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I'll reopen it tomorrow. |
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Reopen after activation of kernel 6.2 this morning |
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(after recreating the branch) |
| ## Etherlink 6.2 | ||
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| The Etherlink 6.2 upgrade went through the fast kernel governance process and fixed 4 vulnerabilities detected by an internal audit in 6.1: | ||
| - It disallows the deposit of FA tokens via the Tezos FA token bridge directly in an EOA account (including smart accounts), to avoid a vulnerability in the FA token bridge Etherlink precompile. Any ERC-20 proxy contract used as a destination must now be a smart contract (the only pattern described in the documentation). |
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Did I understand well that the solution in 6.2 was to just forbid EOA accounts as destinations?
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By seeing the post-mortem analysis, I guess I was wrong. Now I think that in 6.2 it's still valid to send an FA token to an EOA, but the logic of the withdrawal has been fixed to avoid stealing the token, right?
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This is not exactly correct:
It fixes a vulnerability in the FA token bridge where anyone could withdraw FA tickets owned by an EOA, because the proxy authorization was a no-op on addresses with no code. The fix requires msg.sender == ticketOwner when the ticket owner is a wallet (EOA or EIP-7702 smart account).
| - It disallows the deposit of FA tokens via the Tezos FA token bridge directly in an EOA account (including smart accounts), to avoid a vulnerability in the FA token bridge Etherlink precompile. Any ERC-20 proxy contract used as a destination must now be a smart contract (the only pattern described in the documentation). | |
| - Fix a vulnerability in the FA token bridge allowing unauthorized withdrawal of FA tickets from EOA or EIP-7702 accounts. |
| The Etherlink 6.2 upgrade went through the fast kernel governance process and fixed 4 vulnerabilities detected by an internal audit in 6.1: | ||
| - It disallows the deposit of FA tokens via the Tezos FA token bridge directly in an EOA account (including smart accounts), to avoid a vulnerability in the FA token bridge Etherlink precompile. Any ERC-20 proxy contract used as a destination must now be a smart contract (the only pattern described in the documentation). | ||
| - It fixes a flaw in how transaction fees are accounted, that could allow an attacker to build a DoS of the block production process with no cost to the attacker. | ||
| - It fixes a flaw in the Tezos XTZ bridge that could cause a kernel panic when providing an empty L2 destination address. |
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The fix guards against "empty
deposit info" (the entire deposit structure), not specifically an "empty L2 destination address." The scope of the guard is broader than described.
| ## Etherlink 6.2 | ||
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| The Etherlink 6.2 upgrade went through the fast kernel governance process and fixed 4 vulnerabilities detected by an internal audit in 6.1: | ||
| - It disallows the deposit of FA tokens via the Tezos FA token bridge directly in an EOA account (including smart accounts), to avoid a vulnerability in the FA token bridge Etherlink precompile. Any ERC-20 proxy contract used as a destination must now be a smart contract (the only pattern described in the documentation). |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This is not exactly correct:
It fixes a vulnerability in the FA token bridge where anyone could withdraw FA tickets owned by an EOA, because the proxy authorization was a no-op on addresses with no code. The fix requires msg.sender == ticketOwner when the ticket owner is a wallet (EOA or EIP-7702 smart account).
| - It disallows the deposit of FA tokens via the Tezos FA token bridge directly in an EOA account (including smart accounts), to avoid a vulnerability in the FA token bridge Etherlink precompile. Any ERC-20 proxy contract used as a destination must now be a smart contract (the only pattern described in the documentation). | |
| - Fix a vulnerability in the FA token bridge allowing unauthorized withdrawal of FA tickets from EOA or EIP-7702 accounts. |
This PR updates the documentation according to the 6.2 fast kernel upgrade that happenned on 24/3/2026 (see https://governance.etherlink.com/governance/fast)
NB: Text to be finalized after the activation of the new kernel.