Gulf of Oman, placing a large maritime surveillance platform within observation range of the conflict theater. Regional governments have also begun intervening directly in maritime security. Pakistan launched a naval escort mission, Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr, to protect merchant vessels transporting critical cargoes to Karachi.

Energy supply chains also began restructuring. Saudi Arabia accelerated exports through its Red Sea pipeline bypass, while Iraqi exports collapsed as tanker access to southern terminals became constrained.

Nearly two weeks after the initial maritime shock, the conflict is now reshaping shipping behavior, global trade routes, and energy logistics simultaneously.

Hormuz Traffic Remains Suppressed

Commercial activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained extremely limited throughout the second week of the conflict.

Only 10 commercial vessel crossings were recorded between March 7 and March 11, compared with a typical daily average of roughly 70–80 crossings through the Strait of Hormuz.

Daily transit levels fluctuated between one and three vessel crossings, with several days recording no inbound movements.

In many cases, the vessels that continued to transit were Iranian-flagged ships or vessels with elevated compliance risk profiles, including sanctioned or high-risk operators.

Windward analysis shows that 44% of vessels transiting during the crisis carried elevated compliance risk, highlighting that the ships continuing to operate in the corridor are not typical risk-averse commercial operators.

Defensive AIS Messaging Emerges in the Strait

A significant share of vessels continuing to operate near the Strait appear to be linked to shadow fleet networks or non-Western operators. Windward identified 36 vessels broadcasting nationality signals through AIS destination fields, an unusual behavior pattern that emerged during the week.

23 of these vessels were Chinese-linked ships, broadcasting standardized messages such as “CHINESE CREW OWNER,” “CHINA OWNER & CREW,” and “CHINESE VSL AND CREW.” Additional vessels transmitting similar identity signals included five Iraqi-linked ships broadcasting messages such as “IRAQI OWNER” or “IRAQI PORTS,” and one Turkish vessel transmitting “TRIST-TURKISH CREW.”

The vessels using these signals were primarily commercial cargo ships and tankers, including 22 cargo vessels and 11 tankers, operating under flags led by Panama (11 vessels), Liberia (6), Hong Kong (5), and Norway (3).

Dark Vessel Activity Detected Inside Hormuz

Remote Sensing Intelligence also indicates that AIS-visible traffic does not capture the full level of vessel presence in the Strait. Satellite imagery detected eight large vessels inside Hormuz operating without AIS transmission, including one vessel roughly 330 meters long, consistent with a VLCC positioned near the Iranian side of the waterway.

These observations suggest that limited dark or partially visible vessel movement may be occurring alongside the few confirmed AIS-tracked crossings, indicating that the true level of traffic inside the Strait may be higher than visible tracking alone suggests.

Taken together, these signals suggest that the Strait has shifted from a routine commercial corridor to a highly restricted maritime zone where transit remains possible only under exceptional conditions.

Vessel Attacks Expand Across Maritime Zones

Maritime attacks continued to intensify throughout the second week of the conflict.

By March 11, at least 16 vessels had been struck since February 28, spanning a wide geographic arc across the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, UAE coastal waters, and Iraqi export zones.

Several of the most serious incidents occurred on March 11, when multiple vessels were targeted across the region.

The Thai-flagged bulk carrier MAYUREE NAREE was struck north of Oman, triggering an engine-room fire that disabled propulsion and forced the crew to abandon ship.

The Japanese container vessel ONE MAJESTY was struck northwest of Ras Al Khaimah, sustaining minor hull damage but remaining seaworthy.

The Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier STAR GWYNETH was hit by a projectile northwest of Dubai, suffering structural damage to its cargo hold and ballast tank.

Two crude oil tankers, SAFESEA VISHNU and ZEFYROS, conducting a ship-to-ship transfer operation near the Basra offshore STS zone, were also attacked by explosive-laden Iranian unmanned surface vessels, triggering major fires and forcing Iraqi authorities to suspend export terminal operations. 

The distribution of these incidents suggests a deliberate strategy aimed at generating widespread disruption across maritime logistics rather than targeting a single chokepoint or vessel category.

Across the broader conflict period, at least 16 vessels have now been struck, including Skylight, MKD Vyom, Sea La Donna, Hercules Star, Stena Imperative, Athe Nova, Ocean Electra, Safeen Prestige, Sonangol Namibe, Prima, and the tug Musaffah 2, highlighting the widening geographic scope of maritime targeting.

GPS Jamming and AIS Disruption Intensify

Electronic interference across the Gulf expanded significantly during the second week of the conflict.

Windward identified more than 1,650 vessels affected by GPS and AIS disruption, representing a major increase compared with the first week of the war.

AIS signals were falsely projected across locations stretching from Kuwait through the Arabian Gulf and into the Gulf of Oman.

More than 30 jamming clusters were detected across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Iran.

Interference patterns also evolved. Early circular spoofing distortions were increasingly replaced by zig-zag displacement patterns, where vessel signals jumped across multiple locations within a single day.

This environment complicates both navigation and compliance monitoring. Vessels may appear hundreds of kilometers from their actual positions, while other ships disappear entirely from AIS tracking despite remaining physically present in the water.

Naval Mine Threat Raises Risk for Full Strait Closure

U.S. intelligence officials believe Iran has begun preparing to deploy naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz. Initial deployment may involve several dozen mines, though Iran is estimated to possess an inventory of roughly 2,000 naval mines and retains significant minelaying capability despite recent strikes on Iranian maritime assets.

Even a limited number of mines could render the Strait unsafe for commercial shipping for days or weeks. Mine clearance operations require specialized countermeasure vessels, extensive seabed surveying, and coordinated naval protection, meaning that the mere presence of mines could effectively halt traffic through one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

U.S. naval forces have already begun targeting suspected Iranian minelaying assets in the region. According to U.S. Central Command, several vessels believed capable of deploying naval mines were destroyed near the Strait during recent operations, indicating that counter-mine efforts are already underway.

Markets reacted quickly to the reports, with oil prices briefly rising by roughly $10 per barrel as traders assessed the possibility of a broader disruption. Even limited mining would carry strategic consequences: a small number of mines can force insurers and shipping operators to treat the entire corridor as unsafe, potentially shutting the Strait without a formal blockade.

Global Shipping Routes Continue to Redistribute

As Hormuz traffic collapsed, global shipping routes continued adjusting to absorb displaced flows.

Traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained consistently elevated throughout the week, with 383 vessel transits recorded between March 7 and March 11, averaging roughly 77 crossings per day as operators rerouted around Middle Eastern chokepoints.

Activity through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal fluctuated throughout the week as operators adjusted routing strategies. Bab el-Mandeb recorded 122 crossings during the period, while the Suez Canal handled 185 transits, reflecting the uneven distribution of global shipping flows as vessels balanced Red Sea risk against long-haul diversions around Africa. 

These movements indicate that global shipping flows are entering a period of prolonged redistribution rather than a short-term disruption.

Regional Port Operations Continue to Strain

Operational strain is also appearing across regional port infrastructure as the disruption propagates through Gulf logistics networks.

Across the reporting period of March 8–12, exception indicators rose across multiple hubs.

Jebel Ali (UAE) recorded 19 late departures, 25 transshipment rollovers, and 52 transshipment delays across the week.

Salalah (Oman) experienced the most severe disruption, with 37 late departures, 20 rollovers, and 126 transshipment delay cases, including a surge of 88 delay incidents recorded in a single day.

Karachi (Pakistan) reported 12 late departures and 10 transshipment delays, while Hamad (Qatar) recorded 7 late departures and Shuwaikh (Kuwait) logged 2 late departures and 2 transshipment rollovers.

These indicators suggest that chokepoint disruption is beginning to spread beyond transit corridors into regional port operations and container logistics networks, amplifying the broader supply chain impact of the conflict.

Iranian Export Activity Continues at Kharg Island Despite Disruption

Iran’s primary crude export terminal at Kharg Island has continued operating throughout the conflict, although export volumes have fallen sharply and tanker activity has become increasingly opaque.

Satellite imagery from March 7 confirms a substantial clustering of tankers at the terminal and in nearby waiting areas. At the time of the capture, two VLCCs and one Aframax tanker were berthed at the terminal, while two additional VLCCs and one Aframax were anchored nearby alongside several MR tankers awaiting loading or departure. The concentration of tonnage indicates that export operations remain active despite heightened maritime risk in the surrounding Gulf waters.

However, overall export throughput has declined significantly since the start of hostilities on February 28. Average crude exports from Kharg Island fell from approximately 2.04 million barrels per day between February 1 and February 27 to roughly 0.98 million barrels per day between February 28 and March 12, representing a 51.7% reduction in daily export volumes.

Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence indicates that six VLCCs have loaded at Kharg Island since February 28 while manipulating their broadcast positions or identities, underscoring the extent to which Iranian export continuity is now relying on deceptive shipping behavior.

Satellite imagery from March 7 confirms the presence of HEDY, NORA, and PING SHUN either berthed or waiting offshore despite AIS signals indicating misleading or impossible positions. Several vessels have been operating fully dark, including NORA, which has not transmitted AIS since February 14, DANIEL since February 22, and HEDY since February 24.

Other vessels appear to be actively spoofing their positions. PING SHUN broadcast a circular movement pattern in the Gulf of Oman while imagery confirmed it was physically present near Kharg Island before departing the terminal on March 10. STAR FOREST transmitted a linear AIS track across the Iran–Kuwait–Iraq EEZ triangle, inconsistent with observed vessel movement, while DEEP SEA has remained dark since March 7 after last broadcasting near Malaysia.

These patterns indicate that Iranian crude exports are continuing at reduced levels but with heightened reliance on deceptive shipping behavior, complicating real-time monitoring of export flows from one of the Gulf’s most critical energy terminals.

Energy Logistics Shift Toward the Red Sea

Energy export systems across the Gulf began rapidly adjusting to the disruption as Saudi Arabia restructured crude flows away from the Strait of Hormuz.

The primary driver of this shift has been the forced shutdown of major Saudi offshore production facilities following the escalation of maritime risk in the Gulf. Approximately 2.0 to 2.5 million barrels per day of offshore output from the Safaniya, Marjan, Zuluf, and Abu Safa fields is currently offline, representing roughly 20% of Saudi Arabia’s total production capacity.

At the same time, Saudi crude shipments through the Strait of Hormuz have dropped sharply. Export volumes fell to 4.06 million barrels per day, down from a pre-crisis baseline of 6.64 million barrels per day, representing a 39% reduction in Gulf-bound flows.

To compensate, Saudi Arabia accelerated its use of the East–West Petroline pipeline, which transports crude from eastern production hubs directly to Red Sea export terminals.

Saudi Arabia has also issued warnings to Tehran that any attacks on Saudi territory or energy infrastructure would trigger retaliation, reflecting growing concern that the conflict could expand beyond maritime disruption into direct strikes on Gulf energy production systems.

The impact is now visible in export data. Red Sea crude shipments from Yanbu surged to approximately 2.47 million barrels per day during the week of March 2, representing a 330% increase compared with pre-crisis levels.

This shift is also visible in tanker deployment patterns. A fleet of 27 very large crude carriers (VLCCs) is currently sailing toward Yanbu, where they will load Petroline-delivered crude for export toward Mediterranean and Asian markets.

Arrival schedules suggest continuous loading activity, with vessels arriving at a rate of one to two per day through late March.

Iraqi Oil Export Collapse

While Saudi Arabia was able to reroute exports, Iraq experienced one of the most severe energy disruptions during the week.

Iraqi oil production reportedly fell from approximately 4.3 million barrels per day to roughly 1.3 million barrels per day.

Exports declined by at least 800,000 barrels per day, largely due to the closure of the Al-Basra Offshore Terminal and the inability of tankers to safely navigate the Strait of Hormuz.

Destination data shows a two-tier impact across Iraqi customer markets.

South Korea and Greece have received zero Iraqi crude cargoes in March, representing a complete supply interruption.

India and China — Iraq’s largest buyers — have seen deliveries fall by 80–93% compared with January levels.

This collapse represents one of the clearest examples of maritime disruption directly translating into upstream energy supply destruction.

The disruption has triggered what market observers describe as an energy panic across parts of Asia. Several Chinese refineries have reportedly reduced operating capacity or declared force majeure due to feedstock shortages, while Asian buyers are aggressively seeking replacement cargoes from Africa and Latin America.

Commodity Trade Disruption Spreads Beyond Oil

The maritime disruption is also affecting global commodity supply chains.

Dry bulk transits through the Strait of Hormuz have fallen sharply, leaving approximately 280 bulk carriers stranded or effectively trapped within the Gulf.

This has halted exports from a region responsible for roughly 18% of global iron ore pellet exports and 10% of global primary aluminum production.

Aluminum prices have already surged to record highs on the London Metal Exchange, while fertilizer exports from Gulf producers are tightening agricultural supply chains worldwide.

The disruption illustrates how chokepoint instability can propagate rapidly across multiple industrial markets beyond energy.

Shadow Fleet Activity Exploits the Crisis

​​The conflict environment has also created opportunities for sanctions evasion operations.

During the week, the sanctioned Russian tanker M/V TRUST conducted a high-probability semi-dark ship-to-ship transfer in Omani waters involving roughly 325,000 barrels of Russian crude.

The vessel temporarily disabled AIS transmission during a prolonged stationary meeting with another tanker before resuming normal broadcasting.

The timing of the transfer suggests that shadow fleet operators may be exploiting the reduced maritime visibility created by the Gulf conflict to conduct illicit cargo movements.

Russian Oil at Sea Receives Temporary Sanctions Relief

The widening energy disruption also forced a temporary policy adjustment in Western sanctions enforcement. On March 12, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 134, allowing Russian crude oil and petroleum products already loaded onto vessels to complete delivery.

Windward and Vortexa data indicate that the waiver affects approximately 215 million barrels of Russian oil currently on the water, carried by more than 370 tankers in transit or floating storage. Around 44% of those vessels are already sanctioned by the United States, United Kingdom, or European Union, while roughly half are classified as high-risk vessels.

The measure does not authorize new Russian oil trade, but it does allow cargoes already at sea to be delivered despite the war-driven market shock that pushed oil prices sharply higher. The decision reflects the scale of current supply stress and the difficulty of maintaining existing restrictions during a major Gulf disruption.

