Objetivo: Este es último curso de la serie de política comparada del programa de ciencia política. El primero cubrió las explicaciones estructurales de la política y el segundo las institucionales. El hilo conductor del tercer curso será la representación democrática en perspectiva comparada. Haremos hincapié en varios de los procesos de la representación, como la distinción de los aspectos sustanciales y simbólicos, el papel de las elecciones periódicas y la ambición política, el factor que juegan las reglas electorales y los partidos.

Horas de oficina: Martes y jueves de 17:30 a 18:30, o con cita.

Evaluación: Habrá un examen parcial y otro final. En su momento anunciaré el formato. A priori, cada uno contará 40% de la calificación final y el 20% restante valorará la participación en clase y la impresión general que deje en su profesor.

Notas: (1) La página del curso es http://ericmagar.com/clases/pc3/. Alberga este temario y las lecturas. (2) El temario sufrirá modificaciones marginales en el transcurso del semestre para quitar, añadir o cambiar la secuencia de algunos temas. Anunciaré esto en clase. (3) Coordinaré reposición de clases faltantes más adelante.

No habrá clases

• 2018-10-30 mar y 2018-11-02 jue (Muertos)

Última clase

• 2018-12-06

• Holland (1986) "Statistics and causal inference" 16 pp.
• Scientific Method (2015) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Lijphart (1971) "Comparative politics and the comparative method" (opcional) 12 pp.

• Pitkin (2004) "Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance" 8 pp.
• Urbinati (2000) "Representation as Advocacy" 22 pp.

• Kiewiet y McCubbins (1991) The Logic of Delegation,
  • cap. 2 "Delegation and agency problems" 17 pp.
• McCubbins y Schwartz (1984) "Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols vs. fire alarms" 15 pp.
• Raustiala (2004) "Police patrols and fire alarms in the NAAEC" 25 pp.

• Nanetti y Leonardi (2015) en Hancock

  • cap 4.1 The context of Italian politics 21 pp.
  • cap 4.2 Where is the power? 22 pp.
  • cap 4.3 Who has the power? 54 pp.
  • cap 4.4 How is power used? 20 pp.
  • cap 4.5 What is the future of Italian politcs 16 pp.

• Achen y Bartels (2016) Democracy for Realists

  • cap 1 Democratic idels and realities 20 pp.
  • cap 4 A rational God of vengeance and of reward? The logic of retrospective accountability 25 pp.
  • cap 5 Blind retrospection: electoral responses to droughts, floods, and shark attacks 29 pp. <–
  • cap 7 A chicken in every pot: ideology and retrospection in the Great Depression 36 pp.
  • cap 8 The very bases of reasons: groups, social identities, and political psychology 18 pp.
  • cap 10 It feels like we're thinking: the rationalizing voter 29 pp. <–

• Algo sobre revueltas, rational peasant?

• Colapso del sistema de partidos

  • Walter Dean Burnham?
  • Colapso Liberales UK?
  • Plot poll-of-polls italiano
  • Italy review Economist?

• Duverger (1951) Los partidos políticos,
  • cap. 1 El dualismo de los partidos 49 pp.
• Bogdanor
• Riker
• Cox, Making Votes Count
  • cap. 2 Duverger's propositions 21 pp.
  • cap. 3 On electoral systems 32 pp.
  • cap. 4 Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems 29 pp.
  • cap. 5 Strategic voting in multimember systems 24 pp.
  • cap. 7 Some concluding comments on strategic voting 10 pp.
  • cap. 8 Strategic voting, party labels, and entry 24 pp.
  • cap. 9 Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: Evidence from Japan 6 pp.

• Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974), pp. 18-29.
• Cain, Ferejohn y Fiorina, The personal vote
  • Introduction 24 pp.
  • cap. 1 Member visibility and member images 23 pp.
  • cap. 5 Unravelling a paradox 14 pp.
• Micozzi (2014) From House to Home: Strategic Bill Drafting with Non-Static Ambition.
• Merino, Fierro, Zarkin (2013) Por qué la reelección sirve y por qué no servirá en México
• Zaller (1998) Politicians as Prize Fighters: Electoral Selection and Incumbency Advantage.
• Magar y Moreno (2018) Reelección en Coahuila.
• Kerevel (2015) Pork-Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress
• Carson y Engstrom (2005) Assessing the Electoral Connection in the Early United States.

• Smith (2017) Dynasties and Democracy
  • cap. 1 Introduction 27 pp.
  • cap. 2 Japan into comparative perspective 20 pp.
  • cap. 3 Theory of dynastic candidate selection 34 pp.
  • cap. 4 Selection 50 pp.
  • cap. 5 Inherited incumbency advantage 25 pp.

• Bhavnani (2009) "Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India" 13 pp.
• Schwindt-Bayer (2010) Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America's Legislatures
  • cap. 1 Introduction A theory of women's political representation 37 pp.
  • cap. 3 Preferences and priorities 19 pp.
  • cap. 4 Making policy 22 pp.
• Piscopo

• Cox (1987) The Efficient Secret.
• Krehbiel (1993) "Where's the party"
• Cox y McCubbins (1993) Legislative Leviathan,
  • Introduction, 15 pp.
  • cap. 3 "Subgovernments and the representativeness of committees" 21 pp.
  • cap. 5 "A theory of legislative parties" 30 pp.
  • cap. 8 "Contingents and parties" 42 pp.
• Cox y McCubbins (1995) "Bonding, structure, and the stability of parties" 17 pp.
• Cox y Magar (1999) "How Much is Majority Status in US Congress Worth?" 12 pp.
• DenHartog and Monroe (2010) Parties in the Senate.
• Jones y Hwang (2005) "Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory beyond the U.S. Congress" 16 pp.

• Lujambio y Vives (2008) "From politics to technicalities: Mexican redistricting" 12 pp.
• McDonald (2008) "United States redistricting: comparative look at the 50 states" 18 pp.
• Johnston, Pattie y Rossiter (2008) "Electoral distortion despite redistricting by independent commissions" 20 pp.
• Magar et al polGeo
• Engstrom Partisan gerrymandering

• Díaz Cayeros, Estévez y Magaloni (2009) "The Political Manipulation of Pronasol Transfers" 33 pp.
• Cox y McCubbins (1986) "Electoral politics as a redistributive game" 20 pp.
• Cox (2010) "Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics" 23 pp.
• Nichter (2008) "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot". American Political Science Review, 102(1):19–31, 2008

• Smith, The Wealth of Nations (extractos), pp. 33-43.
• Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," pp. 72-85.
• Alchian y Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," pp. 111-134.
• Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," pp. 196-208.

• Shepsle y Weingast, "Institutional foundations of committee power" (1987) 20 pp.
• Weingast y Marshall, "The industrial organization of Congress; or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets" (1988), 31 pp.
• Shepsle y Weingast, "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions," pp. 5-36.
• Hammond y Miller (1987) "The core of the constitution"
• Baron y Ferejohn (1989) "Bargaining in legislatures" 26 pp.
• Fiorina, "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," pp. 25-44.

• Power et al Brasil.
• Magar, Urgencia en Chile
• Magar, Urgencia en Brasil
• Cox y Morgenstern, Proactive reactive
• Magar y Moraes (2008) "Facciones y legislación en Uruguay".
• Palanza y Sin, veto.

• O'Donnell Delegative Democracy
• Carey y Shugart
• Amorim Neto en Brasil