Russia Explores Caspian Export Workaround

​​Additional Russian tankers operating without AIS transmission were detected near Iranian ports in the Caspian Sea, suggesting possible coordination between Russian and Iranian energy logistics networks and the potential development of alternative export corridors bypassing southern maritime chokepoints.

The Caspian corridor could allow crude to move northward into Russian ports before re-entering global markets, bypassing the threatened Strait of Hormuz entirely.

While still limited in scale, this activity indicates that Russia-linked shadow fleet networks may be adapting their routing strategies to exploit alternative maritime pathways during the Gulf crisis.

Sanctions Enforcement Continues in European Waters

Even as regulators introduced temporary flexibility for Russian cargoes already at sea, direct enforcement against shadow fleet vessels continued. On March 12, Swedish authorities boarded the sanctioned oil products tanker SEA OWL I while it transited Swedish territorial waters in the Sound Strait southeast of Malmö.

The vessel, currently flagged under Comoros, is sanctioned by both the European Union and the United Kingdom for transporting Russian oil. Windward assigns SEA OWL I the highest compliance risk classification, and its operating pattern — including repeated dark activity near Russian terminals, flag changes, and identity modifications — is consistent with sanctions-evasion tactics commonly associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

The boarding highlights the fragmented operating environment now emerging around Russian oil: some already-loaded cargoes are being allowed to complete delivery, while sanctioned vessels themselves remain exposed to interdiction and enforcement action.

Cuba Energy Supply Crisis Emerges 

Secondary disruptions are also appearing outside the Gulf. Cuba is experiencing its lowest tanker arrival levels in at least twelve months, with only 11 tankers calling Cuban ports in March, compared with 53 arrivals in January and 34 in February.

No laden tankers are currently reporting Cuba as a destination, according to cargo tracking data, indicating a severe disruption in maritime fuel supply to the island.

At the same time, the Russia-linked tanker SEA HORSE ceased visible AIS reporting while approaching Cuban waters after broadcasting a destination toward the island in late February.

Satellite imagery later detected multiple dark vessels at the Matanzas crude terminal, including one tanker approximately 270 meters long and two additional tankers around 200 meters in length.

These signals suggest that opaque maritime logistics networks may be continuing to supply Cuba through dark or spoofed tanker operations, even as visible maritime traffic to the island collapses.

Outlook

Two weeks into the Iran war, the maritime operating environment remains highly unstable.

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited, while vessel attacks, electronic interference, and insurance constraints continue to deter commercial shipping.

At the same time, global shipping routes are redistributing around the disruption, Gulf energy producers are restructuring export pathways, and commodity supply chains are tightening across multiple markets.

The crisis is no longer confined to a single chokepoint. It is now reshaping global shipping routes, tanker deployment patterns, energy logistics, and maritime risk exposure across multiple regions.

Absent a rapid de-escalation, these disruptions could persist well beyond the immediate conflict window.

The post Two Weeks Into the Iran War: A Maritime Intelligence Breakdown appeared first on Windward.

• Maritime security conditions across the Gulf deteriorated sharply on March 11 as coordinated attacks targeted commercial vessels across the Strait of Hormuz, the northern Gulf, and Iraqi territorial waters.
• At least five ships were struck within a 24-hour period, bringing the total number of vessels hit since the start of hostilities on February 28 to at least 16 vessels.
• Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remains near a standstill, with only two outbound crossings recorded and no inbound transits.
• As traffic collapses in the Gulf, alternate global routes are absorbing displaced flows. Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal traffic rose sharply, while volumes around the Cape of Good Hope remain elevated as vessels continue avoiding the Strait.
• Energy logistics are also shifting. Saudi Arabia is accelerating crude exports through the Petroline pipeline to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu, enabling shipments to bypass Hormuz entirely.
• Iranian crude exports from Kharg Island have fallen 51.7% since February 28, while tankers servicing the terminal increasingly rely on AIS suppression and spoofing to obscure activity.

Operational Overview 

Maritime security conditions across the Gulf deteriorated further on March 11 as multiple coordinated attacks targeted commercial vessels across several operating environments, including open transit corridors, anchorage zones, and ship-to-ship transfer areas linked to regional oil exports.

Commercial vessel activity through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited. Only two outbound crossings were recorded during the reporting period, with no inbound transits observed. The collapse in traffic reflects the combined impact of direct attacks, escalating military confrontation, and the withdrawal of insurance coverage for vessels operating in Gulf waters.

While traffic through Hormuz has slowed dramatically, alternate global routes are absorbing displaced maritime flows. Transit volumes increased sharply through both Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, while Cape of Good Hope rerouting continues to rise, confirming the sustained diversion of vessels away from high-risk waters near the Strait.

Energy supply logistics are also adapting. Saudi Arabia is increasingly redirecting crude exports westward through the Petroline pipeline to the Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu, enabling oil shipments to bypass Hormuz entirely.

The maritime picture now reflects a region operating under sustained high-risk conditions, where direct vessel attacks, disrupted shipping flows, and shifting export logistics are reshaping trade patterns across the Middle East.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained severely constrained on March 11.

A total of two crossings were recorded, both outbound, representing a 33% decrease compared with the previous day and remaining broadly aligned with the seven-day average of 2.57 crossings.

The vessels included one crude oil tanker and one vessel of unknown classification.

Flag distribution included one Comoros-flagged vessel and one Netherlands Caribbean-flagged vessel.

No inbound crossings were recorded during the reporting period.

Attacks and Incidents

March 11 marked one of the most severe days of maritime attacks since the conflict began.

At least five vessels were targeted across the Gulf region, including incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, waters near the United Arab Emirates, and Iraqi territorial waters. These attacks bring the total number of ships struck since February 28 to at least 16 vessels across the Gulf and Red Sea theaters.

Mayuree Naree

The Thailand-flagged bulk carrier MAYUREE NAREE sustained the most severe damage when Iranian projectiles struck the vessel approximately 11 nautical miles north of Oman while it was transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

The strike triggered a stern engine-room fire that disabled propulsion. All crew members were evacuated, although three crew members were initially reported missing and believed trapped in the engine room at the time of the incident.

AIS data shows the vessel exhibited extensive dark activity during the nine days preceding the attack, including anomalous speed readings between 81 and 101 knots, behavior consistent with AIS spoofing or signal manipulation.

The vessel had departed Khalifa Port in the UAE and was sailing toward Kandla, India, when it was struck.

One Majesty

The Japan-flagged container ship ONE MAJESTY was struck by a projectile approximately 25 nautical miles northwest of Ras Al Khaimah.

The vessel sustained minor hull damage above the waterline, including a 10-centimeter breach. It remains seaworthy and is proceeding toward a safe anchorage.

Star Gwyneth

The Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier STAR GWYNETH was struck by a projectile roughly 50 nautical miles northwest of Dubai.

The strike caused a two-meter hull breach in the forward cargo hold and damaged a ballast tank, forcing the vessel to anchor for inspection. All crew members remain safe aboard.

The vessel had departed Iran’s Imam Khomeini port nine days earlier following a 12-day port call. The timing raises questions about whether vessels with recent operational links to Iranian exports may face heightened exposure during the conflict.

Basra Ship-to-Ship Tanker Attack

Two crude oil tankers engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer operation near the Basra offshore STS zone were attacked overnight in Iraqi waters.

The vessels were identified as SAFESEA VISHNU, a Marshall Islands-flagged tanker owned by the U.S.-based Safesea Transport Group, and ZEFYROS, a Malta-flagged tanker linked to Greek shipping interests.

The attack occurred roughly five nautical miles south of Al Basrah while both vessels were actively transferring cargo.

Maritime security reporting indicates that explosive-laden Iranian surface vessels struck both tankers, triggering large fires onboard. Iraqi Coast Guard units evacuated the surviving crew members.

One Indian crew member aboard SAFESEA VISHNU was killed in the blast.

The severity of the fires and the proximity to offshore infrastructure prompted Iraqi authorities and the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) to immediately suspend export terminal operations.

The attack represents a clear escalation in targeting strategy. Striking tankers during an STS transfer maximizes both economic disruption and environmental risk within the Gulf’s energy export system.

IRGC Warning and Safe Sia Incident

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has continued issuing warnings that vessels operating in Gulf waters may be targeted if military operations against Iran persist.

Iranian media reported that a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned tanker named SAFE SIA was struck in the northern Persian Gulf after allegedly ignoring warnings issued by the IRGC Navy. Details of the incident remain limited and are still being verified.

Escalation in Maritime Targeting

The attacks follow repeated IRGC statements that vessels perceived to be linked to the United States, Israel, or their partners could be targeted if military operations against Iran continue.

With the latest incidents, the total number of vessels struck since the start of the conflict has reached at least 16 ships.

Shipping activity across the Gulf has slowed dramatically since February 28, when U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran triggered widespread disruption to commercial maritime traffic.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb increased significantly on March 11.

A total of 26 crossings were recorded, representing a 62.5% increase compared with the previous day and rising above the seven-day average of 23.3 crossings.

Traffic included six bulk carriers, five crude oil tankers, and four oil products tankers. Flag distribution was led by Liberia (seven vessels), followed by Panama (six) and the Marshall Islands (three).

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal also rose sharply.

A total of 44 crossings were recorded, representing a 63% increase compared with the previous day and significantly exceeding the seven-day average of 35.29 crossings.

Traffic included 10 bulk carriers, six crude oil tankers, and five oil/chemical tankers. Flag distribution was led by Panama, the Marshall Islands, and Liberia.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated.

A total of 86 crossings were recorded, representing a 7.5% increase compared with the previous day and remaining broadly aligned with the seven-day average of 82.43 crossings.

The majority of vessels were bulk carriers, followed by container vessels and crude tankers.

These sustained volumes confirm that rerouting around Africa remains a primary diversion route for vessels avoiding Middle Eastern transit corridors.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational exceptions increased across several Gulf and regional ports on March 11.

Inside the Gulf

Jebel Ali, UAE:

• 8 late departures (-27.27% vs previous day, +36.59% vs 7-day average).
• 25 transshipment rollovers (+316.67% vs previous day).
• 25 transshipment delays (+101.15% vs 7-day average).

Hamad, Qatar:

• 3 late departures (+200% vs previous day).

Shuwaikh, Kuwait:

• 2 late departures.
• 2 transshipment rollovers.

Outside the Gulf

Karachi, Pakistan:

• 5 late departures.
• 8 transshipment delays (+300% vs weekly average).

Salalah, Oman:

• 11 late departures.
• 8 rollovers.
• 88 transshipment delay cases (+343% vs weekly average).

These disruptions indicate increasing operational strain across Gulf and near-Gulf logistics networks.

Iranian Oil Exports from Kharg Island Decline Sharply

Iran’s primary crude export hub at Kharg Island has experienced a significant decline in throughput since the start of hostilities on February 28.

Average export volumes have fallen from approximately 2.04 million barrels per day between February 1 and February 27 to roughly 0.98 million barrels per day between February 28 and March 12, representing a 51.7% reduction in daily crude exports from Iran’s main loading terminal.

Remote Sensing Intelligence indicates that the tankers servicing Kharg Island are increasingly relying on AIS suppression and location spoofing to obscure export activity. Six Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) linked to the terminal have exhibited deceptive tracking behavior since the start of the conflict.

Satellite imagery from March 7 confirmed three vessels — HEDY, NORA, and PING SHUN — either docked or waiting near the terminal, despite their broadcast AIS signals indicating different locations.

Several vessels in the fleet have been operating completely dark. NORA has not transmitted AIS since February 14, DANIEL since February 22, and HEDY since February 24, even though satellite imagery confirms their presence near Kharg.

Other ships are actively spoofing their positions. PING SHUN broadcast a circular movement pattern in the Gulf of Oman while imagery confirmed it was waiting at the terminal, before departing Kharg on March 10. STAR FOREST transmitted a linear track across the Iran–Kuwait–Iraq EEZ triangle despite showing no physical movement consistent with that track.

These patterns indicate that Iranian export operations are continuing at reduced levels but with heightened reliance on deceptive shipping behavior, likely intended to obscure loading activity and reduce exposure to sanctions enforcement or targeting.

Wet Cargo Analysis: Saudi Red Sea Export Pivot

Saudi Arabia is accelerating efforts to bypass the Strait of Hormuz by redirecting crude exports toward the Red Sea.

Arab Light crude is now being transported through the 1,200-kilometer Petroline pipeline, linking eastern production fields directly to the Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu.

A fleet of 27 Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) is currently signaling Yanbu as their destination. Each vessel can carry roughly two million barrels of crude, indicating sustained export activity through the remainder of the month.

Arrival schedules suggest continuous loading activity, with one vessel arriving immediately, 21 VLCCs scheduled to load by March 21, and five additional vessels expected to arrive between March 22 and March 25. Arrivals are averaging one to two vessels per day.

Ownership within the fleet shows a strong concentration among state-linked shipping operators. Approximately 46% of the vessels are owned by Saudi Arabia’s Bahri, while 32% are owned by China’s COSCO, with the remainder controlled by independent tanker operators.

Freight markets are already reflecting the pressure created by this rerouting. Charter rates for Yanbu-to-Asia VLCC voyages have surged to roughly $460,000 per day, among the highest rates recorded for this route.

Outlook

Maritime risk across the Gulf and surrounding waterways remains extremely elevated following the March 11 attacks.

Recent incidents demonstrate that commercial vessels are now being targeted across multiple operational contexts, including ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, vessels anchored or drifting in Gulf waters, and tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfer operations tied to regional oil exports.

The strike against the Thailand-flagged MAYUREE NAREE during its Hormuz transit, combined with attacks near Dubai and within Iraqi STS zones, indicates that both moving and stationary vessels may be exposed to threat activity.

Iranian messaging continues to reinforce this escalation. IRGC officials have warned that vessels operating in Gulf waters could be targeted if attacks against Iran persist, while Iranian media have reported additional strikes against ships allegedly ignoring naval warnings.

Reports that Iran may be preparing naval mine deployments within the Strait of Hormuz further raise the possibility that the chokepoint could become temporarily inaccessible to commercial shipping.

Shipping operators should expect continued disruption to vessel movement, elevated war-risk exposure, and additional attacks against commercial maritime targets while the conflict remains active.

The post March 12, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained heavily suppressed on March 10, with only two outbound crossings recorded and no inbound movements observed.
• Remote Sensing Intelligence shows vessel presence inside the Strait exceeds AIS-visible traffic, suggesting that limited movement continues under partially visible or dark conditions.
• Multiple commercial vessels were reportedly struck on March 11, reinforcing the continued kinetic threat to ships operating in and around the Strait.
• Chinese crew and ownership messaging continues to appear in AIS broadcasts, suggesting some vessels may be signaling neutrality while attempting transit.
• Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remained below trend, Suez Canal crossings declined further, and Cape of Good Hope rerouting stayed elevated as route redistribution continued.
• Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export pivot is accelerating, with 27 VLCCs now heading toward Yanbu as Gulf export dependency shifts westward.
• Port disruptions are spreading through Gulf and near-Gulf logistics networks, while dry bulk, metals, fertilizer, and crude supply chains are tightening simultaneously.

Operational Overview 

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained heavily suppressed on March 10, with only two outbound crossings recorded and no inbound movements observed. While this represents a slight increase from the previous day, volumes remain far below normal operating levels and continue to reflect a severely disrupted commercial shipping environment.

At the same time, AIS-confirmed crossings do not reflect the full level of vessel activity inside the Strait. Remote Sensing Intelligence from March 10 detected eight dark vessels inside Hormuz. This indicates that limited transit continues to occur under highly constrained and partially visible conditions. Reports that Iran has begun preparations to deploy naval mines in the Strait further increase the risk that Hormuz could become temporarily closed to commercial shipping.

The maritime threat environment worsened further on March 11. Multiple commercial vessels were reportedly struck in and around the Strait and adjacent waters, including the Mayuree Naree, ONE Majesty, and Star Gwyneth, while a UKMTO advisory confirmed another projectile strike north of Oman. These incidents reinforce that vessels willing to enter the area continue to face direct kinetic risk. Emerging behavioral patterns also suggest vessels may be using AIS destination broadcasts referencing Chinese ownership or crew to signal neutrality while attempting transit through the Strait.

Beyond the chokepoint itself, the disruption is accelerating wider trade and supply-chain shifts. Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remains below trend, Suez Canal crossings declined further, and Cape of Good Hope transits remain elevated as global route redistribution continues.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia is rapidly scaling its Red Sea export pivot through Yanbu, with 27 VLCCs heading toward the terminal as Gulf export dependency shifts westward. Port exceptions are rising across the Gulf region, and the disruption is spreading into dry bulk commodities and global industrial supply chains. Additional dark or low-visibility maritime activity has also been detected near both the Strait of Hormuz and Cuban energy infrastructure.

The crisis is now influencing far more than tanker traffic, affecting naval posture, commodity markets, and global trade routes across multiple theaters.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained severely constrained on March 10.

A total of two crossings were recorded, both outbound, representing a 100% increase compared with the previous day but still remaining below the seven-day average of 3.29 crossings.

Observed vessel subclasses included one bulk carrier and one vessel classified as Other / Unknown. Flag distribution included one Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and one Madagascar-flagged vessel.

Recorded Transits

Remote Sensing Intelligence confirms that there are eight dark vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on March 10

While this confirms that limited passage continues, the broader collapse in movement remains severe. Roughly 66 commercial vessels were recorded transiting Hormuz over a nine-day period, representing only a fraction of normal traffic volumes.

A large dark vessel approximately 330 meters long, possibly a VLCC, was also detected near the Iranian side of the Strait in imagery dated March 8 at 07:02 UTC, suggesting additional unreported or low-visibility vessel movement may be occurring inside the waterway.

Hormuz Remote Sensing Intelligence

Remote Sensing Intelligence from March 10 at 14:16 UTC detected eight large vessels within the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that vessel presence inside the waterway may be higher than AIS-confirmed crossings alone suggest. Their direction of travel and confirmation of full transit could not be determined.

Possible classifications include large tankers such as VLCCs, Suezmaxes, Aframax/Panamax tankers, MR tankers, and small coastal tankers. They could also include large cargo vessels such as VLOCs, ultra-large container vessels, Capesize bulk carriers, Post-Panamax bulkers, Kamsarmaxes, Seawaymaxes, Supramax/Ultramax bulkers, Handysize bulkers, or feeder container ships.

The imagery indicates that AIS-visible activity may represent only a portion of vessel presence inside the Strait, with possible dark or low-visibility movement occurring alongside the limited confirmed crossings.

Chinese Crew Signaling Patterns

Windward monitoring identified 23 vessels currently broadcasting AIS destination strings referencing Chinese ownership or crew presence while operating in the Gulf region.

The most common broadcast patterns include variations such as “CHINESE VSL AND CREW,” “CHINA OWNER AND CREW,” and “CHINA OWNER&CREW.” Other variations include “CHINAOWNERALLCHINESE,” “CHINESE SHIP OWNERS,” and “CHINESE COMPANY.”

Bulk carriers represent the largest share of this group, with 10 vessels, followed by five container vessels, three general cargo vessels, two vehicle carriers, one LPG tanker, one heavy load carrier, and one unspecified vessel. Flag distribution was led by Panama with nine vessels, followed by Hong Kong, Liberia, China, and the Marshall Islands.

On March 11, one bulk carrier broadcasting “CHINA CREW” successfully transited the Strait inbound. A second bulk carrier using the same broadcast pattern approached the Strait but subsequently aborted entry and conducted a U-turn.

The pattern suggests the possibility of an informal access filter, where vessels signaling Chinese ownership or crew may be attempting to indicate neutrality or avoid targeting in the current conflict environment.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb remained unchanged on March 10.

A total of 16 crossings were recorded, including seven inbound and nine outbound movements, remaining below the seven-day average of 20.57 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included four container vessels, two crude oil tankers, and two oil/chemical tankers. Flag distribution included Hong Kong with three vessels, Oman with two vessels, and Equatorial Guinea with one vessel.

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal declined further on March 10.

A total of 27 crossings were recorded, including 10 inbound and 17 outbound movements, representing a 32.5% decrease compared with the previous day and remaining below the seven-day average of 35.29 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included eight bulk carriers, three container vessels, and three general cargo vessels. Flag distribution was led by Liberia with six vessels, Panama with five vessels, and Russia with two vessels.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Transit activity around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated on March 10.

A total of 80 crossings were recorded, including 35 eastbound and 45 westbound movements, broadly consistent with the seven-day average of 82.57 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included 31 bulk carriers, 16 container vessels, and six oil/chemicals tankers. Flag distribution was led by Panama with 13 vessels, Liberia with 12 vessels, and the Marshall Islands with nine vessels.

Sustained traffic volumes around the Cape confirm that rerouting around Africa remains a primary alternative for vessels avoiding Middle East transit routes.

Attacks and Incidents

Multiple commercial vessels were reportedly struck in and around the Strait of Hormuz on day 12 of the conflict.

The most severe incident involved the Thai-flagged Mayuree Naree, which was struck by Iranian projectiles approximately 11 nautical miles north of Oman, causing a severe stern engine-room fire and forcing the 23 Thai crew members to abandon ship.

AIS data shows that the vessel exhibited extensive dark activity in the nine days preceding the attack, including anomalous speed reports of 81–101 knots, behavior consistent with AIS spoofing or signal manipulation. The vessel had departed Khalifa Port, UAE, and was sailing toward Kandla, India, when it was hit. The strike occurred shortly after the vessel exited port, suggesting a possible exit-targeting pattern in which vessels are permitted to load or discharge in Gulf ports but are struck during vulnerable outbound transit windows.

The Japan-flagged container ship ONE Majesty also sustained damage in a separate attack approximately 25 nautical miles northwest of Ras Al Khaimah, with the vessel’s master reporting a 10-centimeter hull breach. The vessel remained seaworthy and proceeded under its own power to safe anchorage, with all crew reported safe.

The Marshall Islands-flagged Kamsarmax bulk carrier Star Gwyneth was struck by an Iranian projectile approximately 50 nautical miles northwest of Dubai, sustaining a two-meter hull breach in the forward cargo hold and damage to a ballast tank. The vessel subsequently anchored to assess structural integrity. No injuries were reported.

The vessel had departed Iranian waters nine days earlier, following a 12-day port call at Imam Khomeini, Iran’s primary bulk export terminal. This suggests a growing compliance risk in which vessels with recent Iranian trade exposure may face heightened targeting during the conflict.

A UKMTO advisory issued March 11 reported that a cargo vessel was struck by an unknown projectile 11 nautical miles north of Oman, resulting in a fire onboard. A follow-up update stated that the fire had been extinguished and no environmental damage had been reported.

Across the broader conflict period, at least 10 oil tankers have been struck or targeted in or near the Strait between March 1 and March 10.

Iranian Mining Threat

U.S. intelligence officials believe Iran has begun preparations to lay naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, according to multiple reports citing senior officials.

Initial deployment may involve several dozen mines, though Iran is estimated to possess an inventory of roughly 2,000 devices and retains significant minelaying capability despite recent strikes.

Even limited mining could render the Strait unsafe for commercial shipping for days or weeks, as clearance operations would require specialized mine countermeasure vessels and extensive surveying.

Markets reacted quickly to the reports, with oil prices rising roughly $10 per barrel following news of the potential escalation.

Naval mines can be deployed not only by dedicated vessels but also by small craft or submersibles, complicating detection and interdiction along the Gulf’s complex coastline. While the Strait would be the primary target, adjacent sea lanes, anchorages, and energy terminals could also face elevated risk if mining expands.

Mining is generally considered a last-resort escalation option, as it would likely disrupt Iran’s own shipping and shadow fleet exports moving crude through the Strait to China.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational exceptions increased across several Gulf and regional ports on March 10.

In-Gulf

Jebel Ali, UAE

• 11 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+26.23% vs 7-day average).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (+100.0% vs 7-day average).
• 6 transshipment rollovers (+20.0% vs 7-day average).
• 17 transshipment-delay cases (+12.26% vs 7-day average).

Dammam, Saudi Arabia

• 6 transshipment-delay cases (+35.48% vs 7-day average).

Hamad, Qatar

• 4 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+154.55% vs 7-day average).

Outside the Gulf

Karachi, Pakistan

• 7 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+390.0% vs 7-day average).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (+100.0% vs 7-day average).
• 2 transshipment rollovers (+75.0% vs 7-day average).
• 5 transshipment-delay cases (+250.0% vs 7-day average).

Salalah, Oman

• 26 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+600.0% vs 7-day average).
• 12 transshipment rollovers (+58.49% vs 7-day average).
• 18 transshipment-delay cases (-36.68% vs 7-day average).

Sohar, Oman

• 2 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+250.0% vs 7-day average).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (+600.0% vs 7-day average).
• 4 transshipment-delay cases (+833.33% vs 7-day average).

The exception pattern indicates widening operational strain across Gulf and near-Gulf logistics networks.

Wet Cargo Analysis

Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to pivot crude export routes away from Hormuz-dependent infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has shifted significant volumes onto the Petroline (East–West Pipeline), allowing crude to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely and move directly from eastern production areas to Red Sea export terminals.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly curtailed approximately 2.0–2.5 million barrels per day of offshore production, including output from the Safaniya, Marjan, Zuluf, and Abu Safa fields, representing roughly 20% of national output.

Saudi Arabia has pivoted onshore Arab Light volumes onto the 7 million b/d Petroline, pushing Yanbu exports to approximately 2.47 million b/d, a 330% increase compared with pre-crisis levels.

That shift is now visible in fleet behavior. Twenty-seven VLCCs are currently heading toward Yanbu, compared with 18 vessels for Jeddah and three each for Jizan, Duba, and Rabigh. This concentration indicates that Yanbu is now serving as the primary outlet for Petroline-delivered crude and the central node of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export workaround.

Remote Sensing Intelligence imagery from March 4 detected four crude tankers simultaneously at Yanbu, more than double the pre-crisis single-day peak, suggesting that Red Sea export terminals are operating at or near maximum berth capacity.

The urgency of the shift is also visible in route choice. Imagery shows the Yanbu-bound convoy moving across the Arabian Sea, through the Gulf of Aden, and toward Bab el-Mandeb, underscoring the scale of the diversion and the growing dependence on Red Sea routing.

Freight rates reflect the same stress. Some charterers have reportedly paid roughly $460,000 per day to secure VLCCs loading at Red Sea terminals for Asia, among the highest rates recorded for this route. Ownership data also shows a concentrated profile within the Yanbu-bound fleet: 46% are owned by Saudi state-owned Bahri, 32% by Chinese state-owned COSCO, and the remainder by independent owners. This suggests that Saudi and Chinese-linked fleets are carrying much of the burden of the Red Sea export workaround.

However, the rerouting also pushes a large number of tankers through the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb, increasing exposure if the conflict expands toward Houthi-controlled areas. This is particularly relevant given the historical pattern of lower Houthi threat toward Chinese-affiliated shipping relative to Western-linked tonnage.

Dry Bulk and Commodity Trade Impact

Windward data indicates that bulk carrier transits through Hormuz have dropped by 44% since Operation Epic Fury, while broader dry bulk activity is estimated to be down roughly 91% compared with pre-crisis levels.

Approximately 280 bulk carriers are currently stranded or trapped within the Gulf region.

The disruption has halted exports from a region responsible for roughly 18% of global seaborne iron ore pellet exports and nearly 10% of global primary aluminum production.

Aluminum prices have already reached record highs on the London Metal Exchange, while fertilizer exports from Iran and other Gulf producers are tightening global agricultural supply chains.

Iraqi Export Disruption

Iraqi southern Gulf export terminals are experiencing severe operational paralysis.

Through January and the first three weeks of February, Iraqi crude departures maintained a relatively stable cadence of 22–26 million barrels per week across 24–32 cargo liftings. The week of February 23 reached 28.4 million barrels, likely reflecting accelerated loading as the threat environment escalated.

The collapse that followed has been immediate and severe. Iraqi southern Gulf terminals have recorded zero crude departures on three of the first ten days of March, highlighting the extent to which export operations have been disrupted.

Destination data now shows a two-tier impact across customer markets. Tier 1 reflects complete supply severance: South Korea and Greece have received zero Iraqi crude barrels in March, representing a full interruption of deliveries. Tier 2 reflects severe reduction: India and China, Iraq’s largest customers, have experienced 80–93% declines compared with January baselines.

U.S.-bound cargoes have shown somewhat greater resilience, declining from 8 million barrels to 5.6 million and then 3.3 million, likely reflecting VLCCs that had already departed before the crisis escalated.

Iraq appears to be the most acutely affected Gulf producer, with production and export capacity constrained by terminal paralysis and the inability to safely move crude through the Strait of Hormuz.

Russia Back Door

Potential alternative Iranian export pathways may be emerging through the north.

Following the onset of Operation Epic Fury and the threatened closure of the Strait of Hormuz, multiple Russian tankers operating without AIS have been detected near Iranian ports in the Caspian Sea.

These non-transmitting vessels may indicate growing use of the northern Caspian corridor to move oil and bypass blocked southern maritime chokepoints.

Additional reporting also suggests that Russian shadow fleet operations in other theaters may be becoming more physically hardened. Crew manifest reporting tied to Baltic sanctions trade indicates that vessels carrying sanctioned Russian oil have, in some cases, sailed with supernumerary personnel linked to Russian security organizations.

The activity indicates that Russia-linked oil logistics networks may be adapting both operationally and physically to heightened enforcement and chokepoint disruption.

M/V TRUST and Russia Shadow Fleet Activity

Russian shadow fleet activity continues to exploit reduced maritime visibility during the Gulf crisis.

Windward reported on March 8 that the sanctioned M/V TRUST carried out a high-probability semi-dark ship-to-ship transfer in Omani territorial waters involving approximately 325,000 barrels of Russian crude originally loaded at Ust-Luga.

At an estimated oil price of around $90 per barrel on March 10, the cargo would have carried an approximate value of $29.3 million.

According to our assessment, the tanker switched off its AIS during a prolonged stationary meeting with another vessel, while the counterpart vessel remained anonymous. This created a semi-dark rather than fully dark event, complicating monitoring while still leaving partial evidence of the transfer.

The timing of the operation coincided with heightened military escalation in the Gulf following Operation Epic Fury, suggesting that the vessel may have exploited the wider conflict environment and reduced scrutiny to conduct the transfer.

The case reinforces the presence of operational blind spots that allow illicit maritime activity to continue even during major regional disruption.

Dark Activity Near Cuban Energy Infrastructure 

Vortexa data shows an absence of any tracked calls into Cuba, while the SEA HORSE (IMO 9262584), a Russia-linked vessel believed to be spoofing or calling dark, had been sailing openly toward the island until February 25. Based on timing, the vessel may already have arrived, but no confirmed match has been identified in imagery.

SAR imagery from March 9 shows a dark vessel approximately 270 meters long positioned at the crude terminal in Matanzas port. This vessel is larger than the SEA HORSE, making it an unlikely direct match.

Additional imagery also shows two dark vessels at southern berths, each measuring approximately 200 meters. These are likely tankers, although berth function could not be fully verified.

The imagery indicates that dark tanker activity may be continuing near Cuban oil infrastructure even though tracked calls remain absent in Vortexa data.

Outlook

The March 11 operating picture shows a maritime environment in which suppressed Hormuz traffic, expanding kinetic risk, adaptive vessel signaling, and widening supply-chain disruption are all interacting at once.

AIS-confirmed crossings remain extremely limited, but remote sensing intelligence indicates that vessel presence inside the Strait exceeds visible maritime traffic, suggesting that partial, dark, or low-visibility movement continues under highly constrained conditions. At the same time, the attack pattern is widening, and preparations for possible Iranian mine deployment raise the risk of a more severe escalation that could temporarily close the Strait to commercial shipping.

Beyond Hormuz, route redistribution remains active rather than temporary. Cape of Good Hope diversions remain elevated, Suez traffic has weakened, and Gulf producers are accelerating export pivots toward alternative infrastructure. Port disruptions are spreading across regional logistics networks, while dry bulk, fertilizer, metals, and crude supply chains are all tightening simultaneously.

Taken together, the crisis is no longer affecting only tanker movements through Hormuz. It is now shaping naval posture, commodity markets, industrial supply chains, and global maritime trade routes across multiple theaters.

The post March 11, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Commercial activity through the Strait of Hormuz fell again on March 9, with only a single outbound Iranian-flagged vessel recorded and no inbound movements observed.
• Defensive AIS nationality messaging appeared on 36 vessels in the Gulf, suggesting that some operators are actively adapting signaling behavior to the current threat environment.
• Regional traffic continues to redistribute rather than normalize, with Bab el-Mandeb declining, Suez recovering toward trend, and Cape of Good Hope transits remaining elevated.
• Pakistan has launched naval escort operations for merchant shipping as maritime security risk spreads beyond the immediate Hormuz chokepoint.
• Port exception activity is rising across Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Pakistan, indicating a widening logistical strain across regional infrastructure.
• Energy market stress remains acute, with Gulf crude rerouting, elevated prices, and tightening tanker availability reinforcing broader supply risk.
• Secondary effects are emerging outside the Gulf, including sharply reduced tanker arrivals in Cuba and possible dark activity near Cuban waters.

Operational Overview 

Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz reached a new low on March 9, with only one outbound transit recorded and no inbound movements observed. The vessel was Iranian-flagged, meaning that all detected crossings during the last 24 hours involved Iranian vessels, reinforcing the assessment that Western-linked commercial shipping has effectively withdrawn from the waterway.

Over the past nine days, only 66 commercial vessels have transited the Strait of Hormuz, representing a fraction of normal traffic levels and reinforcing the assessment that the waterway is effectively operating under blockade conditions.

Reports also indicate selective passage conditions within the Strait. While many international shipping companies have suspended transit entirely, some Iranian tankers continue to move through the waterway, and emerging reporting suggests that certain China-linked vessels may be attempting passage under different security conditions. At the same time, U.S. and British vessels have reportedly been blocked, highlighting the increasingly politicized nature of transit access.

At the same time, maritime traffic is being redistributed rather than restored. Bab el-Mandeb activity fell sharply, Suez Canal traffic rose back toward its recent average, and Cape of Good Hope transits remained elevated, confirming that long-haul rerouting around Africa continues to serve as the main alternative to disrupted Middle East routes. The appearance of defensive AIS nationality messaging on 36 vessels in the Gulf also suggests that some operators are actively adapting signaling behavior to the current threat environment.

Operational and strategic responses are widening beyond the immediate chokepoint. Pakistan has launched a naval escort operation for merchant shipping, while exception activity is rising across ports in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Pakistan. Chinese maritime intelligence assets are also now operating in the Gulf of Oman within observation range of the conflict theater.

The impact is spreading into energy supply chains and secondary markets as well. Wet cargo flows remain heavily concentrated toward Asia, while Cuba is experiencing its lowest tanker arrivals in at least twelve months. No loaded tankers are currently reporting the island as a destination, and possible dark activity near Cuban waters remains under review. At the same time, Gulf producers, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are beginning to adjust production in response to export constraints.

Taken together, these signals indicate that the crisis is no longer defined only by transit suppression in Hormuz. It is now driving a wider reordering of vessel behavior, route choice, port performance, naval posture, and energy supply risk across multiple regions.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz fell further on March 9.

A total of one crossing was recorded, with no inbound movements and one outbound movement, representing a 50% decrease from the previous day and remaining significantly below the seven-day average of 4.14 crossings.

The only observed vessel was Iranian-flagged. The exclusive presence of Iranian-flagged tonnage reinforces the view that Western-linked commercial traffic through the Strait remains effectively suspended.

This pattern aligns with broader reporting that international commercial operators have largely suspended passage, while Iranian vessels continue to move through the Strait under different operating conditions. The result is a highly restricted maritime corridor where transit appears increasingly selective rather than fully closed.

Defensive AIS Messaging Observed in the Gulf

A total of 36 vessels currently transmitting AIS signals in the Gulf have modified their destination fields to broadcast nationality information.

The majority of these vessels are Chinese-linked ships, accounting for 30 vessels. Their AIS messages are highly standardized and typically reference both ownership and crew nationality. Common messages include:

• “CHINESE CREW OWNER”
• “CHINA OWNER & CREW”
• “CHINESE VSL AND CREW”

Additional vessels broadcasting nationality messaging include five Iraqi vessels, typically referencing ownership identity with messages such as “IRAQI OWNER” or “IRAQI PORTS,” and one Turkish vessel broadcasting the message “TRIST-TURKISH CREW.”

The vessels broadcasting nationality messaging are primarily commercial cargo and tanker vessels. They include 22 cargo vessels — including bulk carriers, container vessels, vehicle carriers, and heavy-load carriers — and 11 tankers, including crude oil, chemical, and LPG tankers.

Their flag states are led by Panama (11 vessels), Liberia (6), Hong Kong (5), and Norway (3).

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb declined on March 9.

A total of 16 crossings were recorded, including 7 inbound and 9 outbound movements, representing a 46.7% decrease from the previous day and falling below the seven-day average of 18.57 crossings.

Top vessel subclasses included four crude oil tankers, four container vessels, and three bulk carriers. Flag distribution was led by Liberia with four vessels, the Marshall Islands with four vessels, and Singapore with three vessels.

Despite the decline, Bab el-Mandeb remains materially more active than Hormuz and continues to function as an alternative route for traffic avoiding the Gulf.

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal increased on March 9.

A total of 40 crossings were recorded, including 21 inbound and 19 outbound movements, representing a 29.03% increase from the previous day and placing activity broadly in line with the seven-day average of 37.29 crossings.

Top vessel subclasses included nine bulk carriers, six general cargo vessels, and six crude oil tankers. Flag distribution was led by Panama with six vessels, followed by the Marshall Islands with four vessels and Liberia with four vessels.

The increase suggests that some traffic continues to move through the Mediterranean corridor even as Gulf routes remain highly constrained.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Transit activity around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated.

A total of 81 crossings were recorded, including 39 eastbound and 42 westbound movements, representing an 8.99% decrease from the previous day but remaining broadly consistent with the seven-day average of 85 crossings.

Top vessel subclasses included 40 bulk carriers, 14 container vessels, and six crude oil tankers. Flag distribution was led jointly by Liberia and the Marshall Islands, with 18 vessels each, followed by Panama with 12 vessels.

Sustained volumes around the Cape suggest that long-haul rerouting around Africa remains a primary alternative for vessels avoiding Middle East transit routes.

Dry Bulk and Commodity Trade Disruption

Dry bulk trade through the Strait of Hormuz has collapsed alongside tanker traffic. Dry bulk transits have fallen by approximately 91%, with an estimated 280 bulk carriers currently stranded or effectively trapped inside the Gulf.

This disruption has severed supply chains for several globally significant commodities. The shutdown has affected approximately 18% of global iron ore pellet exports, primarily originating from Iran and Bahrain, as well as nearly 10% of global primary aluminum production, contributing to sharp price increases in aluminum markets.

The sudden interruption of these flows has also paralyzed minor bulk trade across the region, further amplifying the economic impact of the crisis beyond energy markets alone.

Pakistan Naval Escort Operations

Pakistan has launched a maritime security operation named Muhafiz-ul-Bahr to safeguard national shipping routes and protect critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).

According to the Pakistan Navy, the operation was initiated in response to the evolving regional maritime security environment and aims to ensure the uninterrupted flow of maritime trade. Naval vessels are currently escorting merchant ships transiting key sea lines of communication, including vessels operated by the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation.

At present, the navy reports that two merchant vessels are under escort, with one expected to arrive in Karachi shortly.

Pakistan relies on maritime routes for approximately 90% of its trade, making energy supply security a central concern as tanker traffic across the Gulf remains heavily constrained.

Port Operations Disruption 

Operational exceptions increased across several regional ports, indicating a growing strain across shipping infrastructure.

In the Gulf:

Dammam, Saudi Arabia

• 12 late-departure cases.
• 2 transshipment rollovers.

Outside the Gulf:

Karachi, Pakistan

• 2 late-departure cases.
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers.
• 2 transshipment rollovers.
• 2 transshipment-delay cases.

Salalah, Oman

• 2 late-departure cases.
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers.
• 11 transshipment rollovers.
• 9 transshipment-delay cases.

Sohar, Oman

• 2 port-side rollovers.
• 2 transshipment-delay cases.

The spike in operational exceptions suggests that logistical strain is spreading across regional port infrastructure rather than remaining confined to the immediate conflict zone.

Wet Cargo Analysis

Energy markets remain under significant stress.

Brent crude is currently trading between $115.00 and $116.50 per barrel, with intraday highs near $120. WTI is trading between $108.88 and $111.00 per barrel, while TTF natural gas is near €90/MWh.

Global tanker fleet activity shows:

• 2,582 laden vessels in transit.
• 155 vessels currently loading, taking on approximately 32.8 million barrels of cargo.
• 1,011 vessels discharged or discharging.
• 11 vessels in floating storage or loitering status.

Asia continues to absorb the majority of global wet cargo flows, accounting for roughly 290 million barrels of laden cargo currently on the water.

Major destination hubs include:

• Rotterdam: 31.15 million barrels inbound.
• Singapore: 24.69 million barrels inbound.
• Sikka, India: 22.44 million barrels inbound.
• Ningbo (Beilun), China: 20.70 million barrels inbound.
• Ulsan/Onsan, South Korea: 13.16 million barrels inbound.

Mediterranean flows remain structurally constrained, with inbound volumes reaching 76.9 million barrels, primarily handled by Suezmax and medium-range tankers as VLCC access remains limited.

Saudi and UAE Crude Flow Pivot

The latest full week of data highlights the scale of structural shifts in Middle Eastern crude flows as the Hormuz crisis reached a critical threshold.

Saudi Arabia

The primary driver of current market volatility and export rerouting is the forced shutdown of major Saudi offshore production facilities following the escalation of maritime risk in the Gulf.

Approximately 2.0 to 2.5 million barrels per day of Saudi offshore production from the Safaniya, Marjan, Zuluf, and Abu Safa fields is currently offline. This represents roughly 20% of Saudi Arabia’s total production capacity.

Saudi crude shipments through the Strait of Hormuz fell to 4.06 million barrels per day, down from a pre-crisis baseline of approximately 6.64 million barrels per day, representing a 39% reduction in Gulf-bound export flows.

To compensate, Saudi Arabia has pivoted exports toward the East–West Pipeline (Petroline), which connects eastern production hubs with Red Sea export terminals.

As a result, Red Sea crude exports from Yanbu surged to approximately 2.47 million barrels per day during the week of March 2, representing a 330% increase compared with pre-crisis levels.

Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence detected four crude tankers at Yanbu on March 4, more than double the pre-crisis single-day peak. This surge indicates that Red Sea export terminals are now operating near maximum berth capacity.

Cargo destinations also shifted dramatically. During the week of March 2, 100% of crude loaded at Saudi Red Sea ports was destined for Egypt, specifically the Suez and SUMED pipeline system.

This indicates that Saudi Arabia is using the Petroline bypass to move crude westward into the Mediterranean through the SUMED pipeline, effectively circumventing the entire Arabian Peninsula and preserving access to global markets without relying on Hormuz.

Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser has warned that a prolonged halt in Strait traffic could have “catastrophic consequences” for the global economy, noting that current global oil inventories are already at five-year lows, leaving limited buffer capacity if disruptions persist.

Iraqi Export Collapse

Iraq has been among the most severely affected producers during the crisis. National oil production has reportedly fallen from approximately 4.3 million barrels per day to around 1.3 million barrels per day, while exports have dropped by at least 800,000 barrels per day.

The decline is primarily linked to the closure of the Al-Basra Offshore Terminal and the inability of tankers to safely navigate the Strait of Hormuz under current security conditions.

UAE

A similar adjustment is underway in the UAE.

Crude exports departing from terminals inside the Gulf declined to 1.63 million barrels per day, compared with a January average of approximately 2.45 million barrels per day.

To maintain export continuity, the UAE has shifted shipments toward the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP), which transports crude directly to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman.

Fujairah is now handling approximately 1.01 million barrels per day, accounting for roughly 38% of total UAE seaborne crude exports and serving as the primary bypass route around the Strait of Hormuz.

During the week of March 2, approximately 90% of Fujairah cargoes were bound for Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, suggesting that Southeast Asian hubs are absorbing redirected Gulf crude volumes.

Asia Energy Market Pressure

Energy supply disruptions in the Gulf are beginning to create broader macroeconomic pressure across Asian energy markets.

Countries including China, Japan, and South Korea rely heavily on Gulf energy exports, with the region supplying a significant share of their seaborne crude imports.

With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz severely constrained, Asian refiners have begun competing more aggressively for alternative supply sources, including U.S. crude and Omani grades.

Shipping disruptions have also affected LNG flows. No LNG tankers have reportedly exited the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the conflict, while damage to Qatar’s main LNG export facility has further reduced supply availability.

The tightening market has pushed Asian buyers to compete more aggressively for available cargoes, contributing to rising freight rates and widening price spreads for both oil and LNG across the region.

The disruption has triggered what market observers describe as an energy panic across parts of Asia. In China in particular, several major refineries have reduced operating capacity or declared force majeure due to feedstock shortages linked to Gulf supply disruptions. As a result, Asian buyers are aggressively seeking replacement cargoes from Africa and Latin America, intensifying global competition for available crude supplies.

Cuba Supply Disruption

Cuba is experiencing a sharp decline in maritime energy supply.

As of March 9, only 11 tankers have called Cuban ports this month, the lowest level recorded in at least twelve months.

Monthly arrivals had already fallen earlier this year, declining from 53 tanker calls in January to 34 in February.

According to Vortexa, no laden or loading tankers are currently reporting Cuba as a destination.

However, Windward tracking indicates possible anomalous activity involving the vessel SEA HORSE (IMO 9262584). The tanker was openly sailing toward Cuba until February 25, after which it appears to have ceased visible reporting while approaching the region. This behavior may indicate potential AIS spoofing or dark activity, though the vessel’s current operational status remains unconfirmed.

Tankers currently present in Cuban ports are primarily owned or managed by companies registered in Panama, China, and Greece.

Container shipping activity is also limited. Only three container vessels currently report Cuba as a destination, originating from China, India, and the Netherlands, with predicted ETAs indicating delays of approximately ten days.

At the same time, 12 U.S. vessels are currently transmitting AIS signals in Cuban waters, primarily classified under military, law enforcement, or other specialized subclasses.

Power shortages across the island have intensified, with outages in Havana and central regions reportedly lasting up to 18 hours per day.

Outlook

The March 10 operating picture shows a maritime environment where suppressed chokepoint traffic, adaptive vessel behavior, rising logistics disruption, and widening energy supply stress are all interacting at the same time.

Hormuz traffic has fallen to the lowest level of the conflict, with only one outbound Iranian-flagged vessel recorded and no inbound commercial traffic observed. Defensive AIS messaging suggests that some operators are adapting signaling behavior under threat, while Bab el-Mandeb, Suez, and Cape flows indicate redistribution rather than normalization.

At the same time, state responses are widening. Pakistan’s naval escort operation shows that governments are beginning to intervene directly in commercial maritime security, while Chinese intelligence assets in the Gulf of Oman reflect expanding strategic monitoring of the conflict environment.

Operational strain is spreading across ports, Gulf producers are adjusting output and export routing, and secondary markets such as Cuba are showing signs of supply stress.

The paralysis of dry bulk flows, the collapse of Iraqi exports, and rising refinery disruptions across Asia indicate that the effects of the crisis are expanding well beyond the Strait itself. Commodity markets, industrial supply chains, and maritime logistics networks are now being affected simultaneously.

Taken together, the maritime crisis is no longer defined only by transit suppression in Hormuz. It is now driving a broader reordering of route choice, tanker deployment, port performance, naval posture, and energy supply risk across multiple regions.

The post March 10, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz fell to its lowest level of the conflict, with only two outbound Iranian-flagged vessels recorded and no inbound crossings.
• Evidence suggests that at least one tanker may have completed a dark transit through the Strait, reappearing after several days with AIS disabled.
• Regional shipping activity continues to redistribute across alternative routes, with Bab el-Mandeb remaining active while Cape of Good Hope transits surged sharply.
• Suez Canal traffic declined below recent averages.
• Operational stress is beginning to appear across regional logistics infrastructure, with rising exception activity across Gulf ports.
• Iraqi oil production and exports dropped as the collapse in Hormuz-linked shipping began affecting upstream supply flows.
• China deployed the Liaowang-1 signals intelligence vessel to the Gulf of Oman, positioning a major maritime surveillance platform near the active conflict theater.

Operational Overview 

Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz reached its lowest level of the conflict on March 8, with only two outbound transits recorded and no inbound crossings observed. Both vessels were Iranian-flagged, reinforcing the assessment that international commercial traffic has effectively withdrawn from the waterway.

At the same time, maritime activity is not disappearing but redistributing across alternative routes. Bab el-Mandeb remained active, while Suez Canal traffic declined below recent averages. In contrast, Cape of Good Hope transits surged sharply, reflecting a growing shift toward long-haul rerouting around the Middle East and Red Sea risk environment.

Evidence has also emerged that at least one commercial tanker may have completed a dark transit through Hormuz with AIS disabled before reappearing several days later, suggesting that a small number of operators are still attempting passage under highly atypical operating conditions in order to capture elevated freight premiums.

Operational stress is also beginning to appear across regional logistics infrastructure. Gulf port networks are recording rising exception activity, while Iraqi export flows have dropped sharply as the collapse in Hormuz-linked shipping begins affecting upstream oil production and storage capacity.

The strategic environment is evolving as well. China has deployed the Liaowang-1 signals intelligence vessel to the Gulf of Oman, placing a major maritime surveillance platform within observation range of the active conflict theater.

Together, these signals indicate that the disruption is extending beyond localized transit disruption, with shipping routes, tanker deployment patterns, port operations, and energy export flows beginning to adjust simultaneously.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz reached its lowest daily level since the start of the conflict.

Only two crossings were recorded on March 8, both outbound, representing a 33% decrease compared with the previous day and far below the seven-day average of 5.88 crossings.

Both vessels were Iranian-flagged, and no inbound crossings were observed.

The exclusive presence of Iranian-flagged vessels suggests that foreign commercial operators have effectively withdrawn from the waterway, reinforcing the view that international commercial traffic through the Strait has largely ceased.

Industry reporting indicates that some tankers may still be attempting to transit the Strait with AIS signals disabled, but visible maritime traffic remains extremely limited.

Tanker Transit Detected

Evidence indicates that at least one commercial tanker may have completed a highly unusual transit through the Strait of Hormuz during the current crisis.

The vessel appears to have entered the Strait carrying approximately one million barrels of crude oil loaded at Saudi Arabia’s Juaymah Terminal, before switching off its AIS signal around March 4.

The ship reportedly remained dark for approximately five days before its signal reappeared around 07:00 UTC on March 9.

If confirmed, the voyage would represent one of the most audacious commercial transits attempted since the start of the Hormuz disruption.

The maneuver suggests that a small number of operators are attempting to exploit extremely high freight premiums by conducting dark passages through the Strait, minimizing visibility during the highest-risk segment of the voyage.

This behavior highlights the widening divide between risk-averse operators who have halted Gulf transits and a small group of opportunistic owners willing to operate in the current security environment.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remained elevated relative to historical norms.

A total of 30 crossings were recorded, including 14 inbound and 16 outbound movements. While this represents an 11.8% decrease compared with the previous day, activity remains well above the seven-day average.

The continued strength of Bab el-Mandeb traffic indicates that shipping flows are increasingly shifting toward alternative routes as Hormuz remains largely inactive.

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal declined on March 8.

A total of 31 crossings were recorded, representing a 27.9% decrease compared with the previous day and falling below the seven-day average.

The decline likely reflects ongoing uncertainty surrounding Middle East maritime routes and cargo flows rather than a structural closure.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Transit activity around the Cape of Good Hope increased sharply.

A total of 89 crossings were recorded, representing an 89% increase compared with the previous day and exceeding the seven-day average.

The surge suggests that rerouting around Africa is accelerating as operators attempt to bypass Middle East and Red Sea security risks affecting traditional transit corridors.

Chinese Intelligence Presence in the Gulf of Oman

China has reportedly deployed the 30,000-ton Liaowang-1 signals intelligence vessel to the Gulf of Oman, escorted by naval surface combatants.

The vessel is a high-capacity maritime intelligence platform capable of monitoring a wide battlespace using long-range sensors and advanced signal-processing systems.

Its positioning near the Strait of Hormuz places it within observation range of the active conflict theater.

The deployment suggests that China is seeking to monitor developments in real time while increasing its informational presence in a region central to its energy security.

Port Operations Disruption 

Operational disruptions are beginning to appear across Gulf port infrastructure.

Exception activity recorded on March 8 includes:

• Jebel Ali (UAE): 10 transshipment delay cases (+233% day-on-day).
• Dammam (Saudi Arabia): 5 transshipment delay cases (+400% day-on-day).
• Shuwaikh (Kuwait): 4 late departure cases.
• Umm Qasr (Iraq): 2 transshipment delay cases.

The increase in operational exceptions suggests that logistical strain is spreading across regional container networks as vessels delay or reroute operations.

Iraqi Export Disruption

The collapse in Hormuz-linked shipping is now directly affecting Iraqi oil production and export capacity.

Iraqi authorities reportedly recorded zero oil and commercial vessel entries into Iraqi ports following the effective closure of the Strait.

Production from southern Iraqi fields reportedly fell by 70% to approximately 1.3 million barrels per day, down from roughly 4.3 million barrels per day before the conflict.

Exports reportedly dropped to around 800,000 barrels per day, with only two tankers loading and no new arrivals.

Storage capacity has reportedly reached maximum levels, forcing remaining production to be redirected toward domestic refining.

This represents one of the clearest signs so far that maritime disruption in Hormuz is translating into direct upstream supply destruction.

Saudi and Gulf State Risk Posture

Saudi Arabia has issued a direct warning to Tehran that it will retaliate if its territory or oil infrastructure is targeted.

The warning reflects growing concern among Gulf states that the conflict could widen further, particularly as attacks on vessels, ports, and energy infrastructure continue to expand beyond the immediate Strait of Hormuz approaches.

From a commercial perspective, the warning raises the prospect of further disruption to regional energy production and export infrastructure should the conflict expand into Gulf state territory.

Outlook

The March 9 operating picture shows a maritime environment where disruption is spreading beyond the Strait of Hormuz into global shipping routes, logistics infrastructure, and energy export systems.

Hormuz traffic has effectively collapsed, with only two Iranian-flagged vessels recorded and no inbound commercial traffic observed. At the same time, evidence of at least one tanker conducting a dark transit suggests that a small number of operators may still attempt passage under exceptional conditions.

Shipping activity is redistributing rather than normalizing. Bab el-Mandeb remains active relative to historical averages, Suez traffic has declined below trend, and Cape of Good Hope rerouting is accelerating as operators attempt to bypass Middle East and Red Sea risk corridors.

Operational disruptions are now appearing across Gulf port networks, while Iraqi oil production and exports have already begun to fall as the collapse in Hormuz-linked shipping feeds into upstream supply systems.

Meanwhile, China’s deployment of the Liaowang-1 intelligence vessel signals that major powers are expanding their monitoring presence in the region.

Taken together, these developments indicate that the maritime consequences of the conflict are expanding outward across global shipping networks, energy supply chains, and strategic monitoring activity.

The post March 9, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained near a standstill on March 7, with only three total crossings recorded.
• Selective transit behavior may be emerging, with certain non-Western-linked vessels continuing to move while broader commercial traffic remains frozen.
• GPS and AIS interference intensified sharply, affecting more than 1,650 vessels and concentrating spoofed positions near Fujairah and the Gulf of Oman.
• The threat environment remains active, with reported strikes on the tanker PRIMA and the tug MUSAFFAH 2 reinforcing the continued risk to commercial and support vessels.
• Bab el-Mandeb and Suez traffic remained elevated relative to Hormuz, supporting the view that trade is being redistributed unevenly across regional chokepoints.
• Kharg Island crude export activity remains active, while IRISL-linked cargoes continue moving from China toward Iran.
• Shadow fleet and sanctions-evasion activity continues under the cover of the conflict environment, including the previously identified semi-dark ship-to-ship transfer by M/V TRUST in the Gulf of Oman.

Operational Overview 

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained near a standstill on March 7, with only three total crossings recorded and SAR imagery confirming continued lean traffic conditions through the waterway. The small number of successful transits suggests that passage remains possible for a narrow subset of vessels, even as the broader commercial picture remains deeply constrained.

At the same time, the mechanisms suppressing traffic are no longer purely kinetic. The combination of vessel attacks, elevated strike risk, GPS and AIS interference, and the withdrawal of insurable war-risk coverage is now producing a de facto closure effect for much of the commercial market, despite the absence of a formally declared and universally enforced blockade.

A second shift is also becoming visible in the operating environment. Windward analysis suggests that selective transit behavior may be emerging, with certain non-Western-linked vessels continuing to move through Hormuz while broader traffic remains frozen. That pattern is accompanied by continued elevated activity through Bab el-Mandeb, indicating that regional shipping is not normalizing but being redistributed unevenly across chokepoints.

Meanwhile, upstream pressure continues to build. Kharg Island imagery indicates that Iranian crude export operations remain active, while IRISL-linked cargoes continue to move from China toward Iran. Together, these signals indicate that selective transit access, ongoing export activity, strategic resupply, and market dislocation are unfolding in parallel rather than sequentially.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Crossings through the Strait of Hormuz remained extremely limited on March 7.

A total of three crossings were recorded, including one inbound and two outbound movements, representing a 25% decrease from the previous day and remaining significantly below the seven-day average of 13.43 crossings.

Observed vessel subclasses included one oil/chemicals tanker, one container vessel, and one bulk carrier. Flag distribution included one Palau-flagged vessel, one Iranian-flagged vessel, and one Liberia-flagged vessel. 

Recent SAR imagery captured on March 7 visually confirms the continued scarcity of traffic through the Strait. However, the successful outward transit of two vessels suggests that selective transit allowances may now be in effect.

One of the vessels — a 127-meter Palau-flagged oil/chemicals tanker — has previously been highlighted by Windward as high risk due to multiple identity and location tampering events in Iraqi waters, behavior consistent with Iranian loading typologies. Another vessel – a 190-meter Liberia-flagged bulk carrier owned and managed by Chinese companies — was observed exiting the Strait while broadcasting “Chinese Crew” in its AIS destination field.

These movements may indicate the early emergence of an affiliation-based passage model, under which certain non-Western-linked vessels are able to transit while broader traffic remains effectively suppressed.

Who Continues to Transit Hormuz

Windward analysis of vessels that have continued to transit the Strait during the crisis shows that traffic is dominated by vessels with elevated compliance risk profiles.

Of at least 18 vessels confirmed to have transited since March 2:

• 3 vessels (17%) were sanctioned.
• 5 vessels (28%) were classified as high-risk.
• 2 vessels (11%) were medium-risk.
• 8 vessels (44%) were low-risk.

Overall, 44% of vessels transiting the Strait carried elevated compliance risk, indicating that many operators continuing to transit are not typical risk-averse commercial shipping companies.

Three main cohorts appear to be operating:

• Shadow fleet operators: Sanctioned vessels with limited exposure to Western finance or insurance appear willing to accept the heightened risk environment.
• Iran-linked trade networks: High-risk vessels involved in Iran-related cargo flows appear to be continuing operations under the assumption that IRGC forces will permit passage.
• Regional energy necessity operators: A smaller group of regional vessels linked to Gulf energy infrastructure appears to be continuing limited operations to sustain essential supply chains.

Chinese-operated vessels were also among those successfully transiting, including ships broadcasting AIS messages emphasizing Chinese ownership and crew composition, suggesting attempts to signal non-Western affiliation.

Insurance Withdrawal and De Facto Closure Mechanism

The collapse in commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz appears to be driven not only by direct kinetic risk but also by a structural insurance shock within the global maritime risk market.

Following the escalation of hostilities, several major Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurers issued 72-hour cancellation notices on Gulf war-risk coverage, while reinsurance capacity from London markets was temporarily withdrawn. Without reinsurance backing, P&I clubs are unable to extend coverage for vessels operating in designated war zones.

This mechanism has produced a de facto closure effect across the Strait.

Global maritime trade is heavily dependent on the International Group of P&I Clubs, which insures roughly 90% of the world’s oceangoing tonnage. These clubs rely on reinsurance markets to absorb catastrophic risk exposure. When that capacity contracts or disappears, shipowners may no longer be able to obtain the insurance required to operate in high-risk waters.

Premiums that were previously around 0.25% of vessel value per transit have risen toward 0.5% or higher, and in some cases, coverage is unavailable entirely.

This has had an immediate operational impact. Vessel tracking indicates that dozens of tankers and cargo vessels accumulated in holding patterns near Fujairah and across Gulf waters, while major carriers suspended Hormuz crossings.

The result is that the Strait has effectively shifted from a contested waterway to a market-constrained chokepoint, where the primary limiting factor is no longer solely military threat but also the inability of operators to secure insurable risk coverage.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remained elevated on March 7.

A total of 34 crossings were recorded, including 23 inbound and 11 outbound movements, representing a 47.8% increase from the previous day and sitting significantly above the seven-day average of 9.7 crossings.

The top vessel subclasses included nine bulk carriers, five oil products tankers, and three crude oil tankers. The largest flag groups were the Marshall Islands, Panama, and Liberia. 

The continued strength of Bab el-Mandeb traffic, even as Hormuz remains largely frozen, supports the view that shipping is being redistributed unevenly across regional chokepoints rather than normalizing.

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal increased on March 7.

A total of 43 crossings were recorded, including 24 inbound and 19 outbound movements, representing a 59.26% increase from the previous day and remaining above the seven-day average of 36.88 crossings.

Top vessel subclasses included 11 bulk carriers, nine crude oil tankers, and five container vessels. Flag distribution was led by Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands. 

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Transit activity around the Cape of Good Hope remained below normal levels on March 7.

A total of 47 crossings were recorded, including 22 eastbound and 25 westbound movements, representing a 38.96% decrease from the previous day and sitting significantly below the seven-day average of 80.43 crossings.

Top vessel subclasses included 20 bulk carriers, nine container vessels, and four crude oil tankers. Flag distribution was led by Liberia, Panama, and the Marshall Islands. 

GPS Jamming Escalation

Electronic interference across the Gulf intensified significantly over the past week.

Windward analysis shows that more than 1,650 vessels experienced GPS and AIS interference on March 7, representing a 55% increase compared with the previous week. Vessels were falsely positioned across both land and sea locations stretching from Kuwait through the Arabian Gulf and into the Gulf of Oman near Muscat.

Windward identified at least 30 jamming clusters across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Iran, affecting both maritime and onshore signal environments. These clusters have evolved from earlier circular displacement patterns into zig-zag signal distortions, where vessels’ AIS positions are thrown across multiple locations within a 24-hour period.

Persistent interference is increasing operational risk by creating false compliance alerts, degraded navigational awareness, and elevated collision risk in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The interference environment is also contributing to unusual vessel behavior. AIS signals are now clustering hundreds of vessels in concentrated digital locations off the Gulf of Oman, reflecting both signal manipulation and vessels waiting for safer operating conditions.

PRIMA Drone Strike

On March 7, the Maltese-flagged chemicals tanker PRIMA (IMO 9427433), formerly STEPHANIE, was reportedly struck by an Iranian drone while transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

The vessel is a 112-meter chemical tanker owned by Kyotonia Limited of Cyprus and operated by Argo Trading of the UAE since August 2025. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly claimed responsibility for the strike, stating that the vessel had ignored repeated warnings not to enter the Strait.

The incident reinforces the continued threat to commercial vessels attempting to transit Hormuz, even as a small number of ships appear to be securing passage without incident.

MUSAFFAH 2 Incident

The tug struck while towing a previously targeted cargo vessel on March 5 has now been identified as MUSAFFAH 2 (IMO 9522051), a UAE-flagged tugboat.

Subsequent reporting indicates that the tug caught fire and sank in the Strait of Hormuz on March 6 following an explosion. The vessel was carrying seven crew members, including Indonesian, Indian, and Filipino nationals. Four crew members survived, while three Indonesian crew members remain missing.

This case is operationally significant because it supports JMIC’s assessment that vessels engaged in assistance, towing, or salvage operations may themselves face elevated risk of follow-on strikes.

Confirmed Vessel Attacks

As of March 7, 11 vessels have been struck since the beginning of Operation Epic Fury:

• Skylight (IMO 9330020).
• Mkd Vyom (IMO 9284386).
• Sea La Donna (IMO 9380532). 
• Hercules Star (IMO 9916135).
• Stena Imperative (IMO 9666077).
• Athe Nova (IMO 9188116). 
• Ocean Electra (IMO 9402782).
• Safeen Prestige (IMO 9593517). 
• Mussafah 2 (IMO 9522051).
• Prima (IMO 9427433).
• Sonagal Namibe (9325049).

The growing list of affected vessels, combined with attacks on anchored, drifting, and assistance vessels, reinforces that the campaign is designed to generate broad operational uncertainty across the maritime environment rather than target only one vessel type or operating profile.

Kharg Island Activity

Recent satellite imagery from March 7 indicates that Kharg Island crude export operations remain highly active despite the ongoing conflict.

Imagery confirms a substantial clustering of tankers both at berth and in the waiting area:

• At berth: 2 VLCCs, 1 Aframax tanker.
• At anchor nearby: 2 VLCCs, 1 Aframax tanker, and several MR tankers.

This pattern suggests that Iranian export infrastructure remains operational and that crude throughput is continuing, even as maritime risk in surrounding waters remains elevated. The concentration of tonnage also indicates a sustained backlog of export activity rather than a terminal shutdown.

Fujairah Bunkering Disruption

The regional bunkering hub of Fujairah has seen a dramatic reduction in vessel activity following attacks on fuel storage infrastructure earlier in the week.

Bunker suppliers have declared force majeure or suspended deliveries, and vessel tracking shows a near-absence of ships at anchor near Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, normally one of the world’s most congested bunkering zones after Singapore.

The disappearance of anchorage traffic is likely the result of a combination of security concerns, GPS interference, and elevated strike risk in congested maritime areas.

VLCC Freight Market

Middle East disruption continues to drive extreme tanker freight pricing.

A VLCC was reportedly fixed on March 7 at a record $770,000 per day, reflecting the market premium now attached to voyages linked to disrupted Gulf export flows. The fixture highlights the growing divergence between physical trade constraints and owner returns for the small number of operators still willing to engage in high-risk Gulf-linked trades.

Russian Price Cap Pressure

The surge in global energy prices is now pushing Russian crude and refined product trades beyond the limits of the Western oil price cap regime.

Wholesale diesel and gasoil prices in Europe surged 54% week-on-week, reaching more than $1,158 per tonne on March 6 — roughly $155 per barrel equivalent — exceeding the $100 per barrel price cap for Russian refined products.

The price spike means that new Russian cargo sales are increasingly non-compliant with the cap, creating potential enforcement challenges for Western regulators and operational dilemmas for tanker operators.

Greek-owned tankers, which historically carried a large portion of Russian energy exports, may face growing pressure to exit the trade if elevated prices continue to push cargo values above cap thresholds.

CAFFA Seizure

The general cargo vessel CAFFA (IMO 9143611) was seized by Swedish authorities on March 6 while sailing from Casablanca to St. Petersburg.

Authorities determined that the vessel’s claimed Guinea registry was fraudulent, effectively rendering it stateless under maritime law. The seizure was linked to a combination of serious safety deficiencies, false-flag documentation, opaque ownership structures, repeated AIS blackouts, and broader links to sanctions-evasion activity.

Windward identified the vessel as part of Russia’s shadow fleet, with a history of repeated name and flag changes, extended dark activity periods, and repeated operations linked to Russian ports.

The vessel had also been linked to the transport of approximately 3,000 tons of stolen Ukrainian grain from occupied Sevastopol to Tartous in July 2025, following an identity change from VETLUGA to CAFFA and a prolonged AIS blackout approaching Syrian waters.

This seizure reflects a broader European enforcement trend targeting vessels engaged in deceptive shipping practices and Russian sanctions circumvention.

IRISL China–Iran Chemical Shipments

Two cargo vessels owned by Iran’s sanctioned state shipping line IRISL have departed the Chinese chemical port of Gaolan and are currently en route to Iran.

Reporting indicates the vessels may be carrying sodium perchlorate, a key precursor used in solid rocket fuel. The ships Shabdis and Barzin departed after loading in Zhuhai and are expected to reach Iranian ports, including Bandar Abbas and Chabahar.

This movement is strategically significant because it suggests that missile-related supply flows to Iran may still be proceeding during active conflict, even as maritime and military pressure on Iranian infrastructure intensifies.

Outlook

The March 8 operating picture shows a maritime environment where selective passage, insurance withdrawal, electronic manipulation, continued strikes, and active upstream supply flows are all shaping the market at once.

Hormuz traffic remains near minimum levels, but recent transits suggest that passage may still be possible for a narrow subset of vessels with lower exposure to Western finance or political alignment. At the same time, GPS and AIS interference has intensified, attacks continue to affect commercial and support vessels, and insurance constraints are preventing much of the commercial fleet from re-entering the corridor.

Meanwhile, Kharg Island export activity remains active, IRISL-linked cargo movements from China are continuing, and alternative chokepoints, including Bab el-Mandeb and Suez, are absorbing unevenly redistributed trade.

Taken together, these signals suggest that the region is not moving toward normalization. Instead, it is shifting into a more selective, more fragmented, and potentially more persistent operating environment.

The post March 8, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily appeared first on Windward.

• More than 1,650 vessels experienced GPS and AIS interference across the Middle East Gulf on March 7, up 55% from a week ago.
• Ships are falsely positioned across the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf, stretching from Kuwait to Muscat, Oman, adding to already critical navigation and compliance risks.
• Windward identified at least 30 jamming clusters across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Iran, both on land and at sea.
• Persistent electronic interference increases collision risk, false compliance alerts, and operational uncertainty in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.
• Ships are no longer at anchor off the Middle East bunkering hub of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan after the March 4 attack on fuel oil tanks.

GPS Jamming Expands Across the Gulf

GPS jamming affected more than 1,650 ships in the Middle East Gulf on March 7, up 55% from the previous week, erroneously placing vessels across land and sea in Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.

Electronic interference with ships’ Automatic Identification Systems was already endemic in the region before the launch of Operation Epic Fury. Nearly 1,100 ships were impacted within 24 hours after the U.S. attacked Iran on February 28. That number has now risen to more than 1,650.

Windward has identified at least 30 clusters where ships’ AIS are being jammed, including across the Gulf of Oman, and areas on land and sea within the Middle East Gulf, especially near areas where port and facility infrastructure has been attacked or near military areas. 

A week ago, clusters were mainly crop circle-like patterns, but have since evolved into zig-zag type lines, with ships’ signals thrown across multiple locations within a 24-hour period. There was mass AIS interference at the bunkering hub of Fujairah, from where ships have since dispersed after fuel tanks were attacked on March 3, and amid warnings that congested areas carry greater risks of attack.

GPS jamming is concentrating ships’ AIS into clusters of several hundred vessels off the Gulf of Oman.

Major Bunkering Hub of Fujairah Shuts Down

Vessels are avoiding the bunkering hub of Fujairah, the world’s second-largest after Singapore, in the wake of attacks on tank storage areas in the region on March 3.

Bunker suppliers have declared force majeure or suspended deliveries, and vessels are generally avoiding the port due to heightened security risks. There is now an unprecedented near-absence of tonnage at anchor at Khor Fakkan and Fujairah.

Attacks on Vessels and Energy Infrastructure 

So far, 14 tankers and an oil rig have been attacked or hit by missiles or drones, with the Joint Maritime Information Center confirming 11 events. Eleven crew members have been killed, including eight on Mussafeh 2. The latest report, from March 7, claiming a Malta-flagged tanker called Prima was hit, attributed to the IRGC, has not yet been verified.

Affected vessels include: 

• Skylight (IMO 9330020).
• Mkd Vyom (IMO 9284386).
• Sea La Donna (IMO 9380532). 
• Hercules Star (IMO 9916135).
• Stena Imperative (IMO 9666077).
• Athe Nova (IMO 9188116). 
• Ocean Electra (IMO 9402782).
• Safeen Prestige (IMO 9593517) and Mussafah 2 (IMO 9522051), the tug supporting.
• Pelagia (IMO 9402940).
• Sonagal Namibe (9325049).
• MSC Grace (IMO 9987366).
• Golden Oak (IMO unidentified).
• Libra Trader (IMO 9562673).
• Prima (IMO unidentified, IRGC claim not verified).

Port infrastructure targeted:

• Oil Rig Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia. 
• Ras Tanura refinery.
• Bapco refinery.
• Ras Laffan gas complex.
• Duqm port fuel tanks.
• Fuel storage tankers at Fujairah Oil Industry Zone.

Russian Oil Price Cap Breach Creates Market Pressure

Soaring oil prices have seen Russia’s oil price cap breached across the board for crude and refined products, presenting fresh challenges for Russia, as well as the Greek-owned tankers that undertake about a quarter of all shipments.

The oil price cap of $100/barrel for Russian refined products was surpassed as wholesale diesel and gasoil prices in Europe surged 54% compared with the previous week, closing at over $1158/tonne on March 6. That is equivalent to $155 per barrel. Europe’s wholesale prices of diesel and jet fuel are measured as a premium against this marker. 

The stratospheric price gains mean that new sales of Russian oil are no longer price cap-compliant, based on global assessments from the world’s price reporting agencies.

Wholesale EU jet fuel prices are up ~70% from a week ago as tankers remain stranded in the Middle East and are unable to load middle distillates from export refineries in the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia that supply gasoil, diesel, and jet fuel to Europe and Asia. 

The EU27 and the UK are short of diesel, and after banning Russian imports three years ago, the region relies heavily on Middle East Gulf refineries and the U.S. for middle distillates.

Greek shipowners shipped 50% of Russia’s refined products (mostly diesel) in January and 16% of all Russian crude, based on analysis using data from Windward and Vortexa. 

As oil prices have spiked, the cost of Urals, the Russian grade loaded from Baltic and Black Sea ports, has reportedly risen from $40/bbl to $70/bbl, exceeding both the UK & EU cap of $44.10/bbl and the U.S. cap of $60/bbl. 

Private Greek owners have long kept their presence in this market, but will now likely be pushed out in the coming weeks.

This presents policy and market dilemmas. Russian refined products are primarily shipped to South American and African countries, relying on a mix of sanctioned, dark fleet tonnage, Asian ships, and Greek-owned tankers. Who will step in to replace those EU-owned tankers that did 50% of the business is unclear. 

Medium-range charter rates are already surging, setting fresh records daily. Rates to ship from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean exceeded $108,000 per day according to weekend shipbroker reports, while rates to northwest Europe from the U.S. Gulf were over $110,000 per day.

There are some 75 MR tankers stranded in the Middle East Gulf out of a total trading fleet of about 2,500.

While higher crude prices will benefit Putin, the Kremlin faces reduced availability and record-high freight costs as Asian buyers scramble for replacement crude.

With diesel prices rising sharply, the Indian market is largely closed to the EU after a ban on refined products derived from Russian crude took effect in January as part of the 18th sanctions package. This will further constrain supply options. 

The Trickle of Hormuz Transits  

At least 18 vessels that have been tracked undertaking Hormuz transits from March 2 with their AIS on. Traffic has plunged to a trickle from the daily average of about 138 ships, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center.

Two vessels (Safeen Prestige and Mussafah 2) were attacked in the Strait; the latter was a tug providing services to the containership after it was struck. Eight seafarers on the tug were killed.

17% (3/18) of vessels were sanctioned, operating through UAE fronts (2 vessels) or Iranian entities (1 vessel). All 3 transited during the peak crisis (Mar 2-7), with one vessel  – the U.S.-sanctioned, falsely flagged Blooming Dale (12,000 dwt) – sailing through the Strait to Bandar Abbas, Iran.

Windward analysis categorized the vessels that continued transiting the Strait during the conflict according to compliance risk levels:

• 3 sanctioned vessels (17%) were classified as compliance level 3.
• 5 high-risk vessels (28%) were classified as compliance level 2.
• 2 medium-risk vessels (11%) wereclassified as compliance level 1.
• 8 low-risk vessels (44%) were classified as compliance level 0.

44% of vessels carried elevated compliance risk (levels 2-3), indicating these were not typical risk-averse commercial operators. The sanctioned and high-risk vessels had nothing to lose, while the low-risk vessels served regional energy necessity.

One low-risk vessel, Liberian-flagged Al Watan (IMO 9615030), is a handymax bulk carrier operated by ADNOC Logistics & Services (UAE national oil company).

Two were Chinese-owned, including the low-risk vessel, KSL Hengyang, which broadcast “CHINA OWNER&CREW” via AIS, to emphasise its Chinese ownership and lack of Western affiliation.

Who Continued Through the Strait

Cohort 1: Shadow Fleet (3 Sanctioned, 17%)

These vessels had little to lose, as they were already operating under sanctions.

• They were already blacklisted and cut off from Western finance and insurance.
• Two operated through UAE front companies, while one was tied directly to Iranian ownership.

Cohort 2: High-Risk Iran Program Participants (5 High-Risk, 28%)

These vessels remain committed to Iran-connected trade and appear to have calculated that the IRGC would allow passage.

• They were not yet sanctioned but had already been flagged for compliance violations.
• Four were UAE-operated, and one was Marshall Islands-operated.
• They were likely serving Iranian crude and product distribution networks.

Cohort 3: Regional Energy Necessity (2 Medium-Risk & 5 Low-Risk, 39%)

These were regional operators with critical energy infrastructure dependencies.

Key Vessels:

• AL WATAN (ADNOC L&S) is operated by the UAE national oil company and could not realistically halt service. 
• PUFFIN TWO made 47 Jebel Ali port calls between February and March, indicating its role as a critical UAE-Gulf feeder.
• SSF LEO and SSF VALENCE, both managed by GFS Ship Management (UAE), appear to be serving as regional container feeders. 
• VICTORIA is operated by a Turkish company serving the UAE through Mina Saqr.
• SINO OCEAN and KSL HENGYANG are Chinese-operated vessels that may have received preferential passage.

Westbound Dark Transit

Five vessels transited westbound through the Strait within the first three days of the crisis with their AIS off.

These vessels were already in transit or committed to transit when Operation Epic Fury struck on February 28. They appear to represent vessels caught mid-voyage. Most were established operators, including a private Greek company and Chinese state-linked owners, with existing cargo commitments.

The post GPS Jamming Rises 55% in a Week in the Middle East Gulf appeared first on Windward.

• Operation Epic Fury triggered immediate disruption across maritime chokepoints in the Gulf.
• Commercial tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz collapsed as strikes, threats, and insurance withdrawal drove operators out of the corridor.
• At least eight commercial vessels have been struck since the start of the conflict across the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and nearby waters, including a missile incident near Khasab involving a salvage tug.
• More than 1,100 vessels experienced GPS and AIS interference, degrading navigational reliability across the region.
• Cape of Good Hope diversion traffic surged as operators rerouted around Gulf transit routes while Red Sea and Suez activity fluctuated.
• Port disruption indicators began rising across major Gulf hubs, including Jebel Ali and Khalifa.
• Energy markets began showing supply stress as Gulf oil cargo departures dropped sharply and shadow fleet activity continued, including a semi-dark STS transfer by the sanctioned tanker M/V TRUST.
• The maritime conflict expanded geographically after a U.S. submarine sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena near Sri Lanka, extending risk into the Indian Ocean and exposing major importers such as India to supply disruption.

The First Week of the Iran War at Sea

On February 28 at 01:15 ET, the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iranian military targets under Operation Epic Fury, marking the start of the current conflict. 

The operation targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command facilities, missile and drone launch sites, air defense systems, and military airfields, while also aiming to degrade elements of Iran’s missile infrastructure and nuclear development network. The strikes were framed by U.S. and Israeli officials as an effort to eliminate immediate threats to regional security and prevent Iran from advancing toward a nuclear weapons capability.

Within hours, Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks across the region. Targets included U.S. military bases and allied facilities in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states, while air raid sirens sounded in Israel as Iranian projectiles targeted Israeli territory. The escalation rapidly expanded the conflict beyond bilateral confrontation. Hezbollah entered the fighting soon after, launching rockets and drones toward Israel, while Israeli forces responded with strikes against Hezbollah-linked positions in Lebanon. 

For maritime operators, the immediate consequence was the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding Gulf shipping lanes into an active conflict environment.

Within hours, vessel behavior began to change.

Tankers and LNG carriers paused voyages or reversed course before entering the Strait, while routing decisions, vessel visibility, and navigational reliability across the region began shifting sharply.

Seven days later, the maritime operating picture reflects a system under sustained stress: collapsing transit volumes through Hormuz, vessel strikes across multiple maritime zones, electronic interference affecting navigation systems, and global shipping flows adjusting in real time.

Hormuz Traffic Collapses

In the days following the initial strikes, commercial behavior in the Strait of Hormuz shifted rapidly.

Early on, tankers and LNG carriers began pausing voyages or reversing course before entering the Strait. Western-linked vessels were disproportionately represented among these deviations, reflecting immediate reassessment of transit risk.

Within 48 hours, tanker traffic had effectively halted, with hundreds of vessels holding position in the Gulf of Oman or drifting outside the Strait awaiting further clarity.

By March 2, only seven vessels crossed the corridor, dramatically below the typical daily average of roughly 70–80 crossings. That same day, senior officials from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that vessels attempting to transit the Strait could be targeted, reinforcing earlier declarations that the corridor would be closed in response to U.S. and Israeli strikes.

Traffic fell even further over the following days. On March 3, only four vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, followed by five crossings on March 4, keeping volumes dramatically below typical daily levels. By March 5, transit activity remained extremely limited, confirming that routine commercial movement through the corridor had effectively collapsed.

These extremely low transit numbers reflect a combination of factors, including IRGC threats against vessels attempting transit, direct vessel strikes in regional waters, the withdrawal of war-risk insurance coverage, and a broader collapse in commercial confidence in safe passage through the corridor.

Although the Strait has not formally closed, the result has been a functional shutdown of routine tanker traffic.

Missile Strike Near Khasab

On March 5, a tug operating approximately 18 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, was reportedly struck by two missiles while attempting to tow an abandoned merchant vessel that had previously been hit. The merchant vessel had been adrift following an earlier strike and abandoned by its crew. The status of the tug and its crew has not yet been confirmed.

UKMTO subsequently advised merchant vessels not to transit the Strait of Hormuz, recommending that vessels within the Gulf designate a Safe Muster Point and seek shelter if air raid sirens are activated.

This incident reinforces the continued kinetic threat to vessels operating near the Strait of Hormuz approaches, including vessels engaged in salvage or recovery operations.

Insurance Market Reaction Accelerated the Collapse

The insurance market’s response further accelerated the halt in traffic.

Following the strikes, many protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs — which cover third-party liabilities for roughly 90% of the global merchant fleet — issued 72-hour notices cancelling certain war-risk extensions for vessels trading in the Middle East after reinsurers withdrew support for those risks.

These extensions cover liabilities arising from war-related incidents and sit alongside separate hull war-risk policies that insure physical damage to vessels.

At the same time, the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee expanded its list of high-risk waters across the Gulf. Additional voyage premiums reportedly rose from around 0.2% of vessel value to as much as 1%.

Without adequate war-risk cover, vessels cannot be chartered or financed, effectively preventing voyages from proceeding even if the waterway remains physically open.

Vessel Strikes Spread Across the Region

Commercial shipping quickly became exposed to kinetic risk.

Within the first days of escalation, several vessels were reportedly struck across the Gulf and Gulf of Oman, including:

• MKD Vyom (IMO 9284386): Crude tanker struck off Oman.
• Skylight (IMO 9330020): Sanctioned chemical tanker hit during regional military activity.
• Hercules Star (IMO 9916135): Tanker struck near the UAE.
• Sea La Donna (IMO 9380532): Incident associated with GPS spoofing indicators.

The pattern expanded further over the following days. Additional confirmed incidents include:

• Stena Imperative (IMO 9666077): U.S.-flagged tanker struck while moored in Bahrain.
• Athe Nova (IMO 9188116): Vessel hit near Khor Fakkan.
• Ocean Electra (IMO 9402782): Strike reported in regional waters.
• Safeen Prestige (IMO 9593517): Additional confirmed vessel incident.
• Sonangol Namibe (IMO 9325049): Crude tanker struck by an explosion, while anchored southeast of Kuwait, triggering a cargo tank breach and oil leak.

These incidents now form a broad geographic arc across the maritime environment rather than clustering around a single chokepoint. The distribution suggests a strategy designed to create widespread disruption across the regional shipping environment rather than targeting specific national affiliations.

GPS Jamming and AIS Disruption Spread Across the Gulf

At the same time, the electronic environment around Gulf shipping lanes degraded sharply.

Windward detected more than 1,100 vessels affected by GPS and AIS interference within the first 24 hours following the launch of Operation Epic Fury.

AIS signals were falsely projected onto UAE airports, over the Barakah nuclear facility, into inland locations inside Iran, and into circular “crop-pattern” distortions across Gulf waters.

Windward also identified at least 35 jamming clusters between February 28 and March 2.

Two distinct interference patterns emerged when examining the GPS jamming landscape:

• Denial zones: Areas where AIS transmissions are not received despite vessels likely operating normally.
• Injected signal zones: Locations where AIS signals are manipulated, causing vessels to appear in incorrect positions, sometimes even on land.

A March 4 analysis identified 44 injected signal zones and 92 denial areas across the Persian Gulf.

These disruptions complicate both navigation and compliance monitoring, increasing reliance on multi-source intelligence methods to reconstruct accurate vessel positioning.

Multi-Source Intelligence Reveals the Reality Behind AIS Jamming

A recent example illustrates why jamming environments demand a multi-source intelligence approach.

Two Windward visualizations from the same area near Port Khalid in Sharjah on March 3 highlight the difference between AIS signals and physical vessel presence.

The regional heat map of GPS interference shows the jamming landscape across the Gulf. 

Red hexagons represent injection zones, where manipulated signals cause vessels to broadcast incorrect positions. Yellow hexagons represent denial zones, where AIS transmissions disappear entirely.

This next visualization, based on synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite imagery, captures the same area at the same time.

In injection zones, SAR detects far fewer vessels at the AIS-reported coordinates, confirming that manipulated GPS signals are placing ships on the map where they physically are not. In denial zones, SAR detects vessels that transmit no AIS signal at all. The ships are physically present but invisible to anyone relying on AIS alone.

The example illustrates a critical operational reality: in jamming-affected environments, AIS data still provides valuable signals about interference patterns. What AIS cannot reliably provide is the true physical location of vessels.

Alternative data sources — including SAR imagery, RF detection, and behavioral analytics — are required to reconstruct ground truth when electronic interference degrades conventional vessel tracking.

Red Sea and Suez Traffic Become Unstable

While Hormuz traffic collapsed, other corridors also experienced volatility.

Bab el-Mandeb

Traffic initially dropped to extremely low levels, with only two crossings recorded on March 3. Activity rebounded the following day, with 21 crossings on March 4, representing a dramatic increase relative to the recent weekly average.

By March 5, traffic through the corridor remained above recent baseline levels, suggesting temporary corridor utilization and repositioning movements across the Red Sea approach, even as the security environment remains unstable.

Bulk carriers accounted for the largest share of movements during the surge, followed by general cargo vessels and vehicle carriers.

However, continued Houthi threats across the Red Sea region mean the stability of traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb corridor remains uncertain.

Suez Canal

Suez Canal activity moved in the opposite direction.

Traffic surged to 49 crossings on March 3, before falling sharply to 23 crossings on March 4, well below the seven-day average.

By March 5, throughput remained below typical baseline levels, reinforcing the uneven redistribution of global shipping flows as operators adjust routing strategies across multiple maritime chokepoints.

These fluctuations highlight how global trade lanes are responding dynamically to the conflict environment, with operators balancing the risks of Red Sea transit, Gulf exposure, and long-haul diversions around southern Africa.

Global Rerouting Around the Cape of Good Hope

One of the clearest structural shifts has been the rise in Cape of Good Hope diversion traffic.

On March 3, a total of 94 vessels transited around southern Africa, far above recent averages. Traffic remained elevated the following day with 87 transits on March 4, reinforcing the sustained rerouting of global shipping away from Gulf transit routes.

By March 5, diversion traffic remained broadly in line with these elevated levels, confirming that many operators continue to commit to long-haul rerouting strategies as uncertainty around Gulf transit persists.

Bulk carriers and container vessels dominated these movements, reflecting mainstream commercial operators adjusting voyage plans rather than shadow fleet activity.

Wet Cargo Flows Reveal Emerging Energy Market Shock

Beyond vessel movements and chokepoint disruption, cargo-level data also points to growing stress across global energy markets.

Since the launch of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, tanker activity across the Arabian Gulf has dropped sharply. Windward tracked 314 tankers above 16,000 DWT operating in the Gulf during the six days following the strikes, compared with 442 tankers during the six days prior, highlighting a significant contraction in regional tanker activity.

Cargo export volumes show a similar pattern. Gulf oil cargo departures fell to 8.4 million barrels per day on March 6, marking the lowest level of the week and a sharp contraction from volumes above 30 million barrels per day at the start of the period.

The decline was driven primarily by a complete halt in Iraqi exports, alongside significant reductions from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, while only modest volumes from the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar provided limited offset.

The total sits dramatically below the ~30.2 million barrels per day seasonal 12-month baseline, highlighting the scale of the disruption now affecting regional export flows.

At first glance, crude flows still appear active. Large cargoes continue loading from the Middle East Gulf, including the PLATA CARRIER lifting roughly 1.94 million barrels chartered by Indian Oil and the AL YARMOUK loading more than 2.16 million barrels of Kuwait Export crude.

However, operators are increasingly relying on ship-to-ship transfer hubs such as the Dubai STS zone to move cargo through fragmented supply chains rather than exposing large tankers to high-risk transit routes.

At the same time, refined product and gas flows appear increasingly fragile. Cargoes currently on the water were largely loaded before the conflict began, while early-March departures from Ras Laffan LPG and condensate terminals may represent some of the final shipments before production disruptions begin to affect supply.

Venezuela Export Patterns Reflect Structural Market Stress

Outside the Gulf region, tanker activity linked to Venezuelan exports also shows signs of contraction.

AIS-verified tanker voyages within the Venezuelan EEZ have been declining following two major geopolitical shocks.

• Pre-blockade baseline (March–Dec 15, 2025): ~32.18 verified voyages per week.
• U.S. maritime blockade (Dec 16, 2025): activity fell to 15.70 voyages per week, a 51% reduction as legitimate tonnage exited the EEZ.
• Post-February 28 Iran war: activity dropped further to 10.50 voyages per week.

This represents a 67% decline from the 2025 baseline, indicating that legitimate international tanker participation in Venezuelan exports has sharply contracted.

At the same time, dark fleet participation increased slightly, rising from 1.04 to 1.17 voyages per week following the outbreak of the Iran conflict. This AIS-based analysis likely underrepresents actual dark-fleet activity, as vessels engaged in sanctioned oil trades frequently employ non-transmitting practices such as AIS shutdowns or spoofing.

Verified Venezuelan cargo destinations have also shifted geographically since February 28. Rather than long-haul shipments toward Asia, most visible voyages are now concentrated within Latin America and the Caribbean, including Brazil (Itaqui), Colombia (Covenas), and Panama.

Some dark fleet vessels are increasingly using Colon and Cristobal in Panama as transit points, likely enabling Panama Canal passage while bypassing the now-volatile Middle Eastern chokepoints.

Satellite Imagery Shows Stable Vessel Presence at José Terminal

Satellite imagery analysis provides additional insight into how these changes are unfolding on the ground.

Remote Sensing Intelligence analysis comparing imagery from January 28, 2026 (pre-conflict) and March 3, 2026 (post-conflict) indicates no meaningful change in tanker presence at Venezuela’s José Terminal, the country’s primary crude export hub.

The comparison highlights an important operational distinction. While AIS-verified trade volumes are declining and legitimate tanker participation is falling, physical vessel presence at key export terminals can remain stable due to dark-fleet activity and non-transmitting vessels.

Taken together, these signals indicate that verified trade visibility may fall faster than actual cargo movements, as sanctioned supply chains increasingly rely on opaque maritime logistics.

Shadow Fleet Activity Exploits the Conflict

On March 3, 2026, the Russian-flagged crude tanker M/V TRUST, a known component of the Russian shadow fleet, executed a high-probability semi-dark ship-to-ship transfer of approximately 325,500 barrels of Russian crude in the Gulf of Oman.

The vessel had loaded at Ust-Luga 38 days earlier and was already sanctioned across 10 lists in 8 jurisdictions, including OFAC, the UK, and the EU. Following evasive routing and multiple declared destination changes, the vessel anchored in Omani territorial waters at 09:02 UTC and conducted a stationary semi-dark transfer with a similarly sized non-transmitting vessel.

This event appears to reflect direct exploitation of the conflict environment. The vessel used the maritime noise and diverted Western surveillance created by the U.S.-Iranian escalation to mask a sanctions-evasion operation, demonstrating how shadow fleet actors can weaponize regional kinetic conflict to sustain illicit energy flows.

India’s Energy Exposure Deepens

India is emerging as one of the most exposed major importers under the current Gulf disruption scenario.

As of March 6, 15 LNG tankers were reporting India as their destination. Of these, two were already within Indian waters, two were due within two to three days from Oman and South Korea, three were stuck in the Arabian Gulf, seven were en route from the Americas and Africa with ETAs of two weeks to one month, and one was in China with a long-term ETA in June. One South Korean vessel reportedly executed a U-turn in Omani waters, likely linked to recent strikes affecting Omani ports.

Against that backdrop, the United States granted India a 30-day waiver to purchase stranded Russian oil in order to stabilize supply, reflecting growing concern over India’s reliance on Hormuz-linked energy flows.

India’s Supply Chain Pressure Is Uneven

Windward data suggests that India’s exposure is increasingly uneven across fuels.

For crude oil, approximately 10.4 million barrels are currently in transit to India across 57 tankers, with 22 already operating in Indian waters and six more expected within the next 72 hours. India’s estimated 25-day Strategic Petroleum Reserve provides a short-term buffer, although replacement supply is increasingly shifting toward long-haul cargoes from the Americas and Africa.

For LNG, the supply chain appears significantly more fragile. Of the 15 LNG tankers reporting India as their destination, only four are expected within the next several days. Three remain trapped in the Arabian Gulf, while seven others from the Americas and Africa are two to four weeks away, leaving a near-term gap that could affect power generation and fertilizer production.

For LPG, the structural risk appears most immediate. While 35 of 49 LPG tankers destined for India are already operating in Indian waters, providing a temporary floating buffer, departures from Gulf export terminals fell from 824,487 barrels on February 28 to zero on March 5, indicating a potential collapse in the inbound pipeline if disruption persists.

Infrastructure Incidents Expand Maritime Risk

The conflict has also affected maritime infrastructure and port environments.

Fujairah

A fire broke out at the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone after UAE air defenses intercepted a drone, and falling debris struck a storage tank.

At the time of the incident, 116 vessels were present in the surrounding anchorage, including product tankers, crude tankers, and supply vessels.

The event highlighted the vulnerability of dense tanker anchorages to spillover from regional military activity.

Bahrain BAPCO Refinery

On March 5, Bahrain’s BAPCO oil refinery was struck during an Iranian missile attack targeting regional energy infrastructure. The strike triggered large fires visible across the refinery complex and forced emergency response teams to contain the blaze.

BAPCO is one of Bahrain’s primary refining facilities and a critical node in the Gulf’s refined products supply chain. Although the strike occurred onshore, the incident underscores the growing exposure of maritime-linked energy infrastructure across the region.

Refineries, export terminals, and storage facilities remain tightly connected to tanker traffic across the Gulf, meaning attacks on energy infrastructure can quickly propagate into maritime logistics disruptions.

Port of Duqm

Earlier strikes damaged dry-dock infrastructure and triggered fires near the container terminal at the Port of Duqm in Oman.

Fourteen vessels were present in the port during the incident.

These attacks demonstrate that maritime risk now extends beyond transit corridors into logistics hubs and export infrastructure.

Indian Ocean Escalation

The maritime conflict expanded beyond the Middle East when the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena was struck approximately 40 nautical miles south of Sri Lanka.

A U.S. submarine reportedly torpedoed and sank the vessel while it was transiting international waters after participating in a multinational naval exercise in India.

Sri Lankan naval forces launched a search-and-rescue operation, recovering survivors and conducting ongoing recovery operations.

The strike represents a significant geographic escalation, extending the maritime security implications of the conflict into the Indian Ocean theater.

U.S. Operations Against Iranian Naval Assets

U.S. military operations continue to expand against Iranian maritime and missile infrastructure.

According to the latest CENTCOM update, U.S. forces reported that they “control the skies” and have intensified operations against Iranian mobile missile launchers and naval assets. The IRIS Shahid Bagheri, previously struck at the beginning of the war, was reported on fire again as offensive operations entered day seven.

CENTCOM also stated that more than 30 Iranian warships have now been sunk or destroyed and that nearly 200 targets inside Iran were struck in the latest wave of attacks, including missile, drone, and command infrastructure. Iranian ballistic missile attacks were reported down 90%, and drone strikes down 83%, though CENTCOM emphasized that the threat environment remains active.

These developments matter for maritime markets because they suggest Iran may be husbanding resources and adapting its strike posture rather than exhausting capabilities early. That increases uncertainty around the duration and pattern of maritime disruption.

Port Disruption Emerging Across Gulf Hubs

Operational disruptions are now appearing in major regional ports.

At Jebel Ali, the following exception indicators were recorded:

• 18 late departures.
• 5 port-of-loading rollovers.
• 9 transshipment rollovers.
• 32 transshipment-delay cases.

At Khalifa Port, disruption rose even more sharply:

• 14 late departures (1,300% increase day-on-day).
• 14 port-of-loading rollovers.
• 6 transshipment rollovers.
• 11 transshipment delays.

These patterns suggest that chokepoint disruption is now propagating into regional logistics networks, affecting cargo flows beyond the immediate conflict zone.

Outlook

One week into the Iran war, the maritime operating environment is characterized by multi-layer disruption.

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz has effectively collapsed, forcing rerouting. Vessel strikes have occurred across multiple maritime zones, while electronic interference continues to degrade navigational reliability.

At the same time, congestion indicators are emerging across Gulf ports, and global shipping patterns are adjusting to sustained uncertainty around Gulf transit.

Absent rapid de-escalation, maritime risk across the region remains elevated.

The post One Week Into the Iran War: A Maritime Intelligence Breakdown appeared first on Windward.